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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE HOUSING MARKET 
 
BY 
 
PATRICK STOCKDALE SMITH 
 
JULY 14, 2016 
 
 
Committee Chair: Jon Wiley 
 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Real Estate 
 
Essay 1: Institutional Investment, Asset Illiquidity, and Post-Crash Housing Market Dynamics 
 
Abstract: I demonstrate that housing’s mildly segmented market structure adds an additional measure of 
asset illiquidity risk for owner-occupiers and their lenders by examining the effect of a house’s conversion 
from the owner-occupied market to the rental market. From 2012 to 2014, I find that owner-occupied 
houses that were purchased by institutional investors and converted to rentals after the real estate crisis sold 
for approximately 5% less than similar houses that sold to owner-occupiers. The large discount was in 
addition to REO, foreclosure, short sale, and cash purchase discounts which, when combined, highlight the 
low liquidation value for owner-occupied housing.   
 
 
Essay 2: Homeownership: An examination of its effect on house prices 
 
Abstract: Subsidizing homeownership is only justifiable if it increases homeownership attainment and 
creates external benefits that outweigh their costs. Using parcel-level panel data I isolate and examine the 
effect of homeownership on surrounding house prices. Homeownership has a causal effect on house prices, 
but substantial variation exists across quantiles. Changes in homeownership have a lesser (greater) effect on 
house prices in the upper (lower) deciles of the conditional house price distribution - despite the fact that 
households in the upper deciles are the primary beneficiaries of the federal tax subsidies for 
homeownership. 
 
 
Essay 3: School Quality, Latent Demand, and Bidding Wars for Houses 
 
Abstract: I examine the recent rise of bidding wars and their effectiveness relative to traditional listing 
strategies. A simple theoretical model predicts that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war will be 
most effective in housing markets with high levels of latent demand. I use school quality as a proxy for 
latent demand as households with children naturally want their kids to go to the best school possible. I posit 
that the limited supply of housing within high quality school districts creates latent demand for housing 
within those districts. Evidence from Atlanta supports the model - I find that underpricing a house to incite 
a bidding war is more effective in markets with latent demand. However, underpricing does not outperform 
traditional listing strategies. 
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Abstract 
 
I demonstrate that housing’s mildly segmented market structure adds an additional measure of 
asset illiquidity risk for owner-occupiers and their lenders by examining the effect of a house’s 
conversion from the owner-occupied market to the rental market. From 2012 to 2014, I find that 
owner-occupied houses that were purchased by institutional investors and converted to rentals 
after the real estate crisis sold for approximately 5% less than similar houses that sold to owner-
occupiers. The large discount was in addition to REO, foreclosure, short sale, and cash purchase 
discounts which, when combined, highlight the low liquidation value for owner-occupied 
housing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
          In the United States, there are two housing markets: owner-occupied and rental housing. 
Owner-occupied housing, by definition, must be a household’s primary residence to qualify for 
preferential tax treatment.
1
 Thus, owner-occupied housing is not only a consumption good but an 
investment as well. In contrast, rental housing is not purchased for personal consumption; it is 
viewed solely as an investment. The two housing markets are similar, in that, they provide 
housing services. However, comparisons of the two are difficult because of housing’s mildly 
segmented market structure.  
          Liu, Grissom and Hartzell (1990) show that single-family housing has a mildly segmented 
market structure.
2
 Housing is a mildly segmented market because while individuals can invest in 
both owner-occupied and rental housing, institutional investors can only invest in rental 
housing.
3
 For individuals, the segmented demand results in an additional measure of risk and 
hence a higher return for owner-occupied housing.
4
 Until recently, institutional investors have 
not invested in single-family houses arising in part from high transaction costs, lack of 
economies of scale (e.g. buying houses in bulk at a discount and property management issues), 
and perceived political implications.
5
 Adverse political implications include, but are not limited 
to, fear of government regulation and negative publicity regarding bidding wars with potential 
homeowners given the political focus on subsidizing homeownership. Additionally, buying too 
                                                            
1 Homeowners can deduct property tax and mortgage interest payments for their primary residence and a second 
home. However, the overwhelming majority (greater than 90%) of homeowners in the United States only own one 
personal residence. A detailed overview of owner-occupied and rental housing’s taxation is provided in Section 3. 
2 Liu, Grissom and Hartzell (1990) examine the impact of a mildly segmented housing market in a CAPM context. 
The authors segment the housing market into owner-occupied housing and income-producing real estate, but do not 
consider taxes in an effort to reduce their model’s complexity. 
3 Technically institutional investors can invest in owner-occupied housing in several ways. They can purchase 
owner-occupied houses and hold them as dealer (or investment) properties – in which case they cannot depreciate 
the asset over time and do not benefit from owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment, so their return is 
tied directly to the house’s capital appreciation. Institutional investors can also purchase owner-occupied houses and 
convert them rentals – in which case they are no longer owner-occupied housing. Historically, institutional investors 
have not invested in the equity of owner-occupied housing and instead chose to lend equity to owner-occupiers. I 
discuss the mildly segmented housing market and its impact on institutional investment in owner-occupied housing 
in greater detail in Section 2. 
4Stein (1995) shows that an exogenous negative shock to owner-occupied house prices coupled with the market’s 
down-payment requirements can have self-reinforcing effects. I show that these self-reinforcing effects coupled with 
owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment, high transaction costs, and mildly segmented market structure 
can result in low liquidation values. 
5 Previous research on institutional trading focuses primarily on stock markets (see, for example, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Chan and Lakonishok, 1993). Institutional investors’ trading behavior is important 
because they often take large positions and their continued presence on one side of the market can significantly 
affect pricing dynamics (Keim and Madhavan, 1995). 
 
 
2 
 
many houses in a neighborhood could change quality of life dynamics. However, the financial 
crisis created a potential arbitrage opportunity for institutional investors to enter the single-
family housing market. House price declines, to levels which were significantly below their pre-
crisis levels, together with large scale delinquencies and defaults, an increase in demand for 
single-family rental homes arising from these foreclosures, and the tightening of the mortgage 
market created a large supply of available owner-occupied housing which made economies of 
scale possible. 
          The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the nature of the mildly segmented 
housing market given the recent entry by institutional investors. Ex-ante, as the single-family 
housing market becomes more integrated, the price of single-family homes should be bid up and 
returns should fall until no abnormal returns exist if the single-family housing market becomes 
fully integrated. However, segmentation might still exist due to, among other things, the 
preferential tax treatment associated with owner-occupied housing.  As such, I explore how the 
entry of institutional investors influenced house prices by comparing the pre- versus post-crisis 
period using characteristic and propensity score matched samples in a difference in difference 
framework. The price differential I find provides an estimate of the asset illiquidity risk inherent 
in the owner-occupied housing market that is a byproduct of the mildly segmented market 
structure and the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. I also find that although 
institutional investors entrance in the post-crisis period increased prices thereby reducing returns 
and lessening the degree of housing market segmentation and asset illiquidity risk, the premium 
associated with owner-occupied housing persists.  
          This study focuses on institutional investment in the Atlanta, Georgia metropolitan 
housing market. Atlanta is the ideal setting for this study as it was one of the markets heavily 
targeted by institutional investors (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2013; Mills, Milloy, and 
Zarutskie 2015). I identify eleven institutional investors that were active in Atlanta from 2012 to 
2014 – six of which were private equity firms and five of which were publicly traded 
companies.
6
 The institutional investors that I identify are large “informed” financial entities that 
entered the Atlanta housing market, purchased single-family detached houses, and converted the 
houses to rentals during the post-crisis period. The institutional investors’ large cash reserves and 
access to capital give them an advantage over investors that require mortgage financing in the 
                                                            
6 A detailed overview of the eleven institutional investors is available in Appendix A. 
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housing market – especially during times of economy-wide distress. In my model, institutional 
investors substitute their investments in rental housing with investments in owner-occupied 
housing. However, when institutional investors purchase owner-occupied housing they convert it 
to rental housing for the short-term, as they cannot consume its services and can only invest in 
income-producing real estate. Although housing stock is generally considered perfectly inelastic 
to downward demand shocks, I show that the housing market’s mildly segmented market 
structure allows owner-occupied housing to be redeployed as rental housing. In doing so, I 
illustrate the impact the mildly segmented market structure has on owner-occupied housing’s 
asset illiquidity and the two housing markets’ risk-return equilibrium condition.  
          The next section of this paper details housing’s mildly segmented market structure. 
Section 3 provides an overview of owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment. Section 
4 applies Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) asset liquidity framework to the owner-occupied housing 
market. Section 5 presents a model of post-crash housing market dynamics, Section 6 provides 
an overview of the data, Section 7 presents the empirical methodology and results, and Section 8 
concludes. 
2. Mildly Segmented Market Structure 
          There are several factors that contribute to housing’s mildly segmented market structure 
including its (1) preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, (2) dual role as a 
consumption and investment good, (3) heterogeneous housing stock, (4) differing economies of 
scale, and (5) illiquidity. 
          The United States government heavily subsidizes and promotes homeownership by 
providing preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. Owner-occupiers benefit from 
the tax exemption of their implicit rental income and the exclusion of capital gains from the sale 
of their house. They can also deduct their mortgage interest, mortgage insurance premium, and 
property tax payments when filing their federal income taxes. The preferential tax treatment 
promotes homeownership, increases owner-occupier’s consumption demand, and results in 
higher house prices. In essence, preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing increases 
owner-occupied house prices to a level that is prohibitively high for institutional investors, 
thereby restricting them from entering the market.
7
 
                                                            
7 This is similar to the notion of restricted marketability presented in Errunza and Losq’s (1985) International 
Pricing Model under Mild Segmentation. Errunza and Losq argue that U.S. investors trade primarily in domestic 
 
 
4 
 
          Housing has a dual role as both a consumption and investment good. The majority of 
owner-occupiers satisfy their consumption and investment demand for housing by owning only 
their primary residence without relying on the rental market to disentangle the two. Several 
studies show that owner-occupier’s optimal level of housing as a consumption good often differs 
from its optimal level as an investment good (Henderson and Ioannides 1983; Brueckner 1997; 
Flavin and Yamashita 2002). As a result, owner-occupied housing is often “overdetermined” in 
homeowner’s portfolios. The extent to which it is overdetermined is likely exacerbated by its 
preferential tax treatment.  
          Preferential tax treatment coupled with owner-occupied housing’s dual role as a 
consumption good results in a heterogeneous housing stock. Housing’s heterogeneous stock adds 
to the two markets’ degree of segmentation as owner-occupiers and institutional investors’ 
property type and size preferences differ according to their prevailing motives (consumption 
versus investment). The housing market’s stock can be split into three property types: single-
family detached, single-family attached, and multi-family housing. In theory, one could argue 
that the property types are interchangeable and perfect substitutes, as single-family attached and 
multi-family units are adaptive and can be redeployed (i.e. apartment buildings can be converted 
into condos and vice-versa), and owner-occupied single-family detached units can easily be 
converted into rentals. However, in reality, the motives of the housing market’s participants 
(consumption versus investment) result in different property type preferences that are not perfect 
substitutes. For example, single-family detached units are usually owner-occupied, while rental 
housing is more likely to be a part of a multi-family building.  
 Previous research on conversion activity in housing markets has focused on condo 
conversions. An increase in condo conversions - from rental housing to owner-occupied housing 
- has been tied to an increase in the number of households without children (Sternlieb and 
Hughes 1975), rent controls (Sternlieb and Hughes 1975; Werczberger 1988), barriers to 
ownership in the single-family market (Sternlieb and Hughes 1975), tax considerations 
(Whinihan 1984), reduced profitability in the rental market relative to the “for sale” market 
(Diskin and Tashchian 1984; Crone 1988; Benjamin et al. 2008; Wiley 2009), low interest rates 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
stocks because the cost of investing abroad is prohibitively high. I argue that institutional investors trade primarily in 
rental housing because, among other things, the cost of owner-occupied housing is prohibitively high due to its 
preferential tax treatment. Section 3 compares the tax code for owner-occupied and rental housing and examines its 
impact on house prices. 
 
 
5 
 
(Benjamin et al. 2008; Wiley 2009), and a growing demand for homeownership (Lea and 
Wasylenko 1983). The studies show that multi-family properties are valued differently in rental 
and owner-occupied housing markets over time and that the property owners maximized their 
return by converting rental housing to owner-occupied housing during boom periods. This study 
is similar, in that, I examine housing unit conversions. However, this study focuses on 
heterogeneous single-family detached houses that were converted from owner-occupied to 
rentals during the recent real estate crisis.  
Rental housing is more likely to be part of a multi-family building from an institutional 
investors’ perspective because they look to create economies of scale. Multi-family housing 
offers several advantages over single-family detached housing in this regard. Multi-family 
housing, by definition, includes multiple separate housing units within one building or several 
buildings in a single complex. Thus, institutional investors can purchase a large number of units 
in a single transaction. Multi-family housing units are also spatially concentrated, making them 
easier and cost-effective to manage, and typically have similar layouts and components, which 
helps minimize repair and replacement costs as parts can be purchased in bulk. Single-family 
detached housing units, in contrast, are generally not available for bulk purchase at a cost 
effective price point, making it difficult for investors to accumulate a large portfolio of houses in 
a short amount of time (i.e. the market has historically lacked economies of scale).
8
  Single-
family detached housing units are also spatially dispersed and more likely to have dissimilar 
layouts and components.  
In addition to the differences between owner-occupiers and institutional investors 
highlighted above, clientele effects exist within the two groups. For example, when looking to 
purchase a house, local school quality is one of the primary considerations for owner-occupiers 
with children. Whereas, owner-occupiers who do not have school age children may not be as 
concerned with school quality. The size of the household plays a major role in the type of 
                                                            
8 Block trades (i.e. bulk purchases) by institutional investors have been thoroughly examined in the general finance 
literature (see, for example: Kraus and Stoll 1972; Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers 1987; Saar 2001). The studies 
find that block trades by institutional investors impact the efficiency of the stock market and that block purchases 
have a longer permanent impact than block sales. We examine block trades by institutional investors in owner-
occupied housing and note that there are several key differences between the two markets (heterogeneous versus 
homogeneous assets, passive versus active investments, and high versus low transaction costs - to name a few). In 
addition, institutional investors may shy away from block trades of single-family detached housing if they are 
targeting houses with specific characteristics in a limited number of concentrated geographical areas. 
 
 
6 
 
property owner-occupiers purchase. Single-family detached housing generally offers more living 
area and bedrooms, so it attracts large households.  
          Real estate is notoriously illiquid. In this paper I consider two types of illiquidity in owner-
occupied housing markets: market illiquidity and asset illiquidity. I define market illiquidity as 
the inability to sell an owner-occupied house quickly at its full market value. Market illiquidity 
in housing, similar to most real estate, is a product of the market’s high transaction costs, search 
costs, and down-payment requirements. Grossman and Laroque (1990) illustrate the impact of 
transaction costs on the liquidity of durable goods. In their model, households continuously 
consider whether to reoptimize their level of housing consumption in relation to changes in their 
wealth. They find that small transaction costs can make consumption changes occur very 
infrequently.
9
 Stein (1995) develops a model which illustrates the self-reinforcing effect of 
down-payment requirements on falling house prices. He shows that a decrease in house price 
reduces homeowner’s equity; thereby reducing the amount of money the homeowner has for a 
down-payment should they sell their current house.
 10
 A reduction in down-payment reserves 
reduces household mobility and the demand for owner-occupied housing. The reduced demand 
reinforces the decrease in house prices and explains housing’s illiquidity in down markets. 
          Housing’s degree of illiquidity varies across housing submarkets and property types, as 
only the capital appreciation component of housing, and not the income producing component, is 
subject to the illiquid nature of the market. The illiquid nature of owner-occupied housing has 
historically made rental housing’s income-producing component more attractive to institutional 
investors. Additionally, although institutional investors can lend the equity for owner-occupied 
housing, they cannot directly invest in owner-occupied housing which provides income in the 
form of rental opportunity costs (Liu, Grissom and Hartzell 1990). Thus, market illiquidity 
reinforces the mildly segmented market structure. 
          Shleifer and Vishny (1992) define asset illiquidity as the difference between an asset’s 
value in best use and its liquidation value. They argue that when firms are in financial distress 
their industry peers are likely in a similar situation, which leads to asset sales below their value 
in best use. When the housing market is in equilibrium, the best use for owner-occupied housing 
                                                            
9 Using a transaction cost of five percent, Grossman and Laroque estimate the average time between house 
purchases is 20 to 30 years. Five percent is a conservative estimate of transaction costs in housing markets as real 
estate broker’s commissions usually exceed five percent on their own.   
10 Stein (1995) does not include the rental housing market in his primary model.  
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is owner-occupancy and institutional investors, who value housing services based on their rental 
value, are constrained from investing in owner-occupied housing. The reduced demand results in 
an additional measure of risk for owner-occupied housing (Liu, Grissom and Hartzell 1990). In 
this paper, I define the additional risk from housing’s mildly segmented market structure as its 
asset illiquidity risk.
11
  
 
3. Taxation of Housing 
In the United States, both owner-occupied and rental housing receive preferential tax 
treatment. However, the tax code differs for the two types of housing. The dissimilar tax code 
creates an environment in which the same house is valued differently by owner-occupiers and 
institutional investors. Using the break-even rental rate and user cost of housing approaches I 
examine the impact of the dissimilar tax treatment for owner-occupied and rental housing on 
housing values across the two markets. 
3.1 Break-even Rental Rate 
The break-even rental rate calculates the rate necessary to set the net present value of an 
investment opportunity equal to zero. In doing so, it allows us to evaluate the impact of the 
dissimilar tax code on house values across the two housing markets. Using a standard present 
value approach one can estimate the break-even rental rate β in housing market y as: 
PV = [-𝑉0(1-𝑙0)] + [ ∑
𝛽𝑦𝑉𝑡−1− 𝐸𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡
𝑦
(1+𝑟)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 ] + [
(𝑉𝑇 − 𝑉0(𝑙𝑇) − 𝐺𝑇
𝑦
)
(1+𝑟)𝑇
]      (1) 
𝑋𝑡
𝑦
 = {
[−𝜏𝑡
𝑖  ((𝑚 ∗ 𝑉0 ∗ 𝑙𝑡−1) + (ϸ𝑡𝑉𝑡−1)) ],   𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 − 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑
𝜏𝑡
𝑖  [ 𝛽𝑉𝑡−1 – (𝑚 ∗ 𝑉0 ∗ 𝑙𝑡−1) −  𝐶𝑡  – (ϸ𝑡𝑉𝑡−1) −  𝑑𝑉0 ],   𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙
 (2) 
 
𝐺𝑇
𝑦
 = {
max[ 0, 𝜏𝑇
𝑔(𝑉𝑇 − 𝑉0 − 𝐴𝑇)] ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 − 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 
[𝜏𝑇
𝑔
(𝑉𝑇 − 𝑉0) + 𝜏𝑇
𝑑(𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑉0)],   𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙
    (3) 
 
Where: 
 𝑉𝑡 is the value of the house at time t 
𝑙𝑡 is the loan-to-value ratio at time t 
𝛽𝑦 is a constant break-even rental rate for housing market y 
                                                            
11 I discuss owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity risk in greater detail in Section 4. 
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T is the final time period in which the property is sold 
𝐸𝑡 is the mortgage payment and operating expenses at time t 
r is the discount rate 
𝑋𝑡
𝑦
 is the mortgage interest and property tax deduction in the owner-occupied market OR  
the income tax on net rental income in the rental market 
𝐺𝑇
𝑦
 is the capital gains tax paid in housing market y 
𝜏𝑡 is the income (𝜏𝑡
𝑖), capital gains (𝜏𝑇
𝑔
), or depreciation recapture (𝜏𝑇
𝑑) tax rate at time t 
𝑆𝑡 is the standard tax deduction at time t 
𝑁𝑡 is the non-housing itemized deductions at time t   
𝑚 is the mortgage interest rate 
𝐶𝑡 is the operating costs paid during time period t 
ϸ𝑡 is the property tax rate at time t 
𝐴𝑇 is the capital gains exemption allowance for owner-occupiers at time T 
𝑑 is the rate of accounting depreciation expressed as a fraction of the purchase price 
 
The present value calculation in Equation 1 contains three components that I separate in 
brackets. The first component represents the initial down payment that I assume is the same in 
the owner-occupied and rental housing markets. The second component represents the sum of the 
discounted explicit (implicit) after-tax rental income payments for rental (owner-occupied) 
housing. The second component includes a subcomponent (𝑋𝑛
𝑦
) that varies based on the 
property’s form of tenure. The third component, which also contains a subcomponent (𝐺𝑛
𝑦
) that 
varies based on the property’s form of tenure, represents the discounted after-tax capital 
appreciation.
12
  
The two subcomponents highlight the key differences between owner-occupied and rental 
housing in the tax code. In Equation 2 owner-occupied housing is not taxed on its implicit rental 
income and mortgage interest and property tax payments can be deducted.
13
 Whereas, rental 
                                                            
12 For the sake of brevity I assume that purchasing and selling costs are zero. 
13 Homeowners can deduct their property taxes on any number of houses. However, homeowners can only deduct 
interest on the first $1,000,000 in acquisition debt and first $100,000 in home equity debt that is secured by their 
primary residence and second home. If a homeowner has a second home and they rent it out for part of the year, they 
must use the second home more than 14 days or more than 10% of the number of days during the year that the home 
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housing is taxed on its explicit rental income, but mortgage interest, property taxes, operating 
costs, and depreciation can be deducted.
14
 Thus, the true benefit of the deductions for owner-
occupiers is derived, in a large part, from the way the tax code treats their imputed rental 
income.
15
  
The tax benefit for rental housing in Equation 2 depends on the investor’s ability to claim 
passive activity losses. Investors who do not actively participate in their rental property’s 
operations can only use the passive activity losses from the rental property to offset gains on 
other passive income.
16
 Investors who actively participate in the operations of the rental 
property, and are not real estate professionals, benefit from a special allowance where they can 
use up to $25,000 of rental losses to offset their active income.
17
 These tax benefits are not 
applicable to institutional investors. Equation 3 highlights the capital gain tax benefit afforded to 
owner-occupied housing. Single (married) owner-occupiers are not taxed on the first $250,000 
($500,000) in capital gains, 𝐴𝑇, from the sale of their primary residence.
18
 Whereas, investors 
have to pay capital gain and depreciation recapture taxes when they sell their rental property.
19
 
Using Equations 1-3 one could simultaneously determine the break-even rental rate that 
(1) an investor would explicitly need to charge to equal their opportunity cost of capital and (2) 
an owner-occupier would implicitly need to charge to cover its net costs and opportunity cost of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
is rented at a fair market rental rate, whichever is longer. If they do not meet these requirements, the property is 
considered a rental and not a second home (IRS Publication 936). 
14 The amount of property tax and mortgage interest that an investor can deduct is not capped because they are 
expenses that offset the rental income investors are taxed on. Investors use the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (MACRS) to depreciate their residential rental property. The MACRS allows investor to depreciate the basis 
of their rental house (excluding land) using a straight-line method of 27.5 years (IRS Publication 527). The rate of 
depreciation often exceeds the actual decline in value of the house and allows the investor to defer income taxes 
until they sell the property when they have to pay a depreciation recapture tax. 
15 Equation 2 assumes that owner-occupiers do not claim the standard deduction. In reality, they only benefit from 
the mortgage interest and property tax deductions if they itemized their tax returns. Homeowners would decide 
whether to claim the standard deduction based on the following formula: max[𝑆𝑡, −𝜏𝑡
𝑖 ((𝑚 ∗ 𝑉0 ∗ 𝑙𝑡−1) +
(ϸ𝑡𝑉𝑡−1) + 𝑁𝑡) ] 
16 If the investor’s passive losses exceed their passive gains that year they can carry them forward. 
17 The special allowance of $25,000 is subject to a phaseout rule in which it is reduced by 50% of the amount of the 
investor’s modified adjusted gross income that is more than $100,000. If the investor’s modified adjusted gross 
income is $150,000 or more, they generally cannot use the special allowance (IRS Publication 925). 
18 Homeowners are not taxed on the sale of their primary residence as long as they lived in the property an aggregate 
of two of the last five years and have not claimed the exemption within the past 24 months. Partial exemptions are 
possible for less than two years ownership and occupancy (IRS Publication 936). 
19 Investors can defer the capital gain and depreciation recapture taxes if they invest in a like-kind exchange. 
However, the basis from the rental property the investor sold is transferred to the rental property the investor 
purchased plus any additional investment they made in the new rental property. 
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capital. In a competitive market, the break-even rental rate for an investor is the market rental 
rate and households decide whether to become owner-occupiers by comparing their break-even 
rental rates to the market rental rates.  
3.2 User Cost of Housing   
Another approach to examining the impact of taxes on housing values is the user cost of 
housing. The user cost of housing approach focuses on the return to capital and relies on two 
conditions. The first condition is that households must be indifferent between owner-occupied 
and rental housing. One can evaluate a household’s housing tenure choice by estimating its 
annual user cost of housing as an owner-occupier and renter. If the annual cost of housing is the 
same for an owner-occupier as a renter, then the household should be indifferent between the 
two. Following Poterba (1984) the annual cost of homeownership is: 
𝑂𝑡 = [(1-𝜏𝑡)( ϸ𝑡+ 𝑚𝑡)+ ɸ𝑂]𝑃𝑡 – (𝑃𝑡+1- 𝑃𝑡)       (4) 
In Equation 4, there are five components in the annual cost of owner-occupied housing. The first 
component is the cost of forgone interest that the owner-occupier would have earned if they did 
not purchase a house. The forgone interest is calculated by multiplying the current market 
interest rate 𝑚𝑡 by the house price 𝑃𝑡. The second component is the annual property taxes 
incurred by the owner-occupier, calculated as the property tax rate ϸ𝑡 times the house price 𝑃𝑡.  
The third component is the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes, calculated 
as the owner-occupier’s effective tax income rate 𝜏𝑡 times their mortgage and property tax 
payments ( ϸ𝑡+ 𝑚𝑡 ). The fourth component is the unobserved maintenance costs of owner-
occupied housing, calculated as a fraction ɸ𝑂 of the house’s price 𝑃𝑡. The final component in 
Equation 4 is the capital gain (loss) for the year, calculated as the house price one year from 
today 𝑃𝑡+1 minus the house price today 𝑃𝑡 . 
If an owner-occupier is indifferent between renting and homeownership, then the cost of 
renting 𝑅𝑡 should equal the cost of owning (𝑂𝑡 =  𝑅𝑡). Substituting 𝑅𝑡 into Equation 4: 
𝑅𝑡 = [(1-𝜏𝑡)( ϸ𝑡+𝑚𝑡)+ ɸ𝑂]𝑃𝑡 – E[𝑃𝑡+1- 𝑃𝑡]       (5) 
Where E[𝑃𝑡+1- 𝑃𝑡] is the expected capital gain on the single-family house at time t. Deriving the 
transversality condition for owner-occupied house prices 𝑃𝑡 in Equation 5: 
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𝑃𝑡 =  ∑
𝑅𝑡+𝑛
(1+ (1−𝜏𝑡)(ϸ𝑡+𝑚𝑡)+ɸ𝑂)𝑛+1
∞
𝑛=0         (6) 
The price of a house today 𝑃𝑡 is the present value of expected future rents. Since future rents are 
unobservable, Equation 6 is simplified by assuming that future rents will increase at a constant 
rate of α which results in the following expression: 
𝑃𝑡 = 
𝑅𝑡
(1−𝜏𝑡)(ϸ𝑡+𝑚𝑡)+ɸ𝑂−α
         (7) 
The second condition is that investors must be indifferent between investing in owner-
occupied housing and other assets. Thus, the net present value of the investment equals zero: 
𝑅𝑡 – (ϸ𝑡+𝑚𝑡+ɸ𝐼)𝑃𝑡 + E[𝑃𝑡+1- 𝑃𝑡] = 0       (8) 
Where the property taxes ϸ𝑡 are the same as an owner-occupier, the investor can borrow money 
at market interest rate 𝑚𝑡, and the investor’s unobserved costs of being a landlord are ɸ𝐼𝑃𝑡. 
Iterating Equation 8 one can derive the following transversality condition for investor house 
prices as: 
𝑃𝑡 =  ∑
𝑅𝑡+𝑛
(1+ϸ𝑡+𝑚𝑡+ɸ𝐼)𝑛+1
∞
𝑛=0          (9) 
Assuming a constant rate of rental growth, similar to Equation 7, then: 
𝑃𝑡 = 
𝑅𝑡
ϸ𝑡+𝑚𝑡+ɸ𝐼−α
          (10) 
If the unobserved costs of investors and owner-occupiers are equal (ɸ𝑂 = ɸ𝐼), then the rent-price 
ratio for owner-occupiers and investors are as follows: 
𝑅𝑃𝐻 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)(ϸ𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡) + ɸ𝑂 − α        (11) 
𝑅𝑃𝐼 =  ϸ𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 + ɸ𝐼 − α         (12) 
If owner-occupiers do not deduct interest and taxes, then 𝑅𝑃𝐻 = 𝑅𝑃𝐼. If owner-occupiers do 
deduct interest and taxes, they should be willing to pay more than an investor.  
3.3 Preferential Tax Treatment of Owner-occupied Housing 
Previous studies that utilize the break-even rental rate and user cost of housing approach 
find that owner-occupiers should be willing to pay between 5% to 45% more than investors, 
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depending on their income and corresponding tax bracket, due to the preferential treatment that 
owner-occupied housing is afforded in the tax code. Ozanne (2012) finds that the preferential tax 
treatment of owner-occupied housing results in a 5.6% savings for households in the 15% tax 
bracket using an approach similar to the one presented in Section 3.1. Households in higher tax 
brackets fare even better.
20
 Ozanne estimates that households in the 25% (35%) tax bracket save 
approximately 16.3% (26.5%).
21
 Studies that use the user cost of housing approach estimate that 
owner-occupiers should be willing to pay up to 45% more than an investor based on their ability 
to deduct interest and tax payments (Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai 2005; Glaeser and Gyourko 
2010).
22
  
The preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing discourages institutional 
investors from entering owner-occupier’s favored housing markets, increases the degree of 
segmentation between the two housing markets, and adds an additional measure of asset 
illiquidity risk for owner-occupied housing. Lenders should be particularly concerned because 
owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment can raise house prices to a point in which a 
20 percent down payment does not cover the price decrease were the owner-occupied house to 
be valued in its absence. Thus, when the housing market is in equilibrium, a newly purchased 
owner-occupied house may have negative equity when valued as rental housing.  
In the next section, I apply Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) asset liquidity framework to the 
owner-occupied housing market to illustrate how preferential tax treatment exacerbates the 
housing market’s mildly segmented market structure and adds to its asset illiquidity risk. 
4. Owner-Occupied Housing’s Asset Illiquidity 
When an indebted owner-occupier has trouble making their mortgage payments and their 
creditor is unwilling to renegotiate the terms of their loan, they have limited options. The owner-
occupier can attempt to quickly sell their house if they have enough equity or strategically 
default if they are underwater. Either way, the owner-occupied house is liquidated. If the shock 
                                                            
20 Litzenberger and Sosin (1978) show that a progressive income tax promotes homeownership among middle and 
high income households. High income households also purchase rental properties which they rent to low income 
households.  
21 Not all households benefit from the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. Households in lower 
tax brackets may be better off financially if they rent and claim a standard tax deduction. The standard tax deduction 
in 2014 for single (married) taxpayers was $6,200 ($12,400). 
22 The two studies estimate the 45% premium based on a marginal tax rate of 25%, property tax rate of 1.5%, 
interest rate of 5.5%, unobserved costs of 2.5%, and a constant rate of rental growth of 3.8%. 
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that caused the owner-occupier’s distress is market- or economy-wide, other households are 
likely experiencing the same distress when the house is put up for sale. Households that can 
potentially become owner-occupiers (i.e. put the house to its best use) likely have difficulty 
securing a loan or don’t have enough money for a down-payment.  
The situation is compounded by the fact that owner-occupiers can only own two owner-
occupied houses.
23
 If owner-occupiers purchase a third owner-occupied house they do not 
receive preferential tax treatment, even if they personally consume its housing services. Thus, 
owner-occupied housing can only be put to its best use if it’s purchased by a household that does 
not already own two owner-occupied houses. I assume that the overwhelming majority of 
households that want to be owner-occupiers have already become owner-occupiers and in times 
of market-wide distress they are unable to trade up or down, which adds illiquidity to the market. 
Current owner-occupiers are not restricted from purchasing the liquidated owner-
occupied house. However, if they purchase the house I assume they convert it to rental housing, 
thereby becoming a landlord. Rental housing is not eligible for the same preferential tax 
treatment as owner-occupied housing, so the owner-occupied house would be revalued. Owner-
occupiers can pay substantially more for housing services they consume due to their preferential 
tax treatment, so the conversion of an owner-occupied house to rental housing results in a large 
decrease in value. Landlords have the advantage of knowing the local neighborhood, housing 
quality, and being able to manage the property themselves. Therefore, landlords have several 
advantages over institutional investors. Competition among landlords would likely result in the 
second highest valuation of the owner-occupied house being liquidated. Unfortunately, an 
economy-wide distress will make it difficult for landlords attempting to secure a loan. Thus, 
owner-occupied housing has a significant amount of asset illiquidity risk as it may not be able to 
be put to its second best use. 
When the housing market is in equilibrium, institutional investors are restricted to rental 
housing. However, when would-be owner-occupiers and landlords are credit constrained and the 
housing market is in disequilibrium, owner-occupied housing has to be sold to institutional 
investors as they, by definition, have deep pockets and do not require financing to complete the 
                                                            
23 Although the majority of homeowners only own one owner-occupied house, previous research finds that housing 
is already “overdetermined” in their portfolios (Flavin and Yamashita 2002). 
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purchase. Institutional investors incur an extra set of costs when purchasing owner-occupied 
housing due to its lack of spatial concentration (i.e. it is labor intensive) and heterogeneous 
housing stock (i.e. lack of economies of scale). To manage their new portfolio of properties 
institutional investors have to invest in new technology and hire (train) a specialized local 
property management team. Thus, institutional investors incur higher upfront costs and take on 
additional risk relative to landlords. As a result, institutional investors demand a higher return 
and pay a lower price for owner-occupied housing compared to what a landlord or owner-
occupier would pay if they were not credit constrained.  
This was the case during the recent real estate crisis when a rash of foreclosures, strategic 
defaults, and the tightening of the mortgage market created a large supply of available owner-
occupied houses. Figure 1 shows that homeownership rates peaked at 69.2 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2004 and then steadily decreased to 64 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014 (U.S. 
Census 2014). The steady decline is significant because a one percent drop in homeownership 
represents a change in living situations for approximately 1.1 million households and up to an 
additional 1.1 million owner-occupied houses available for sale. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
An overview of the United States housing market is provided in Table 1 using data from 
the 2006 to 2013 American Community Surveys (ACS). Table 1 illustrates the steady decline in 
homeownership and rise of rental occupancy. The total number of occupied units increased by 
almost 4.7 million between 2006 and 2013. Occupied rentals outpaced the increase in occupied 
units with an increase of over 5.9 million units, which represented a 16.2% increase. Whereas, 
the number of owner-occupied units decreased by 1.2 million units, or 1.1%, despite the overall 
increase in occupied units. The bottom section of Table 1 breaks down the occupied rental 
market by property type and clearly illustrates that single-family units were the primary gainers 
in rental occupancy. Single-family housing was the only property type that increased its market 
share from 2006 (31%) to 2013 (35.1%). Separating single-family housing into attached and 
detached units shows that conversions of single-family detached houses into rental properties had 
the largest impact. The number of occupied single-family detached rental properties increased by 
over 1.27 million units, representing a 13.8% increase over the seven year period.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
 
15 
 
5. Post-Crash Housing Market Dynamics 
The recent real estate boom and subsequent crash was the product of overly optimistic 
future price expectations for owner-occupied housing (Glaeser et al. 2008; Piazzesi and 
Schneider 2009). Liu, Nowak and Rosenthal (2014) show that house price increases during the 
real estate boom of the mid-2000s were not justified by fundamentals and incentivized 
speculative developers to expand the existing single-family housing stock. When supply exceeds 
demand in housing markets, vacancies increase and prices fall (Wheaton 1990). Thus, 
oversupplying the housing market during a boom can result in significant economic and social 
welfare losses (Glaeser et al. 2008). In my model, I show that large-scale investment and 
conversions of owner-occupied housing into rental housing reduces the available owner-
occupied housing stock, decreases vacancies, and increases prices. 
Figure 2 presents the market equilibrium E, boom B, and post-crash C price dynamics in 
the owner-occupied housing market. I assume that pre-boom prices in 2001 were based solely on 
the underlying fundamentals of supply and demand. Thus, prices were in equilibrium in Figure 2 
at 𝑃𝐸. Liu et al. (2014) show that house price increases from 2004-2006 were not justified by 
fundamentals, and that in response speculative developers expanded the housing stock (from 𝐻𝐸 
to 𝐻𝐵). The housing bubble burst in 2007 and the anticipated demand never materialized, so 
prices must eventually fall to 𝑃𝐶 on the demand curve for the market to clear (Glaeser et al. 
2008; Liu et al. 2014). The downward price correction is magnified if lending standards are 
tightened or unemployment increases as a result of the bubble bursting (Haughwout et al. 2012).  
In Figure 2, I also present a model of post-crash housing market dynamics. Unlike 
previous research I do not assume that the supply of housing is fixed. Thus, the shift from 𝐻𝐵 
back towards 𝐻𝐸 represents the reduction in available owner-occupied housing stock. The cost to 
convert a property from owner-occupied to a rental is negligible, so institutional investors can 
easily convert a house to a rental property, and vice-versa when the market rebounds. However, 
when institutional investors purchase and convert houses to rentals they pay cash and no longer 
benefit from owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment. As such, institutional investors 
pay lower prices relative to homeowners for owner-occupied housing. The difference in price 
represents owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity risk.    
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[Insert Figure 2] 
As institutional investors purchase owner-occupied houses and convert them to rental 
housing they reduce the available owner-occupied housing stock and push the market back 
towards equilibrium. In my model, institutional investors target owner-occupied housing with the 
highest anticipated yields based on (1) expectations of mean reversion in prices and (2) rental 
income.
24
 In doing so, institutional investors impose a disciplining effect by reducing the 
available housing stock. As the housing stock shifts inward to 𝐻#, prices move up the demand 
curve from C towards 𝐶#, thereby reducing the relative price divergence.25 Thus, the model 
supports institutional investors’ expectations of mean reverting prices.  
If the market’s population continues to grow and the single-family housing market begins 
to recover, the model predicts that demand will gradually increase. As demand increases, prices 
will move up the supply curve from 𝐶# to 𝐸#. As prices increase and demand grows, some 
institutional investors will convert their properties back to owner-occupied housing by listing 
them for sale instead of renting them out. As institutional investors reintroduce the converted 
houses back to the owner-occupied housing market they gradually shift the available housing 
stock back towards 𝐻𝐵. As institutional investors convert and sell their rental properties to 
owner-occupiers prices will move up the demand curve from 𝐸# to B. 
6. Data 
The analysis in this paper focuses on single-family detached homes in the Atlanta, GA 
metropolitan area.
26
 Atlanta is the ideal setting for this study as it attracted considerable 
institutional investment after the real estate crash. In their examination of large “buy-to-rent” 
investors, Mills, Molloy and Zarutskie (2015) find that Atlanta had the second highest buy-to-
rent market share in 2012 – only Phoenix, AZ (6.5%) had a higher market share than Atlanta’s 
                                                            
24 I examine institutional investors’ expected returns in Section 6. 
25 If lending standards are tightened or unemployment increases, the demand for housing will decrease and the 
demand curve will shift inwards resulting in lower prices (Haughwout et al. 2012). Regardless, owner-occupied 
houses redeployed as rental housing will reduce the available owner-occupied housing stock and prices will increase 
up the ‘reduced’ demand curve.  
26 I focus on single-family detached housing for several reasons. First, single-family detached housing is the largest 
property type in the United States, representing 63.1% of the occupied housing stock (ACS 2006). Second, single-
family detached housing is synonymous with owner-occupied housing as 86.9% of its stock was owner-occupied 
prior to the real estate crisis (ACS 2006). Third, single-family detached housing gained the largest market share after 
the real estate crash. 
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6.4%. In 2013, Atlanta (11.6%) had the second highest market share again - Winston-Salem, NC 
(12.2%) had the highest market share. In 2014, Atlanta (5.0%) had the fourth highest buy-to-rent 
market share - only Charlotte, NC (6.6%), Jacksonville, FL (6.6%), and Memphis, TN (5.1%) 
outpaced Atlanta (Mills et. al 2015).
27
  
Atlanta’s housing market is also very similar to the United States market as a whole. As 
displayed in Table 2, 36.5% of occupied housing units were rentals in both Atlanta and the 
United States in 2013. In addition, prior to the real estate crash single-family detached housing’s 
market share in Atlanta and the United States were nearly identical (25.4% in Atlanta versus 
25.9% in the United States in 2007). In 2013, single-family detached rental properties accounted 
for 31.7% of the Atlanta rental market after experiencing a 25.2% increase in the number of 
rental units between 2007 and 2013. Single-family detached rental housing also grew across the 
United States, albeit at a slower pace of 11.2% over the same time period, accounting for 28.8% 
of the rental market in 2013.  
[Insert Table 2] 
The data for this study comes from several sources. The first two sources are datasets 
compiled by CoreLogic. The first CoreLogic dataset contains county tax assessor records. The 
tax assessor dataset includes parcel level information for every property in the eighteen counties 
that comprise the Atlanta, Georgia metropolitan market.
28
 The parcel file specifies whether there 
is a structure built on the property and, if so, the type of structure (single-family detached, multi-
family, commercial, etc.). The parcel file also includes detailed information about the physical 
characteristics of the structure, such as the square feet of living area, number of bedrooms, 
number of bathrooms, and its lot size. 
The second CoreLogic dataset includes every property transaction recorded in the 
eighteen counties from January 1
st
, 2000 through December 31
st
, 2014. I use several fields in the 
dataset to identify and isolate single-family detached sales transactions. After applying several 
                                                            
27 Atlanta was the clear leader in terms of institutional investor purchase volume. Mills et al. (2015) estimate that 
institutional investors purchased approximately 17,660 single-family homes in metro-Atlanta from 2012-2014. Of 
the other markets listed – institutional investment volume was second highest in Tampa, FL where they purchased 
approximately 7,498 single-family homes from 2012-2014 (*Note: only the top 10 markets are listed for each year 
so it is possible that a market that was only listed once or twice had a higher volume than Tampa, FL).  
28 The counties included in the dataset are Barrow, Bartow, Carroll, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb, 
Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, and Walton. A map of the 
counties is available in Appendix A. 
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filters that remove (i) single-family attached, multi-family, and commercial sales transactions, 
(ii) interfamily transactions, and (iii) non-purchase transactions, the final dataset includes 
approximately 1.25 million sales transactions. The data is well suited for the issues I address in 
this paper as it contains detailed information about the parties involved in the transaction (i.e. 
buyer and seller), terms of the transaction, and the type of deed conveyed. Thus, I can determine 
whether an owner-occupier or investor purchased the property, it was part of a portfolio sale, or 
it was a foreclosure, REO, or short sale. 
The third data source I utilize was provided by the Georgia Multiple Listing Service 
(GAMLS). The GAMLS dataset includes houses that were listed for sale or rent in the eighteen 
counties in and around Atlanta, GA. The GAMLS sales data is available between 2000 and 2014 
and the rental data is available between 2003 and 2014. The data collected from the GAMLS 
includes detailed property characteristics (bedrooms, baths, etc.), listing information (list date, 
sale date, etc.), and sale conditions (foreclosure, REO, etc.). As noted by Levitt and Syverson 
(2008), MLS data is manually entered by real estate agents and is prone to error. Thus, I augment 
and validate the MLS records with the CoreLogic tax assessor and sales transaction data. 
6.1 Repeat Sales House Price Index 
I create a quarterly repeat sales housing price index using the CoreLogic sales transaction 
data that includes all single-family detached houses that were listed and sold at least twice during 
the sample period of 2000 to 2014. The initial dataset contains 1,255,075 sales transactions, over 
30% of which are attributable to houses that only sold once during the sample period. After 
creating matched pairs, I remove records whose sales transactions occurred within six months of 
each other. The final repeat sales sample includes 420,809 records. Following Case and Shiller 
(1989) I estimate the index as follows: 
  Log(
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑓
) =∑ 𝛽𝑞𝑞  𝐷𝑖𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑓,     q = 1, 2, … , Q        (13) 
 where  𝐷𝑖𝑞 = {
   1, if 𝑞 = 𝑡
−1, if 𝑞 = 𝑓
               0, otherwise        
  
𝑃𝑖𝑓 is the price of property i at the time of the first sale f 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the price of property i at the time of the second sale t 
 
 
19 
 
𝛽𝑞 is the estimated coefficient for quarter q 
Q is the number of quarters in the study period 
𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑓 is the error term 
I report exponentiated values that are scaled to 100 in relation to the first quarter of 2001. Figure 
3 presents the results for Equation 13 in the form of a repeat sales index. House prices in Atlanta 
were relatively stable through the early to mid-2000s, increasing an average of 5.8% per year 
from 2000 to 2006. Although Atlanta’s prices did not increase as much as other cities during its 
boom period, its bust period was equally dramatic. House prices dropped by almost 50% during 
the real estate crisis and remained at levels below those experienced in 2001 until the second 
quarter of 2014.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Single-family detached sales volume mirrored the growth of house prices as displayed in 
Figure 4. The total volume of sales in the Atlanta metro area rose steadily from 2000 through the 
second quarter of 2006, peaking at 32,831 quarterly sales transactions. Sales volume dropped 
dramatically during the real estate crash as the percent of distressed sales rose rapidly, reaching 
as high as 74.3% in the fourth quarter of 2010. Both home prices and sales volume increased 
after 2012 and were approaching their pre-boom levels in the final quarter of 2014. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
6.2 Classification of Sales Transactions 
Much of the analysis going forward relies on the correct identification and classification 
of owner-occupiers and investors. As such, I meticulously identify and assign each transaction as 
follows. To identify owner-occupiers I rely on a field provided in the CoreLogic dataset. I also 
perform a validation using the legal mailing address of the properties that were flagged by 
CoreLogic as owner-occupied (where available). The validation checks whether an owner-
occupier’s mailing address is simultaneously used as the legal mailing address for two or more 
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additional properties in the dataset.
29
 If so, I assume those properties are not owner-occupied. If 
the owner-occupier’s legal mailing address does not match any of the property addresses I 
assume that the first single-family house purchased by the owner-occupier is their primary 
residence and the remaining properties are investments.   
All single-family detached housing transactions not attributed to owner-occupiers are 
considered investor activity. I segment the investor transactions into two categories using an 
indicator variable available in the CoreLogic dataset. The indicator variable identifies all 
transactions in which the buyer is a corporate entity. If the indicator variable is 0, the transaction 
is assigned to an individual investor. If the indicator variable is 1, I further segment the corporate 
entity transactions into one of four investor subcategories: government/non-profit, financial 
institution, institutional investor, or corporate investor. Government and non-profit transactions 
include all purchases by government entities, such as local city and county governments, as well 
as purchases by non-profit groups, such as Habitat for Humanity. Financial institution 
transactions include all purchases by credit unions, securitized mortgage trusts, and banks.  
To identify institutional investors I take a more granular approach as they are the primary 
group of interest in this study. I classify a purchaser as an institutional investor if they (i) entered 
the Atlanta housing market after the real estate crash, (ii) raised equity to invest in single-family 
detached housing, (iii) purchased 200 or more single-family detached houses, and (iv) had a 
publicly stated investment strategy of converting the houses they purchased to rentals.
30
 After 
identifying eleven institutional investors, I associate all their transactions to their parent company 
to ensure the classification is comprehensive and accurate.
31
 If the company is publicly traded, I 
                                                            
29 The legal mailing address is where the property’s owner receives property tax statements from the county. I 
cleanse the legal mailing addresses using an address verification system to remove typos and to ensure consistency 
in the dataset. 
30 I investigated every company that purchased more than 25 single-family detached houses from 2007 to 2014. 
Several companies had more than 200 combined purchases, but were not classified as an institutional investor if 
their investment strategy differed. Opportunistic investors that purchased houses and sold them in a short period of 
time (i.e. flippers) are not included. In addition, local investors that already had a portfolio of single-family detached 
houses prior to the real estate crisis are not included in the classification. Thus, the classification identifies the 
institutional investors discussed in section 4. 
31 The companies included in the institutional investor classification include American Homes 4 Rent, American 
Residential Properties, Colony American Homes (Colony Capital), Invitation Homes (Blackstone Group), Main 
Street Revival (Amherst Holdings), Progress Residential, Silver Bay Realty Trust, Starwood Waypoint Residential 
Trust, Havenbrook Homes, Residential Capital Management, and Sylvan Road Capital. The first eight companies 
listed above match the eight companies identified as “buy-to-rent” investors by Mills, Molloy, and Zarutskie (2015). 
 
 
21 
 
identify and search the transaction records for every asset company name listed in their SEC 
filings. If the company is private, I search their website for rental properties, look up the 
properties’ owner in the CoreLogic dataset, and flag the asset company name as a known 
subsidiary of the institutional investor (I also perform this task for institutional investors that are 
public companies to ensure I capture all of their transactions). If a transaction is not assigned to 
the government/non-profit, financial institution, or institutional investor classifications it is 
placed in the corporate investor classification. A breakdown of sales transactions by buyer type 
is available in Table 3, which I discuss in detail in the next section. 
6.3 Atlanta’s Housing Stock and Investor Activity 
Increasing house prices incentivized new development in the Atlanta market during the 
early to mid-2000s as displayed in Table 3. The number of new single-family detached houses 
introduced to the market remained relatively steady from 2000 to 2006, peaking at 48,245 new 
units in 2006. The new houses represented an annual supply growth of approximately 4%, when 
compared to Atlanta’s housing stock in 2000, and may explain why Atlanta’s house prices did 
not rise as rapidly as other cities during the real estate boom. Development slowed during the 
real estate crisis as prices crashed and the number of financial institution transactions nearly 
doubled from 2005 to 2007. The number of individual and corporate investor transactions also 
increased rapidly after the crash, almost doubling from an average of 6,321 purchases per year 
(2000-2006) to 12,370 purchases per year (2012-2014).  
[Insert Table 3] 
6.3.1 Institutional Investment  
Several market factors likely influenced institutional investors’ decision to enter the 
single-family detached housing market including declining house prices, decreasing multi-family 
vacancy rates, a large number of delinquent borrowers, the capital markets acceptance of 
investments in residential Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), the prospect of bulk purchases, 
and higher expected returns relative to apartment buildings. The repeat sales price index in 
Figure 3 shows that house prices were falling in 2011 and bottomed out in the first quarter of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Appendix A includes a brief description of the institutional investors included in this study and the location of the 
houses that they purchased. 
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2012 – which corresponds with the entrance of institutional investors.32 Figure 5 shows that 
demand for rentals was increasing as multi-family vacancy rates decreased from 13.1% in the 
third quarter of 2009 down to 10.3% in the first quarter of 2012. In addition, there was very little 
multi-family construction in the pipeline. From 2000 through 2008, approximately 74,000 new 
multi-family units were started each quarter. In contrast, approximately 30,000 new multi-family 
units were started each quarter from 2009 through 2011. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
Figure 1 shows that over 10% of homeowners were delinquent in 2011. The increased 
demand for rentals was expected to continue because the delinquent homeowners would likely 
become renters after they were foreclosed on. The delinquencies also meant that a large supply 
of distressed single-family detached housing would be available for purchase in the near future. 
The upcoming liquidation of distressed single-family detached housing combined with an 
increasing demand for rentals and decreasing rental vacancies offered a unique opportunity for 
large scale investment in and conversion of single-family detached housing.  
Another potential draw for institutional investors was the capital market’s acceptance of 
residential REITS. In January 2007, residential REITs accounted for $67 billion or 16.8% of the 
equity REIT market capitalization (NAREIT 2007).
33
 Prior to the real estate crash, residential 
REITs included apartment and manufactured home REITs. There were no single-family rental 
REITs, but the market had a history of accepting and investing in new asset classes.
34
 The 
growth and innovation of capital markets may have played a role in institutional investors’ 
entrance into the owner-occupied housing market in 2012.   
Table 3 highlights the entry of institutional investors into the Atlanta owner-occupied 
housing market. Over a four year period, 2011 to 2014, institutional investors purchased 21,283 
single-family detached houses in the metro Atlanta area. Although institutional investors 
purchased a few properties in late 2011, it wasn’t until 2012 when they truly entered the Atlanta 
market and accounted for over 5% of all the single-family detached housing transactions. In 
                                                            
32 The repeat sales price index in Figure 3 only includes sales transactions for metro-Atlanta. However, the start of 
Atlanta’s housing market recovery coincides with the start of the recovery nationwide  
33 In December 2014, residential REITs accounted for $108 billion or 12.9% of the equity REIT market 
capitalization (NAREIT 2014). 
34 Single-family rental REITs are listed in the ‘diversified’ sector and not the ‘residential’ sector. Additional 
information about institutional investors who became single-family rental REITs is available in Appendix A.  
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2013, institutional investment in Atlanta more than doubled, accounting for over 13% of all the 
sales transactions in the market. Competition among investors and increasing prices curtailed 
institutional investment in 2014, although they still accounted for over 8% of all single-family 
detached sales transactions. 
The publicly stated investment strategy of the institutional investors included in this study 
is to purchase single-family detached homes and operate them as rentals.
35
 Prior to the real estate 
crash, it was difficult for institutional investors to amass a portfolio of single-family detached 
rental homes – as they usually were only available through one-off sales. Thus, the single-family 
rental market remained fragmented in terms of both ownership and operation until after the real 
estate crash when institutional investors had several avenues in which they could purchase and 
build a portfolio of single-family detach rentals quickly including: individual sales, auctions, 
short sales listed on the MLS, trustee sales (foreclosed and tax sale properties), bank-owned 
houses listed on the MLS, bank-owned houses purchased directly from banks, and in some cases 
bulk sales.
36,37
  
Institutional investors purchased single-family detached houses in Atlanta through 
several avenues as displayed in Table 4. Approximately 46.7% of their purchases were 
foreclosures, 7.9% were REOs, 7.8% were short sales, and 5.5% were part of a bulk purchase.
38
 
Of the remaining non-distressed transactions approximately 18.8% were purchased directly from 
an owner-occupier, 12.7% were purchased from an investor who already converted the property 
to a rental, and 0.6% were purchased from investors who owned and rented the house prior to 
2007. The largest institutional investor in Atlanta was the Blackstone Group, through their 
Invitation Homes subsidiary. The Blackstone Group accounted for over one-third of all 
                                                            
35 See, for example, the American Homes 4 Rent website - https://www.americanhomes4rent.com/ - which states 
that they are “focused on acquiring, renovating, leasing and operating attractive, single-family homes as rental 
properties.”  
36 Citing a 1996 Property Owners and Managers Survey, Mills et al. (2015) state that three quarters of the single-
family detached rental units were owned by individuals or partnerships that owned fewer than 10 units. 
37 Auctions, short sales, trustee sales, and bank-owned sales were available prior to the real estate crash – but their 
volume paled in comparison to their post-crash volume (see Figure 4).  
38 I use the same definition of a bulk sale as Mills et al. (2015). I consider a transaction part of a bulk sale if there are 
three or more properties with the exact same transaction price, sales date, and buyer name with a sales amount 
greater than $225,000. I modify the sales price of each property that is part of a bulk sale to reflect the average price 
paid per house – because the sales price is estimated I remove bulk sales in most of the empirical analysis. If a 
property is listed as a bulk sale and a foreclosure it is only displayed in Table 4 as a bulk sale. 
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institutional purchases and was the primary bulk purchaser in Atlanta.
39
 Although bulk sales only 
represented 5.5% of institutional investors’ single-family purchases in the Atlanta - the prospect 
of bulk purchases may have drawn institutional investors into the market. 
 
In February 2012, the 
Federal Housing Financing Authority (FHFA) and Fannie Mae announced a REO-to-Rental Pilot 
Initiative to determine if bulk sales would generate private investment in single-family rental 
housing.
40
 
[Insert Table 4] 
6.4 Institutional Investors’ Expected Return 
The liquidation of distressed single-family housing may offer a unique investment 
opportunity, but institutional investors are rational and will only enter the owner-occupied 
market if it offers higher returns than apartment buildings in the rental market. In this section, I 
compare institutional investors’ competing investment alternatives in rental housing (apartment 
buildings) with owner-occupied housing (single-family detached houses).       
6.4.1 Mean Reversion Expectations 
To examine institutional investors’ mean reversion expectations I use the same dataset 
described in Section 6.2 to create a repeat sales index by investor type. The results displayed in 
Figure 6 show that institutional investors were able to identify and purchase single-family 
detached houses that offered higher expected mean reverting returns relative to individual 
investors and owner-occupiers. Institutional investors place a lower value on owner-occupied 
housing because they must convert it to rental housing, so the higher expected mean reverting 
returns are a product of, among other things, owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity and 
preferential tax treatment.  
[Insert Figure 6] 
                                                            
39 The overwhelming majority of Blackstone’s transactions that are flagged as bulk purchases can be attributed to 
one deal that they completed in April 2013 with Building and Land Technology’s single-family rental business. 
40 Additional information on the REO-to-Rental Pilot Initiative is available on the FHFA website: 
http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Policy/Pages/Real-Estate-Owned-(REO).aspx. Although bulk sales 
would allow institutional investors to build a large portfolio of single-family detached homes quickly – investors 
may shy away from bulk sales if the properties included in the sale were not in their target markets or if the 
properties were spread across large geographical areas - as it would undermine their stated goal of creating 
economies of scale. 
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Figure 7 plots an annual repeat sales index that that has been stratified into twenty home 
size segments based on each houses’ square feet of living area. The stratified home size segments 
are a proxy for housing quality and that help identify the housing segments that institutional 
investors targeted. I stratify the home size segments in ascending order, so the smaller the house 
is, the lower the percentile it is segmented into (i.e. 0-5 percentile contains the smallest houses 
and 95-100 percentile contains the largest houses). Although the boom period in Atlanta was 
relatively mild compared to other cities, Figure 7 suggests that prices in two segments of 
Atlanta’s single-family detached housing market, the 0-5 and 5-10 percentile, increased at a rate 
much higher than the rest of the market. The same two segments also experienced the largest 
decline during the crash.  
[Insert Figure 7] 
Next, I quantify and compare the mean reversion expectations by home size segment and 
buyer type in Table 5. The top section of Table 5 is stratified into the same twenty home size 
segments that correspond with Figure 7 – it details each home size segments’ size distribution, 
number of properties purchased by institutional investors, and mean reversion expectations. 
Although institutional investors were active in every home size segment, the majority (over 85%) 
of their purchases fell in the 5-75 percentile range. The top right section of Table 5 provides the 
price index levels by home size segment for the pre-boom index level (𝑃𝐸) in 2001, the pre-crash 
price apex (𝑃𝐵) in 2006, the post-crash nadir (𝑃𝐶) in 2012, and the recovery price in (𝑃𝑅) in 
2014. I also calculate each home size segment’s pre-crash price appreciation (𝑃𝐵 - 𝑃𝐸), post-
crash price depreciation (𝑃𝐶 - 𝑃𝐵), and mean reversion expectations in 2012 (𝑃𝐸 - 𝑃𝐶)  and 2014 
(𝑃𝐸 - 𝑃𝑅). The last two columns of Table 5 clearly show that smaller houses offered higher 
expected mean reversion returns in both 2012 and 2014. The monotonic price declines explain 
why institutional investors preferred smaller houses and were not as active in the 75-100 
percentile home size segments.  
[Insert Table 5] 
In the bottom section of Table 5 I create price index levels by buyer type to compare 
institutional, corporate, and individual investors. The price index levels correspond with the 
repeat sales index in Figure 6. When institutional investors entered the Atlanta market in 2012 
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their expected return, based on mean reversion to pre-boom price levels in 2001, was 46% for the 
properties they purchased, which outpaced individual investors (36%) and was comparable to 
corporate investors (48%). The results support the asset illiquidity framework in Section 4, as 
institutional investors paid lower prices and demanded higher expected returns compared to 
owner-occupiers and local landlords (i.e. individual investors).  
6.4.2 Income-producing Expectations 
Although the expectation of large capital gains played a role in institutional investors’ 
entrance into the owner-occupied housing market, housing’s income-producing component is 
equally, if not more, important to institutional investors because, unlike the capital appreciation 
component, it is not affected by market illiquidity. To examine the income-producing component 
of owner-occupied housing, I calculate its gross rent-price ratio and compare institutional 
investors’ competing real estate investment alternatives both before and after the crash. Rent-
price ratios are a fundamental component of real estate returns and have a major role in 
investor’s portfolio management decisions (Plazzi, Torous and Valkanov 2011). When 
comparing rent-price ratios, I restrict the sample to single-family detached houses that were both 
sold and rented within six months of each other.
41
 The approach allows me to compare actual 
rent-price ratios over time across investor and property types.  
I identify 10,144 single-family detached houses that were both sold and rented within six 
months of each other in the MLS rental and CoreLogic sales data. Summary statistics for the 
combined dataset and rent-price matches are displayed in Table 6. The median rent for a single-
family detached house in the matched rental dataset is $1,150, which is identical to the median 
rent in the complete rental dataset. The median sales price for the matched dataset is much lower 
($109,900) than the median sales price in the entire dataset ($154,670). However, the matched 
dataset is heavily weighted towards post-crash prices, whereas, the entire dataset is more evenly 
distributed. This is expected as single-family detached houses were not frequently purchased as 
rental properties prior to the real estate crash. Table 6 also provides summary statistics by period 
for the matched and entire dataset - including the median gross rent-price ratio for the boom, 
bust, and recovery time periods. The median rent was relatively flat over the three periods, 
                                                            
41 My approach to calculating rent-price ratio is similar to the approach employed by Bracke (2014) in his study of 
the central London Housing market. 
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however, house prices declined after the real estate crash. As a result, the median gross rent-price 
ratio increased from 10% during the boom to 14% during the recovery.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Next I compare rent-price ratios for owner-occupied housing (single-family detached) 
and rental housing (apartment buildings) over the length of the study. If rents are relatively stable 
across the two housing submarkets, the model predicts that as owner-occupied house prices 
decrease, institutional investors will substitute some of their investment in rental housing with 
single-family detached rentals, thereby determining owner-occupied housing’s liquidation value. 
I calculate the gross rent-price ratio for apartment buildings using data from CoStar for the 
Atlanta market from 2003 to 2014. Table 7 provides an overview of the gross rent-price ratio for 
apartment buildings in the Atlanta market by period. The CoStar data includes a total of 277 
transactions over the 12 year period.  
[Insert Table 7] 
From 2003 to 2006, the median rent-price ratio for apartment buildings was 
approximately 15% (compared to 10% for single-family detached housing). After the crash, the 
median rent-price ratio dropped to 11%, which was 2% lower than the single-family detached 
housing market. During the recovery, 2012 to 2014, the median rent-price ratio rose to 17%, 
once again exceeding single-family detached housing. In Figure 8, I plot the rent-price ratios for 
the two property types. In the mid-2000s, the rent-price ratios for apartments are clearly superior 
to those offered by single-family detached housing. However, after the crash rent-price ratios for 
single-family detached houses rose rapidly and exceeded those offered by apartment buildings 
until the third quarter of 2013. 
[Insert Figure 8] 
In Figure 9, I examine the single-family detached gross rent-price ratios by investor type. 
In the mid-2000s, prior to the real estate crash, rent-price ratios averaged approximately 10% 
regardless of investor type. After the real estate crash, rent-price ratios climbed rapidly and 
peaked in 2011 when both corporate and individual investors purchased properties with gross 
rent-price ratios above 20%. In 2012, institutional investors entered the market and started to 
build their large single-family detached rental portfolios. The introduction of a new market 
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participant increased competition and likely contributed to the sharp decline in rent-price ratios 
for single-family detached houses.   
[Insert Figure 9] 
6.4.3 Expected Returns 
In Table 8, I provide a rough estimate of institutional investors’ expected return that 
includes both their expected rental income and capital appreciation yields. For simplicity’s sake, 
I assume that rents will remain the same over time, so an investors’ rental yield equals the 
houses’ rent-price ratio when it was purchased. Investors’ capital appreciation yield is calculated 
based on the assumption that house prices will revert back to 2001 levels. To allow for a back of 
the envelope comparison and keep things simple, I divide the mean reversion expectation by the 
investors’ holding period. I estimate the mean reversion return using holding periods of 3, 5, and 
10 years. I tabulate the returns for houses purchased in 2012, 2013, and 2014 separately as 
market conditions changed over time. 
[Insert Table 8] 
In 2012, institutional investors’ expected returns were particularly attractive. If 
institutional investors hold their purchases until 2017 (5 years) and house prices revert back to 
2001 levels, they will receive an annualized gross return of approximately 23.7%. Given the fact 
that house prices in some segments have already reverted back to their 2001 levels in the Atlanta 
market, I believe this is a reasonable, if not conservative, assumption. If the market returns to its 
pre-crash (2006) levels by 2017, institutional investors’ gross return would increase to a 26.6% 
annualized return. In 2013 and 2014, the Atlanta market started to recover, so the rental and 
capital appreciation returns available to institutional investors in single-family detached housing 
decreased. In 2013, single-family detached housing yields were still clearly favorable relative to 
the yields offered by apartment buildings in the Atlanta market. However, in 2014 a sharp 
increase in apartment building yields combined with the increase in house prices made the two 
markets’ returns comparable.42     
                                                            
42 To allow for ease of comparison, I assume that the apartment buildings included in the analysis were operating at 
capacity when purchased and their rent-price ratio will stay the same over time. Thus, the rent-price ratio listed 
represents the investors’ expected return.  
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I recognize that a portion of the higher return offered by single-family detached rental 
housing may be offset by higher renovation, maintenance, and operating expenses. However, due 
to a lack of available data, I cannot quantify and compare the impact of single-family detached 
housing’s higher expenses on its return. Instead, I assume renovation costs of 20% of the 
purchase price for single-family detached housing and recalculate institutional investors’ 
expected income and appreciation yields in Table 8.
43
 I also assume that the renovation adds no 
value and has no impact on the yield – this assumption is made to highlight the attractiveness of 
the investment opportunity.
44
 After adjusting for renovation costs, institutional investors’ returns 
still outpace returns offered by apartment buildings in the Atlanta market in 2012 and 2013, 
regardless of the holding period chosen. 
7. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 The intuition behind the identification strategy employed in the empirical analysis going 
forward can be understood through a simple example. Consider two single-family detached 
houses which I will refer to as house A and house B. The two houses have similar physical 
characteristics and are located in the same neighborhood. Initially, both houses are owner-
occupied and benefit from preferential tax treatment. Then suppose there is a crisis in which 
house prices rapidly decline and mortgage defaults increase. As a result of the crisis, demand 
simultaneously decreases for owner-occupied housing and increases for rental housing. Next 
suppose that house A and house B are both put on the market by their respective homeowners 
and are sold around the same time. House A is purchased by an owner-occupier and house B is 
purchased by an institutional investor. The institutional investor converts house B to a rental. As 
noted in Section 4, institutional investors incur an extra set of costs when investing in single-
family detached housing and, because they convert the house to a rental, they do not benefit from 
the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. Thus, I expect institutional investors 
                                                            
43 According to their 2014 Annual Report, Starwood Waypoint spent, on average, 17% of the purchase price of a 
house on its renovation to ensure it was in “rent ready” condition. In Atlanta, which is Starwood Waypoint’s second 
largest market in terms of aggregate investment ($312 mm), they spent 24% of the purchase price, on average, to 
renovate their homes (Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust 2014). I use a 20% renovation estimate as I do not 
know what other institutional investors’ spent on renovation costs and I am not adjusting the comparison group 
(apartment buildings) for renovation costs. 
44 Institutional investors would never rationally renovate under these conditions. If institutional investors expect zero 
NPV, then the discounted cash flows post-renovation, including price reversion and increased rents, should equal the 
cost of renovation – in which case the institutional investor’s return would be similar to their expected return in the 
absence of the renovation costs.   
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to pay a lower price for owner-occupied housing – in which the pricing differential represents an 
estimate of owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity risk. 
7.1 Single-family Detached Rental Conversions  
Prior to running the empirical analysis I identify owner-occupied houses that were 
converted to rentals. Several obstacles exist in identifying these conversions. Although I 
identified institutional investor transactions and I know that institutional investors plan on 
renting the houses they purchase based on their publicly stated investment strategy - I have yet to 
determine whether the houses they purchased were conversions. It’s possible that a portion of the 
houses institutional investors purchased were rental properties for the entire length of the study. 
Another obstacle is determining whether individual and corporate investors convert the houses 
they purchase to rental properties because investment strategies vary both across and within the 
two groups of investors. Thus, I recognize that the identification and categorization of 
conversions in my analysis is not perfect. However, I develop a set of reasonable assumptions to 
classify every single-family detached house as either (i) owner-occupied, (ii) rental [Rent], (iii) 
owner-occupied to rental [O2R] conversion, or (iv) rental to owner-occupied [R2O] conversion.  
I begin the classification process by identifying houses that have no transactions during 
the study period. If a house has no transactions and is owner-occupied in 2014, I classify it as 
owner-occupied. If a house is investor-owned in 2014, I classify it as a rental. Approximately 
51.8%, or 724,060, of the 1,399,067 single-family houses in the Atlanta metro market did not 
transact between 2000 and 2014. Of the non-transacting houses, approximately 84.6% are 
owner-occupied and 15.4% are rentals. Next I classify houses that only transacted during the pre-
crisis subperiod (2000-2006). Approximately 21.3%, or 297,433 houses transacted during the 
pre-crisis subperiod, but did not transact in the post-crisis subperiod (2007-2014). Of these 
houses, approximately 82.9% are owner-occupied and 17.1% are rentals.   
The remaining 377,574 houses transacted at least once in the post-crisis subperiod and 
therefore may be a conversion. Using the CoreLogic tax assessor and transaction data I begin by 
identifying the houses’ baseline tenure status in the pre-crisis (2000-2006) subperiod. I classify a 
house as pre-crisis owner-occupied if the house was owner-occupied for more than five years 
from 2000 to 2006. I classify a house as a pre-crisis rental if it was investor owned for two or 
more of the seven years in the pre-crisis subperiod. Each houses’ pre-crisis tenure serves as a 
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baseline for the identification strategy where a house is classified as (i) owner-occupied  if it was 
owner-occupied pre-crisis and post-crisis; (ii) rental if it was a rental pre-crisis and post-crisis; or 
(iii) conversion if it was owner-occupied (rental) pre-crisis and converted to rental (owner-
occupied) post-crisis.
45
 I estimate that approximately 76,138 houses, or 5.5% of metro Atlanta’s 
single-family detached housing stock, were converted from owner-occupied to rental [O2R] from 
2007 to 2014 and 5,328 houses were converted from rental to owner-occupied housing [R2O]. 
The total number of O2R conversions I identify is comparable to the single-family detached 
housing growth highlighted in Table 2. The American Community Survey (ACS) estimates that 
the number of occupied single-family detached rental houses in Atlanta increased by 
approximately 75,873 between 2007 and 2013. 
7.2 Transaction Data and Matched Samples 
After classifying every single-family detached house into one of four categories I merge 
the classifications with the sales transaction data. When running the empirical analysis in the 
following sections I remove records with missing data in a key field. I also remove houses that 
have more than six bedrooms or bathrooms, more than five acres of land, and winsorize the top 
and bottom .5 percent of sales prices. Select summary statistics for the full sample and two 
matched samples are displayed in Table 9 - where the treatment group in columns 1, 4, and 7 of 
the top section represent houses classified as owner-occupied to rental [O2R] conversions and the 
treatment group in the bottom section of Table 9 identifies houses that were purchased by 
institutional investors [Institution]. The control group in column 2 of the top section includes all 
sales transactions that were not included in the treatment group. The large t-statistics in column 3 
- which compare the difference between the means of the treatment and control groups - 
highlight a potential sample selection issue. To address this potential issue I create matched 
samples for houses classified as O2R conversions in the top section of the table and houses 
purchased by institutional investors in the bottom section of the table.  
                                                            
45 A pre-crisis owner-occupied house is classified as an O2R Conversion if (i) it was purchased by an investor(s) and 
held for a total of at least two years in the post-crisis period, (ii) it was purchased by an investor in 2013 and held 
through the end of the study period, or (iii) it was purchased by an institutional investor whose investment strategy is 
to buy and rent single-family housing. Thus, if a house was owner-occupied in the pre-crisis period, purchased by an 
investor in 2010, held by the investor for six months, and then sold to an owner-occupier – it would not be classified 
as a conversion. The number of conversions may be understated as first time non-institutional investor purchases in 
2014 are not classified as conversions due to an “unknown” holding period. 
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[Insert Table 9] 
I create the matched samples using two matching processes. The first process is a 
characteristic matching technique that identifies every unique combination of the following 
characteristics in the treatment group: transaction year, census block-group, number of bedrooms 
and number of bathrooms. I then limit the control sample to only include owner-occupied houses 
that match at least one of the records in the treatment group on every characteristic.
46
 The second 
matching process I employ matches each observation in the characteristic matched treatment 
group with its nearest neighbor in the control group using a one-to-one propensity score 
matching technique with replacement.
47
 The second matching process requires an exact match on 
the census block-group and transaction year fields – if there is no exact match the treatment 
record is dropped. If there are multiple exact matches the process then identifies the nearest 
neighbor by calculating a propensity score using the following fields: age, living area, lot size, 
bedrooms, and bathrooms. The second matching process is executed with replacement, so there 
are duplicate observations in the control sample. This approach increases the matching precision, 
but results in fewer independent control observations. As noted in Wiley (2014), having fewer 
independent control observations reduces the likelihood of finding statistically significant 
differences between the two groups (i.e. selection bias), but it does so at the expense of statistical 
power. The t-statistics for the matched samples are reported in columns 6 and 9 of Table 9. The 
t-statistics are smaller in magnitude which suggests that running the empirical analysis on the 
matched samples will help address potential empirical problems that may result from sample 
selection bias. 
7.3 Transaction Level Analysis of Institutional Investor and Conversion Activity  
In this section I examine the transaction-level correlates of institutional investor 
purchases and conversion activity using a series of linear probability models (LPM): 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = c + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1  + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡       (14a) 
                                                            
46 Houses purchased in bulk sales were removed from both the treatment and control groups in both the 
characteristic and nearest neighbor matching processes. I remove bulk purchases in the majority of the analysis 
going forward because their transaction price is estimated and they represent a small fraction of the transactions 
during the time period. 
47 Propensity score matching techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) have been been employed in residential 
(McMillen 2012) and commercial (Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010; Wiley 2014) real estate studies. 
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𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = c + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1  + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡      (14b) 
𝑂2𝑅𝑖 = c + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1  + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡        (14c) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the house was purchased by an 
institutional investor and 0 otherwise, 𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the house was purchased by a non-institutional investor and 0 otherwise, and 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the house was pre-crisis owner-occupied and converted to a 
rental after the crisis and 0 otherwise. In all three LPM specifications c is a constant, 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 
represents a vector of K transaction level characteristics that are potentially related to conversion 
activity, 𝐹𝑡 represents year fixed effects, and ε𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The specifications provide 
insight into the house characteristics and neighborhood attributes that institutional and non-
institutional investors targeted. Institutional investors entered the Atlanta housing market in late-
2011, so the correlate estimates displayed in Table 10 only include sales transactions from the 
beginning of 2012 through the end of 2014. The results in columns 1 and 3 are based on (14a), 
column 2 is based on (14b), and column 4 is based on (14c).  
[Insert Table 10] 
The property level characteristics in 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 include the house’s age, square feet of living 
area, square feet of lot size, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms and indicator variables 
for whether the house has a fireplace, garage, carport or pool. The results in column 1 suggest 
that institutional investors targeted 3 to 6 bedroom houses with 2 or 3 bathrooms and a garage. 
The presence of a carport or pool reduced the probability that the house would be purchased by 
an institutional investor. Houses located on larger lots were also less likely to be purchased by 
institutional investors. In most cases, non-institutional investors targeted houses with similar 
physical characteristics – however, column 2 suggests that they were more likely to purchase 
older houses with more bathrooms that do not have a garage. 
In addition to the houses’ physical characteristics - 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 includes distressed sales 
condition and neighborhood variables. The distressed sale condition variables identify whether 
the transaction was a short sale, foreclosure, REO, or part of a bulk sale and include a measure of 
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the percent of distressed sales transactions over the past six months.
48
 The results in column 1 
show that a house was more likely to be purchased by an institutional investor if it was a bulk 
sale, foreclosure, or short sale. Houses that were REOs were less likely purchased by 
institutional investors – although they were more likely to be purchased by non-institutional 
investors. Both institutional and non-institutional investors targeted houses located in census 
tracts with higher levels of distressed sales transactions – which suggests that they were 
providing liquidity to the market. 
The following neighborhood controls from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey 
are also included in 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 at the census tract level: unemployment rate, percent of household with 
kids, median income, median age, percent of population without a high school degree, and 
percent of the population with a college degree. The results in column 1 suggest that a house was 
more likely to be purchased by an institutional investor if it was located in a census tract with 
higher levels of unemployment – which serves as another proxy for distressed market conditions 
- and a higher percentage of households with children. 
Additional census tract level variables were constructed to examine the neighborhoods 
that institutional investors purchased single-family detached houses in. Census tracts’ gross rent-
price ratio was calculated as the median census tract rent from 2012 to 2014 divided by the 
median census tract transaction price in the year that the house was purchased.
49
 The results in 
column 1 suggest that institutional investors did not purchase houses located in neighborhoods 
with the highest rent-price ratios – which collaborates with the transaction-level rent-price 
estimates displayed in Figure 9. Attractive rent-price ratios likely attracted institutional investors 
into the single-family detached housing market, but it was not the deciding factor in their 
purchase decisions. Houses located in zip codes with higher mean reversion expectations were 
more likely to be purchased by institutional investors.
50
 Note, however, that non-institutional 
investors were more likely to purchase houses in zip codes with higher mean reversion 
                                                            
48 The ‘Percent Distressed Prev 6 Months’ variable is measured at the census tract level as the number of distressed 
sales transactions over the past six months divided by the total number of transactions over the past six months. 
49 The median rent was calculated using three years of data to increase the number of rental transactions at the 
census tract level and avoid dropping records. The measure assumes that rents were relatively stable over the three 
year period. 
50 Mean reversion expectations are estimated using a zip code repeat sales home price index where the mean 
reversion estimate equals the difference between the zip code’s index in the year the house was purchased and the 
zip codes’ 2001 price index level (the calculation is similar to the calculation employed in Table 5 except its 
conducted at the zip code level instead of home size segments).  
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expectations. These findings suggest that other factors, such geographical location and 
economies of scale, likely played a role in institutional investors’ purchasing decisions.51  
Pre-crisis rental and market liquidity measures are also included in 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 at the census tract 
level. The pre-crisis rental measure identifies and controls for the percent of single-family 
detached houses that were already rentals prior to the crisis (2000-2006). Houses located in 
traditional single-family rental markets (i.e. housing markets with a higher fraction of single-
family detached rental units prior to 2007) were less likely to be purchased by institutional 
investors – which suggests that institutional investors were purchasing houses in census tracts 
that were traditionally owner-occupied. This finding supports the owner-occupied housing asset 
illiquidity framework in section 4 – which states that owner-occupied housing has to be sold to 
institutional investors during times of market wide distress because they do not require financing. 
Berkovec and Goodman (1996) find that housing turnover is the most appropriate proxy 
for housing demand. As such, I include two turnover variables and a time-on-market (TOM) 
variable to estimate the market liquidity (i.e. demand for housing) in the census tracts where 
institutional investors purchased houses. The first turnover variable estimates market liquidity 
prior to the real estate crisis (2000-2006) and the second turnover variable estimates market 
liquidity in the two years leading up to the entrance of institutional investors (2010-2011). The 
turnover measures are calculated at the census tract level as the average annual number of sales 
transactions divided by the tract’s housing stock. The results in column 1 suggest that houses 
located in census tracts with lower levels of turnover (i.e. market liquidity) from 2010-2011 were 
more likely to be purchased by institutional investors. Similarly, the average time-on-market 
(TOM) variable suggests that houses in census tracts with longer average TOM (i.e. less market 
liquidity) were more likely to be purchased by institutional investors. 
 Table 3 documents the large increase in new residential structures in the metro-Atlanta 
housing market. From 2000-2006, the supply of single-family detached housing grew 
approximately 4% per year relative to Atlanta’s housing stock in 2000. The next measure 
examines whether houses located in census tracts that experienced high levels of growth in their 
                                                            
51 The maps in Appendix A suggest that institutional investors tried to concentrate a large portion of their purchases 
in a geographical area. Additionally, in an interview with a large scale investor in Fulton County, GA Immergluck 
(2013) reports that the investor discussed a “hub and spoke” model of property management, in which the investor 
had multiple local offices that serviced rental units within a twenty-mile radius. 
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single-family detached housing stock were more likely to be purchased by institutional investors. 
In column 1, houses located in census tracts with higher fractions of new residential structures 
were more likely to be purchased by institutional investors - which suggests that those markets 
were oversupplied in the early to mid-2000s. The final two measures of interest examine 
investment in existing single-family detached structures. The first remodel variable identifies 
whether the house purchased by the institutional investor was remodeled between 2000 to 2011. 
The second remodel measure is a proxy for private investment in residential structures in the 
surrounding census tract – which I calculate using the CoreLogic tax assessor records as the 
percent of houses in the census tract in 2000 that were remodeled from 2000 to 2011. I create the 
two remodel measures using the ‘effective year built’ field in the CoreLogic tax assessor data.52 
The results in column 3 suggest that houses that were recently remodeled or were located in 
census tracts with a higher fraction of remodeled houses were less likely to be purchased by 
institutional investors. 
7.4 Owner-occupied to Rental Conversion Pricing Differential 
Using a difference in difference framework and the identification strategy described in 
the beginning of section 7, I estimate the difference in price paid for house A (control/owner-
occupied) and house B (treatment/O2R conversion) using the following specification: 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = c + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4𝑂2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅2𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖  + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂2𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅2𝑂𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡   (15) 
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is log of the sales price for house i at time t. The sales price is a function of a vector of 
the house’s physical characteristics [𝑋𝑖𝑡], distressed sale conditions [𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡], whether the 
purchaser financed the purchase or paid cash [𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡], and the house’s tenure classification 
[𝑂2𝑅𝑖, 𝑅2𝑂𝑖, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖].  
                                                            
52 The effective year built field identifies the first year the building was assessed with its current components. If a 
house was constructed in 1980 and an additional bedroom and bathroom were built in 2005 – then the effective year 
built would be 2005 and it would be flagged as a remodeled property. Five counties (Barrow, DeKalb, Fayette, 
Forsyth, and Paulding) do not report an effective year built so they are removed in column 3. Smaller remodeling 
projects that do not require a permit from the county are not included in the measure. The numerator for the measure 
is the number of houses built prior to 2000 that were remodeled from 2000 to 2012 and the denominator is the 
number of houses built prior to 2000. I calculate the measure at the census tract level. Approximately 1.3% of the 
houses were remodeled in the 13 county subsample displayed in column 3. 
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The 𝑋𝑖𝑡 vector of variables includes the house’s age, square feet of living area, lot size, 
number of bedrooms, and number of bathrooms. It also includes indicator variables to identify if 
the house has a garage, carport, fireplace, and pool. The 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡vector includes indicator 
variables that identify whether the transaction was a bulk sale, short sale, foreclosure, or real 
estate owned (REO) transaction. The 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 variable identifies houses that were owner-occupied 
prior to the crisis (2000 – 2006), but were then converted to rental housing after the crisis (2007 
– 2014).  The 𝑅2𝑂𝑖 variable identifies houses that were rentals prior to the crisis (2000 – 2006), 
but were then converted to owner-occupied housing after the crisis (2007 – 2014). The 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 
variable identifies houses that were rentals both before and after the crisis.
53
 Indicator variables 
for quarter and year time fixed effects [𝐹𝑡] and post crisis [𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡] are also included. Of particular 
interest is the coefficient for the interaction between the post crisis and own-to-rent conversion 
variables [𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑂2𝑅𝑖], as it represents an estimate of the asset illiquidity risk inherent in 
housing’s mildly segmented market structure. 
 Next I run a difference in difference model where the treatment groups are delineated by 
institutional and non-institutional investor purchases: 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = c + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 
𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 (16) 
 
where the notation in (16) is similar to (15) expect for the 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 and 𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
variables that identify whether the house was purchased by an institutional investor or non-
institutional investor, respectively. As noted earlier, asset illiquidity is the difference between an 
asset’s value in best use and its liquidation value. Thus, the [𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡] interaction 
coefficient represents an estimate of the asset illiquidity risk inherent in housing’s mildly 
segmented market structure.  
I also estimate the pricing differential over time by interacting the 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
variables with annual indicator variables that identify the year the house sold. Ex ante, I expect 
houses that were converted after the crisis, as indicated by 𝑂2𝑅𝑖, to appreciate at a rate similar to 
owner-occupied housing prior to the real estate crash, as they were trading in the same housing 
                                                            
53 In subsequent specifications I filter out 𝑅2𝑂𝑖and 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 properties to isolate the impact of a conversion on owner-
occupied house prices. 
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market. However, after the real estate crash, when the previously owner-occupied houses were 
converted to rental housing, I expect the returns to differ due to, among other things, owner-
occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment and the market’s mildly segmented structure.    
7.5 Empirical Results 
Prior to the real estate crash, O2R conversions were trading in the owner-occupied 
market, so I expect them to sell for a price similar to owner-occupied houses. However, after the 
crash when the conversions trade in the rental market, I expect them to sell for a discount relative 
to owner-occupied houses that were not converted. In column 1 of Table 11, I find that owner-
occupied houses that were subsequently converted to rentals [O2R ] sold for approximately 3.2% 
more than owner-occupied houses that were not converted. However, after the crash when the 
houses were purchased as rental housing, they sold at an 11.2% discount relative to owner-
occupied houses that were not converted. Although the post-crash discount was expected 
because the house was converted from the owner-occupied market to the rental market, the pre-
crash premium is unexpected. The pre-crash premium suggests that either the O2R conversions 
were of superior quality, previous buyers overpaid for them, or there is a sample selection issue 
with the full dataset.  
[Insert Table 11] 
In column 1, the post-crisis and cash purchase interaction variable highlights the 
increased discount for cash purchases after the real estate crash. Prior to the real estate crash 
(2000 – 2006), houses sold for a 13.3% discount if the buyer paid cash. After the real estate crash 
(2007 – 2014), houses sold for a 26.0% discount when the buyer paid cash. The increased 
discount represents the value placed on liquidity during the financial crisis when a large 
proportion of potential homebuyers were credit constrained. The large discount also highlights 
the financial incentive offered to institutional investors, who did not require credit to make their 
purchases, when they entered the market in 2012.  
In column 1, rental houses that were subsequently converted to owner-occupied houses 
[R2O] sold for approximately 2.7% less than owner-occupied houses prior to the crisis. After the 
crash when they were purchased as owner-occupied housing, the pricing differential remained 
the same. Single-family detached houses that were rentals for the entire study period [Rent] sold 
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for a discount relative to owner-occupied housing prior to the real estate crash and, similar to 
O2R conversions, dropped significantly relative to owner-occupied houses after the crash. In 
column 2, I filter out R2O conversions, rental properties, and bulk sales as I am primarily 
interested in estimating the price effect of converting a house from owner-occupied to the 
rental.
54
 The results in column 2 are similar to column 1 - O2R conversions sold for 
approximately 3.6% more than owner-occupied houses prior to the crash and a 12.2% discount 
after the crash.
55
   
In column 3, indicator variables are included to identify houses purchased by institutional 
and non-institutional investors. Houses that were purchased by institutional investors were not 
significantly different than owner-occupied houses prior to the real estate crash. However, after 
the crash, when the houses were converted to rental properties, they sold for a 14.6% discount 
relative to owner-occupied houses that were not converted. In contrast, houses that were 
purchased by non-institutional investors sold for a 4.8% premium prior to the real estate crash 
and an 11.4% discount after the real estate crash.  
Columns 4 and 5 use the same specifications as columns 2 and 3, but are run using the 
characteristic matched samples in Table 9. The sign and significance for all of the variables in 
column 4 remain the same, but the magnitude of the coefficients decrease. In column 5, the sign 
and significance of the institutional investor variable changed from positive and insignificant to 
negative and significant. The magnitude of the post-crisis institutional investor interaction 
variable decreased but still represents an 11.1% discount. Columns 6 and 7 run the same 
specifications using the nearest neighbor matched sample in Table 9. The results in column 6 are 
similar to columns 2 and 4 – although the sign on the O2R conversion variable flipped and the 
magnitude of the coefficients decreased further. Based on the nearest neighbor matched sample, 
O2R conversions sold for a 1.5% discount prior to the crisis and a 6.2% discount after the crisis. 
The results in column 7 are similar to columns 3 and 5 – except the post-crash cash discount is 
no longer significant. Houses purchased by institutional investors sold for a 2.5% discount prior 
to the crash and an 8.5% discount after the crash. The estimated discounts are in addition to the 
                                                            
54 Bulk sales are included in column 1 of Table 11. The coefficient for the bulk sale variable is -0.5844 and it is 
significant at the 1% level. The empirical analysis going forward does not include bulk sales transactions. 
55 Table B1 in the appendix provides a full set of estimates for columns 1 and 2 in Table 11. 
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cash and distressed sale discounts (i.e. REO, foreclosure, and short sale) displayed in Table 11 
and highlight the low liquidation values for single-family detached housing.  
Table 12 examines the pricing differential on an annual basis. Ex ante, as the single-
family housing market becomes more integrated, I expect the price of single-family homes to be 
bid up and returns to fall until the single-family detached housing market becomes fully 
integrated. However, segmentation may still exist due to, among other things, the preferential tax 
treatment associated with owner-occupied housing. To test this conjecture I interact the O2R 
conversion and Rent variables with annual indicator variables to examine the relationship over 
time. The first column of Table 12 examines the degree of segmentation between the owner-
occupied and rental property markets. I am particularly interested in the relationship between the 
owner-occupied houses that were converted to rentals and the houses that were rentals for the 
entire study period. After the crash O2R conversions should sell for the same price as rental 
properties unless the buyers value the option to convert the property back to the owner-occupied 
market in the future. In which case, O2R conversions will sell for a discount compared to owner-
occupied housing, but at a premium compared to rental housing.  
[Insert Table 12] 
In column 1, the O2R conversion (Rent) interactions are displayed to the left (right) of the 
pipe delimiter. Table 12 does not include R20 conversions or bulk sales. The results show that 
rental properties sold for a discount relative to both owner-occupied and O2R conversions prior 
to crisis (2000-2006). From 2007 to 2011, rentals continued to sell for a discount (25.8%) 
relative to O2R conversions (10.4%). Additionally, from 2012 to 2014 the gap widened as rentals 
sold for a 43.3% discount relative to owner-occupied houses, compared to O2R conversions’ 
15.3% discount. Although institutional investors purchased owner-occupied houses and 
converted them to rentals they still sold for a premium relative to rental housing. The premium 
paid for the O2R  conversions - relative to rental housing - is likely a function of the buyer’s 
ability to convert the property back and sell it to an owner-occupier when the market recovers. 
In column 2 of Table 12 I remove the rental transactions and focus solely on O2R 
conversions. The annual interactions in column 2 show that O2R conversions sold for a discount 
relative to other owner-occupied houses soon after the real estate crash. From 2007 to 2011 O2R 
conversions sold for an average discount of 10.7%. From 2012 to 2014 – which aligns with the 
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entrance of institutional investors - the average discount for conversions relative to owner-
occupied properties was 15.2%. Columns 3 and 4 run the same specification as column 2 using 
the characteristic and nearest neighbor matched samples. Similar to Table 11, the magnitude of 
the estimates decreased when using the matched samples. Using the nearest neighbor 
(characteristic) matched sample, O2R conversions sold for a 6.5% (8.6%) discount from 2007-
2011 and a 6.7% (11.3%) discount from 2012-2014. 
In Figure 10, I plot separate repeat sales price indexes for owner-occupied houses that 
were converted to rentals [O2R] and were not converted to rentals after the real estate crisis. I 
also include 95 percent confidence intervals for both indexes. The two indexes track each other 
closely from 2001 to 2006, but begin to diverge prior to the real estate crash. After the crash, 
O2R conversions clearly sell for a discount relative to owner-occupied housing that was not 
converted. In 2012, house prices started rising - likely due to increased competition among 
institutional investors and owner-occupants - but market segmentation still existed. These results 
suggest that the O2R conversions do not fully integrate into the rental housing market, but 
instead trade in a new conversion market that resides somewhere between the pre-existing 
owner-occupied and rental housing markets.  
[Insert Figure 10] 
Table 13 examines the pricing differential for houses that institutional and non-
institutional investors purchased on an annual basis. The table does not include R20 conversions, 
rentals, or bulk sales. In column 1, the annual institutional (non-institutional) investor 
interactions are displayed to the left (right) of the pipe delimiter. Similar to column 3 of Table 
11, non-institutional investor properties sold for a premium prior to crisis (2000-2006).  From 
2007 to 2011, houses that institutional investors eventually purchased sold for a discount 
(17.4%) relative to non-institutional investor purchases (9.5%). However, when institutional 
investors entered the market in 2012 the discount dropped for the institutional investor houses 
(15.9%) and increased for non-institutional investor houses (15.3%). 
[Insert Table 13] 
Columns 2 to 4 compare houses purchased by institutional investors to owner-occupied 
houses that were not converted. Column 2 displays estimates for the full sample, column 3 
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displays estimates for the characteristic matched sample, and column 4 displays estimates for the 
nearest neighbor matched sample. Summary statistics for each sample are displayed in the 
bottom section of Table 9. Based on the nearest neighbor matched sample, houses purchased by 
institutional investors sold for, on average, a 5% discount from 2012 to 2014. The discount was 
the largest in 2012 (9.9%) and dropped considerably in 2013 (1.9%) and 2014 (3.1%) as 
institutional investors competed against each other. The 5% discount was in addition to cash 
purchase and distressed sale discount - highlighting owner-occupied housing’s low liquidation 
value.     
7.4 Alternative Specifications 
Although I attribute the results in the previous section to owner-occupied housing’s asset 
illiquidity, I examine several alternative specifications to test the robustness of my findings. I 
examine whether the O2R conversions were (i) in markets with less historical market liquidity, 
(ii) in markets with less current market liquidity, (iii) in markets with higher percentages of 
distressed sales, (iv) in markets with less investment in residential structures, (v) of differing 
quality, or (vi) a combination of all the above.  
If the previously owner-occupied houses that were purchased and converted to rentals are 
located in markets that historically have less market liquidity (i.e. lower demand) - I would 
expect them to sell for a larger discount during times of distress. To examine the market liquidity 
for the houses I calculate the average turnover of existing homes prior to the real estate crisis. I 
calculate housing turnover at the census tract level as the average annual number of sales 
transactions divided by the tract’s housing stock from 2000 to 2006. Column 1 of Table 14 uses 
the nearest neighbor matched dataset and is similar to column 6 of Table 11 except for the 
inclusion of the pre-crisis turnover measure and the use of zip code fixed effects. The average 
pre-crisis turnover variable is not significant in column 1 and has little impact on the O2R 
conversion coefficient. Column 2 includes a rolling 6 month turnover variable as a proxy for the 
current market liquidity when the house was purchased and converted. Similar to the turnover 
variable in column 1, it is not significant and does not impact the O2R conversion coefficient. 
[Insert Table 14] 
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Several recent studies document a negative relationship between house sales prices and 
the number of nearby foreclosures (e.g. Immergluck and Smith 2006; Lin et al. 2009). Harding, 
Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) find a foreclosure contagion discount that reached as high as 1% for 
each nearby foreclosed property. If the converted properties in this study were located in areas 
with higher percentages of distressed sales I would expect them to sell for considerably less, 
which could potentially explain the large discount I find in the previous section. To examine the 
impact of nearby foreclosures on house prices I calculate the percent of distressed sales as the 
number of distressed sales transactions divided by the total number of sales transactions at the 
census tract level. In column 3 of Table 14 I find that a 5% increase in the percentage of 
distressed sales results in a 2.2% decrease in house prices. However, an increase in distressed 
sales does not explain why conversions sold for a discount after the real estate crash as the O2R 
conversion discount increased to 6.2% in the post-crisis period. 
Another possible explanation for the O2R conversion discount is that the conversions are 
located in previously under-invested housing submarkets. Information on private investment in 
residential structures at the submarket level is not available, so I use two proxies available in the 
current dataset. The proxies examine private investment in new and existing structures. Column 
4 includes a variable that identifies the fraction of the housing stock within the census tract that 
was built in 2000 or later. Investment in new housing structures likely creates a positive 
externality for the surrounding neighborhood and incentivizes current owners to maintain and 
invest in their existing structures. The variable is positive and significant – although it does not 
have a material impact on the O2R conversion discount. Column 5 includes a variable that 
identifies the percent of the census tract’s existing housing stock in 2000 that were remodeled 
from 2000-2014. The variable is not significant and although the O2R conversion coefficient is 
smaller – its decrease can be attributed to use of the 13 county subsample.56 
Next, I examine whether the O2R conversion discount for previously owner-occupied 
houses can be attributed to differences in housing conditions. I use a ‘condition’ variable in the 
CoreLogic dataset as a proxy for the house’s condition. The condition variable identifies whether 
                                                            
56 As noted in Table 10 – five counties do not report the effective year built in the CoreLogic tax assessor data. In 
unreported results the coefficient for the O2R conversion variable is -.0373 using the 13 county subsample in the 
absence of the ‘Percent Houses Remodeled’ variable. Thus, the inclusion of the variable only increases the 
coefficient by .0001. 
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the house was in excellent, very good, good, average, fair, poor, or unsound condition - 
according to the local county tax assessor’s office – in 2014. The variable is not available for 
every parcel and is not populated for every county, so I remove records in which it is missing. 
The results in column 6 of Table 14 show that houses in excellent condition sell for a premium 
and that, ceteris paribus, house prices decrease as the condition of the house deteriorates. 
Additionally, after controlling for house quality the O2R conversion discount remains at 5.7% in 
the post-crisis subperiod.
57
 In column 7 I include the additional controls in a single specification. 
Note that the sample size drops due to the missing remodeled and condition fields. The 
magnitude and significance of several variables change – although their signs remained the same. 
In unreported results the O2R conversion discount for the 126,202 subsample was 5.7% in the 
post-crisis subperiod. After including all the controls the discount dropped to 4.7% in column 7. 
In the final three columns of Table 14 I run a series of alternative specifications for 
houses located in Fulton County. I restrict the nearest neighbor subsample to Fulton County to 
further examine the property condition variable in column 6. As noted in the previous paragraph 
the property condition variable in the CoreLogic dataset is a static measure as of 2014. Using 
property tax assessor records obtained directly from Fulton County tax assessor’s office I 
examine whether the O2R conversion discount can be attributed to differences in the condition of 
the houses that were converted using a property condition variable that is updated annually. 
Column 8 provides a baseline model of the Fulton County subsample and column 9 incorporates 
the annual condition variables. The inclusion of the annual property condition variables does 
explain a small portion of the O2R conversion discount as it drops from 4.1% in column 8 to 
3.6% in column 9. Column 10 incorporates all the controls for Fulton County and the O2R 
conversion discount increases to 3.9%.  
The results of the alternative specifications – several of which include proxies for 
property condition – confirm the earlier results. Although I use a nearest neighbor matched 
sample, include distressed sale indicator variables, and include proxies for property condition - I 
recognize that the true condition of the property may not be captured in my model. If property 
                                                            
57 The condition variable may vary across counties as it is populated by the county’s local tax assessors. To address 
this potential issue I run a regression that interacts the condition variable with indicator variables for each county. 
The results are similar to those reported in Table 14. The condition variable in column 6 is also a static measure of 
the house’s condition in 2014. Using a subset of data from Fulton County and annual tax assessor data from 2002 to 
2014 I further examine the impact of the condition variable in columns 8-10. 
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condition is not properly controlled for and is correlated with the O2R conversion or Institution 
variable then my estimates may be biased. For example, it may be the case that the properties 
purchased by institutional investors require a certain amount of capital expenditure and that the 
price they paid was a no-arbitrage price that brought the house’s value to the same level as a 
comparable house that did not require the same capital expenditure.  
7.5 Impact on Local Markets 
In the post-crash housing market model (Section 5), I argue that as institutional investors 
purchase owner-occupied houses and convert them to rental housing they reduce the available 
owner-occupied housing stock and push the market back towards equilibrium. In this section I 
examine whether lagged institutional investor activity had an impact on local house prices from 
2012 to 2014. As noted by Mills et al. (2015) it is difficult to test the causal effect of institutional 
investor activity on house prices without exogenous variation in the activity of institutional 
investors. In addition, I also recognize that it is difficult to estimate the impact of institutional 
investor activity while they are still active in the market. Thus, the estimates presented in this 
section are meant to provide insight into the likely sign and magnitude of institutional investors’ 
impact on local housing markets. If the data were available - it would be more appropriate to 
estimate the impact of institutional investor activity from 2012 to 2014 on local house prices 
from 2015 to 2016.  
 I examine institutional investors’ impact on local housing markets using two 
specifications. The first (second) specification examines whether house prices increase in zip 
codes with increased institutional investment (conversion) activity. Both specifications are 
conducted at the zip code level by creating a repeat sales home price index for all zip codes that 
have a housing stock of at least 10,000 single-family detached houses. As a robustness check I 
also run the specifications using house price data from Zillow. The results of the first 
specification are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 15 - where the change in a zip code level 
home price index from 2012 through 2014 is regressed on the lagged market share of the 
following investor types: institutional, corporate, and individual. All zip codes with a single-
family detached housing stock of 10,000 or more are included in the analysis (61 zip codes in 
total). I find that zip codes with increased institutional activity in previous years experienced 
higher house price appreciation the following year. Column 1 suggests that a 10% increase in 
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institutional investor transaction share results in a .9% increase in house prices the following 
year.  
[Insert Table 15] 
In column 2, I include additional controls for zip code characteristics that may influence 
investor activity and have an independent effect on house prices within the zip code. I include 
the lagged log of house price and rent, the lagged percent of distressed sales in the zip code, as 
well as the following variables obtained from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey: 
percent of population without a high school degree, with an associate’s degree or higher, with 
income in the first quintile, with income in the fifth quintile, households with kids, the poverty 
rate, and unemployment rate. I also include a pre-crisis rental and turnover measure. The pre-
crisis rental measure identifies and controls for the percent of houses that were already rentals 
within the zip code and the turnover measure controls for the liquidity of the market prior to the 
crisis. The results in column 2 suggest that an increase in institutional investor activity within a 
zip code during the previous year increases house prices the following year. Institutional 
investors are the only investor type that significantly impact local house prices in the first 
specification.
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In columns 3 and 4 of Table 15, I present the results of the first specification using zip 
code level house pricing data from the Zillow website. Zillow uses a proprietary formula to 
estimate the value for every residential property in their coverage area and provides monthly 
averages of their house price estimates on their website. After downloading the monthly data for 
the Atlanta metro area at the zip code level I convert it to an annual average and regress the 
change in log of house prices from 2012 to 2014. Zillow’s extensive coverage allows the 
inclusion of additional zip codes in the analysis (150 compared to 61 in columns 1 and 2). 
Similar to columns 1 and 2, I find that zip codes with increased institutional activity in previous 
years experienced higher house price appreciation the following year. Unlike the first 
specification, I find that individual and corporate investors do have a significant impact on local 
house prices. Although the sign for corporate investor changes when I include the control 
variables in column 4. 
                                                            
58 Coefficient estimates for the control variables are available in Table B2 in the appendix. 
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Using the O2R conversions identified in Section 7.1, I aggregate the data at the zip code 
level and calculate their market share. I then regress the change in the log of house prices on 
lagged conversion market share as I expect an increase in O2R conversion activity in previous 
periods will help stabilize the local market and increase prices in subsequent periods. I present 
the results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 15.
59
  The results suggest that a 10% increase in 
conversion activity results in a price increase in the range of .8% to 1.2% the following year. 
8. Conclusion 
House price declines together with large scale foreclosures, an increase in demand for 
rental housing resulting from the foreclosures, and the tightening of the mortgage market created 
a large supply of available owner-occupied housing. The large supply of available housing made 
economies of scale possible and represented a potential arbitrage opportunity. I show that owner-
occupied housing offered higher returns than rental housing after the real estate crash. The higher 
returns coupled with potential economies of scale attracted institutional investors into the owner-
occupied housing market. When institutional investors entered the owner-occupied housing 
market they not only increased demand, but also decreased the market’s supply as they converted 
the houses they purchased to rentals. 
The primary contribution of this study is to empirically isolate the mechanism, 
magnitude, and consequence of a single-family detached house’s shift across the mildly 
segmented housing market. Although institutional investors entered the owner-occupied housing 
market which, in effect, should have decreased the two housing markets’ degree of segmentation, 
I show that segmentation still exists. I find that although house prices did increase when 
institutional investors’ entered the market, the premium associated with owner-occupied housing 
persisted. Using a propensity score nearest neighbor matched sample I estimate that from 2012 to 
2012 – when institutional investors were active in the market- owner-occupied housing sold for 
6.7% more than similar owner-occupied housing that was converted to rental housing after the 
crisis.  
 
 
 
                                                            
59 I also ran analysis using a zip code level home price index similar to the first section of Table 15, but did not get 
significant results due to the zip code HPI’s limited coverage area. 
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Figure 2: Post-Crash House Price Dynamics 
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Appendix A – Institutional Investor Overview 
 
American Homes 4 Rent: www.americanhomes4rent.com 
American Homes 4 Rent is an internally managed real estate investment trust (REIT) that is 
publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE: AMH). American Homes 4 Rent is 
focused on acquiring, renovating, and leasing single-family homes as rental properties. They 
recently merged with American Residential Properties (see below) and now own and operate 
approximately 47,910 single-family properties in select housing markets across 22 states. 
American Homes 4 Rent was originally founded by self-storage (NYSE: PSA) billionaire B. 
Wayne Hughes. Its IPO data was August 1
st
, 2013. 
American Residential Properties: www.amresprop.com [redirects to AMH website] 
American Residential Properties was a publicly traded REIT (NYSE: ARPI) that acquired, 
owned, and managed single-family homes as rental properties. In March 2016, American 
Residential Properties merged with American Homes 4 Rent. American Residential Properties 
owned and operated approximately 8,938 single-family properties in 12 states when they merged 
with American Homes 4 Rent. Its IPO date was May 9
th
, 2013. 
Colony American Homes: www.cah.com [redirects to www.waypointhomes.com] 
Colony American Homes merged with Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust (NYSE:SWAY) in 
January 2016 to form Colony Starwood Homes. Colony Starwood Homes (NYSE:SFR) acquires, 
renovates, leases, maintains and manages single family homes. Prior to the merger Colony 
American Homes owned and operated approximately 17,796 single-family homes. After the 
merger, Colony Starwood Homes owned and operated approximately 30,667 single-family 
homes. Before merging with Starwood Waypoint, the Colony American Homes filed for an IPO 
on May 2
nd
, 2013, but postponed the pricing of its offering in June 2013.  
Invitation Homes: www.invitationhomes.com 
Invitation Homes is a subsidiary of the Blackstone Group (NYSE: BX). Invitation Homes owns 
and operates the largest single-family housing stock – not only in Atlanta, but nationwide. 
According to their website Invitation Homes owns over 50,000 single-family homes across 14 of 
the country’s most popular cities.  
Havenbrook Homes: www.havenbrookhomes.com 
Havenbrook Homes owns and operates approximately 4,000 single-family homes in 5 housing 
markets that are spread across 4 states. Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO) owns a 
controlling stake in Havenbrook Homes and recently bought out Sylvan Road Capital – who had 
an 8% stake in Havenbrook Homes.
60
 
 
                                                            
60 Additional information on the transaction is available in the following article: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-25/pimco-bets-on-rental-homes-in-buyout-of-former-analyst 
 
 
79 
 
Main Street Renewal: www.msrenewal.com 
Main Street Renewal is a subsidiary of Amherst Holdings LLC (www.amherst.com). Main Street 
Renewal’s investment strategy is focused on acquiring, renovating, leasing, and managing 
single-family homes across the United States. Main Street Renewal owns and operates single-
family housing rentals in 19 major cities across 12 states. 
Progress Residential: www.rentprogress.com 
Progress Residential focuses on acquiring, renovating, leasing, and managing single-family 
rental homes in 20 housing markets across the United States. Progress Residential owns and 
leases over 8,000 single-family rental homes. Progress Residential is backed by over $1 billion 
of equity capital. 
Residential Capital Management: http://www.resicap.com/ 
Residential Capital Management is a “vertically integrated single source solution for institutional 
level single family real estate needs.” Residential Capital Management has acquired, renovated 
and manages over 7,700 single family homes. Residential Capital Management operations are 
focused in 7 housing markets in the Southeast United States. 
Silver Bay Realty Trust: www.silverbayrealtytrustcorp.com 
Silver Bay Realty Trust is a publicly traded REIT (NYSE: SBY) that focuses on the acquisition, 
renovation, leasing and on-going management of single-family rental properties. Silver Bay 
owns and operates approximately 9,000 single-family properties that are spread across 9 states. 
Silver Bay was the first single-family rental REIT – its IPO date was December 17th, 2012.  
Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust: http://colonystarwood.com/ 
Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust (NYSE:SWAY) merged with Colony American Homes in 
January 2016 to form Colony Starwood Homes. Colony Starwood Homes (NYSE:SFR) acquires, 
renovates, leases, maintains and manages single family homes. Prior to the merger Starwood 
Waypoint Residential Trust owned and operated approximately 12,881 single-family homes. 
Starwood Waypoint’s original IPO date was January 22nd, 2014. 
Sylvan Road Capital: https://www.sylvanroad.com/ 
Sylvan Road Capital is an asset management firm that focuses on the buy-to-rent market in 
single family housing. Sylvan Road Capital raised more than $500 million to acquire and 
rehabilitate homes in Atlanta and surrounding markets. 
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Figure A1: County Map 
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Figure A2: American Homes 4 Rent Purchases 
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Figure A3: American Residential Purchases 
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Figure A4: Colony American Homes Purchases 
 
 
 
84 
 
Figure A5: Havenbrook Homes Purchases 
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Figure A6: Invitation Homes Purchases 
 
 
 
86 
 
Figure A7: Main Street Renewal Purchases 
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Figure A8: Progress Residential Purchases 
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Figure A9: Residential Capital Management Purchases 
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Figure A10: Silver Bay Realty Purchases 
 
 
 
90 
 
Figure A11: Starwood Waypoint Purchases 
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Figure A12: Sylvan Road Capital Purchases 
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Abstract 
 
Subsidizing homeownership is only justifiable if it increases homeownership attainment and 
creates external benefits that outweigh their costs. Using parcel-level panel data I isolate and 
examine the effect of homeownership on surrounding house prices. Homeownership has a causal 
effect on house prices, but substantial variation exists across quantiles. Changes in 
homeownership have a lesser (greater) effect on house prices in the upper (lower) deciles of the 
conditional house price distribution - despite the fact that households in the upper deciles are the 
primary beneficiaries of the federal tax subsidies for homeownership.  
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1. Introduction 
In the United States, homeownership is often considered the “American Dream” and has 
long been a central focus of housing policy. Homeowners benefit from various local, state and 
federal programs whose primary purpose is fostering homeownership. In 2014 alone, the federal 
government provided over $209 billion in homeownership subsidies (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury 2015).
1
 Justifications for such programs are derived from the belief that 
homeownership creates positive externalities. While homeownership may create positive 
externalities questions regarding its impact on house prices remain. What is the monetary value 
of the positive externalities associated with homeownership? Does the monetary value of the 
positive externalities exceed their cost? Are the positive externalities allocated equally? 
Although these questions have important policy implications, difficulty in designing and 
implementing a study that isolates homeownership’s effect on house prices has limited previous 
research on the topic. 
This paper provides a framework to address these questions and offers new insight into 
the distributional effect of homeownership on house prices. It has two primary goals: (i) to 
isolate the effect of homeownership, and changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house 
prices and (ii) to examine the effect of homeownership across the full distribution of house 
prices. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use parcel-level data to isolate the 
effect of homeownership, and changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house prices. Isolating 
the extent and nature of price differentials related to homeownership is difficult because a variety 
of other factors may be correlated with sales prices and homeownership levels. For example, 
house prices in neighborhoods with high homeownership likely vary in quality, both structurally 
and in terms of neighborhood amenities, compared to houses in neighborhoods with low 
homeownership. Additionally, to properly isolate the effect of homeownership on house price, 
one needs to compare the effect homeownership has on prices for identical properties. However, 
due to the heterogeneous nature of real estate this is extremely difficult in practice. 
I address these concerns and extend the extant literature using a unique dataset that 
provides information on sales prices, house characteristics, neighborhood quality, and buyer 
                                                            
1 To provide a sense of magnitude, the federal government’s subsidy for rental housing was $8.3 billion or just under 
4% of the homeownership subsidy. 
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attributes. The dataset includes every single-family detached sales transaction that occurred in 
Fulton County, Georgia from 2002-2014. For each transaction I observe the sales price, location, 
and detailed housing characteristics. I then merge information about the race, sex, mortgage, and 
income of the buyer to the sales transactions. The dataset also includes annual panel data for the 
entire housing stock, allowing me to isolate homeownership rates while controlling for differing 
property type compositions and neighborhood amenities.  
High-income households are the primary beneficiaries of the federal government’s 
subsidization of homeownership.
2
 Despite this well documented fact, previous studies tend to 
focus on the average causal effect of homeownership on house prices, so little is known about 
the relationship over the full distribution of house prices. Understanding the distributional effect 
of homeownership is important because promoting homeownership, particularly low and 
moderate income as well as first time homeownership, has been a primary focus for 
policymakers for several decades.
3
 Additionally, knowledge of the distributional effect of 
homeownership provides a clearer picture of what is driving the mean results and provides 
insight into the allocation of the positive externalities associated with homeownership.  
The results of this study have several important policy implications. First, using a 
research design that explicitly controls for the unobserved quality of the individual house as well 
as time-varying neighborhood effects I find that the average causal effect of homeownership on 
house prices is much lower than previously reported. I estimate that a 10% increase in 
homeownership results in a 2.6% increase in surrounding house prices.
4
 I also document the 
existence of quantile effects. Ex ante, I would expect changes to homeownership rates to have a 
greater effect on house prices in the upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution, as 
the federal tax subsidies for homeownership combined with a progressive income tax favors high 
income households. However, I find that changes in homeownership rates have a lesser (greater) 
effect on house prices in the upper (lower) deciles of the conditional house price distribution. 
                                                            
2 Poterba and Sinai (2008) show that the mortgage interest tax deduction saves the average homeowner $1,060. 
However, the average savings for households who make more than $250,000 is $5,459, compared to $91 in savings 
for households whose annual income is less than $40,000. 
3 For example, the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 established 
performance standards for the Government Sponsored Enterprises to make homeownership available to a wider 
variety of households (Case et al., 2002). 
4 Coulson and Li (2013) estimate that a 10% increase in homeownership increases house prices by approximately 
6%. 
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The subsidization of homeownership should also, in theory, directly affect a household’s tenure 
choice. However, the lesser effect of homeownership on house prices in the higher deciles 
suggests that the federal tax subsidies for homeownership, which provide greater benefits to 
high-income households, are ineffective. Thus, if promoting homeownership is one of the 
primary goals of the federal tax subsidies, they are, at a minimum, poorly allocated.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I provide a survey 
of the related literature. The paper then proceeds with a detailed overview of the dataset and 
homeownership measures used in this study. I then present the paper’s methodology and 
empirical results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the potential implications of the 
findings. 
2. External Benefits of Homeownership 
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in the United States. Owner-occupiers benefit from 
the tax exemption of their implicit rental income and the exclusion of capital gains from the sale 
of their house. Owner-occupiers can also deduct their mortgage interest and property tax 
payments from their federal income taxes. In addition to the federal government’s preferential 
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, there are numerous state and local programs designed 
to promote homeownership.
5
  
Several studies offer justifications for subsidizing homeownership by showing that the 
actions of homeowners create positive external benefits for their surrounding neighborhoods. 
Green and White (1997) find that children who grow up in owner-occupied housing, especially 
those in low-income households, have higher high school graduation rates. However, Aaronson 
(2000) notes that owner-occupiers have longer tenure than renters, so the positive effect may not 
be a result of the type of housing and instead a result of the length of tenure. Haurin et al. (2002) 
find that owning a house, compared to renting, results in greater cognitive ability and fewer child 
behavior problems; although follow-up studies by Barker and Miller (2009) and Holupka and 
Newman (2012) contradict Haurin et al.’s (2002) findings. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) argue 
that homeowners, who are less mobile, have an incentive to invest more social capital in their 
                                                            
5 For example, in the Atlanta market that this study focuses on the Georgia Dream Homeownership Program 
provides first mortgage loans and down payment assistance to low income home buyers. To be eligible for the 
program the borrower must meet income and purchase price limits, have limited assets, and invest at least $1,000 
into the sales transaction. 
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neighborhoods. Thus, they are more likely to get involved with local organizations and vote. In 
contrast, Engelhardt et al. (2010) find little evidence that homeowners are more involved in 
neighborhood organizations and Hilber and Mayer (2009) find that the positive externalities 
related to homeownership are likely confined to places with an inelastic supply of housing. 
Additionally, Hilber and Turner (2014) show that in areas with an inelastic housing supply the 
federal tax subsidies, the MID specifically are often capitalized into house prices, adding costs 
rather than boosting homeownership attainment. In addition to the conflicting results above, the 
studies are unable to quantify the monetary value of the external benefits.  
The use of microdata allows me to estimate the monetary value of the positive 
externalities created by homeownership. Similar to Coulson and Li (2013), I argue that the 
subsidization of homeownership is only justifiable if the external benefits created as a result of 
the subsidies exceed their cost (i.e. forgone tax revenue). Coulson and Li (2013) measure the 
external benefits of homeownership in the form of higher house prices using data from the 
American Housing Survey. Using neighborhood clusters ranging in size from 4 to 11 units, 
Coulson and Li (2013) estimate the average causal effect of homeownership on house prices. 
The authors find that a transition in housing tenure from renting to owning creates positive 
external benefits (i.e. increases nearby house prices). This study is similar, in that, I measure the 
external benefit of homeownership in terms of higher house prices. However, this study differs in 
several key ways. First, I use negotiated sales transactions, instead of self-reported value 
estimates from homeowners. Second, the use of microdata allows me to examine the sensitivity 
of the empirical results to the areal unit (i.e. scale) at which homeownership is measured. I use 
both predefined geographical units and continuous spatial measures to estimate homeownership, 
which allows me to examine how house prices are affected by the overall tenure composition of 
a neighborhood, in addition to the tenure status of properties in the immediate vicinity of a 
house.
6
 The comprehensive dataset allows me to employ a research design that explicitly 
controls for the unobserved quality of the individual house as well as time-varying neighborhood 
effects. I also show that homeownership’s effect on house prices varies across the house price 
                                                            
6 The American Housing Survey data used in Coulson and Li (2013) includes neighborhood clusters that range in 
size from 4 to 11 units. If house prices are affected by the tenure composition of the surrounding neighborhood 
(outside the neighborhood clusters) then the coefficient estimates may be biased. 
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distribution and, as such, the effectiveness of programs that promote homeownership among 
targeted groups, such as low and moderate income households, will vary as well. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Homeownership Distributions 
When examining the external benefits of homeownership, I argue that the distributional 
effect should be estimated to provide a clearer picture of what is driving the mean results. To 
support this conjecture I tabulate homeownership levels based on income and home value 
deciles. Table 1 displays homeownership rates by median income deciles. Median income is 
assigned at the block-group level using five year estimates from the 2013 American Community 
Survey (ACS). As expected, homeownership rates rise as the median income of the census 
block-group increases. The relationship is clearly displayed in the top section of Table 1 as 
homeownership rates monotonically decline from 91.8% (91.0%) for the tenth decile to 69.9% 
(56.0%) for the first decile in 2002 (2014). The upward sloping relationship holds over the entire 
length of the study regardless of market conditions (i.e. pre- and post-crisis). 
[Insert Table 1] 
 In the middle and bottom sections of Table 1 I partition the data based on the property 
type composition of the census block in which the house is located. The middle section includes 
homogeneous census blocks that contain only single-family detached housing. Whereas, the 
bottom section of the table includes census blocks that contain a mix of single-family detached, 
single-family attached and multi-family housing units. I separate the data in this manner as 
previous research has shown that homeownership is strongly associated with single-family 
detached housing structures (Glaeser and Shapiro 2003) and including multiple structure types 
complicates the analysis (Coulson and Li 2013). Although the relationship between income and 
homeownership remains in both sections, homeownership rates are noticeably lower in the lower 
income deciles of the heterogeneous housing stock sample. 
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Table 2 presents homeownership rates by assessed value deciles.
7
 The assessed value 
deciles are assigned based on the house’s assessed value in 2002 or the year in which it was built 
if after 2002. The assessed value represents the houses’ value prior to the real estate boom. Table 
2 shows that a house’s tenure status is highly correlated with its assessed value. Similar to the 
median income deciles, the relationship between assessed value and homeownership rate is 
upward sloping. In 2002 (2014) the homeownership rate in the first decile was 62.3% (49.1%) 
compared to 90.5% (90.3%) in the tenth decile. Table 3 displays the average assessed values for 
the median income deciles presented in Table 1. As expected, the average assessed value of a 
neighborhood increases as the median income of the census block-group in which the house is 
located increases.  
[Insert Table 2] 
The stylized facts presented in this section set the stage for the analysis going forward. 
The summary statistics show that homeownership increases as the average assessed value and 
income of the neighborhood increases. Although the summary statistics do not show that 
homeownership has an effect on house prices, they do suggest that a relationship exists and that 
it may vary across the distribution of house prices. 
[Insert Table 3] 
3.2 Data Overview 
The Fulton County Tax Assessor’s office provided two complementary datasets. Fulton 
County is the most populous county in the state of Georgia and includes the city of Atlanta. The 
assessment dataset includes property-level information for every parcel in Fulton County on an 
annual basis from 2002 to 2014. The dataset includes detailed information about the parcel itself, 
such as lot size and land use codes, as well as the physical characteristics of the dwelling unit(s) 
built on it. The transaction dataset includes every real estate transaction that was recorded from 
2002 to 2014. The sales transaction file includes information about the buyer and seller, such as 
their name and address, which I use to identify owner-occupiers. It also includes, among other 
things, the sales date, purchase price, and the type of deed that was conveyed.  
                                                            
7 I use assessed values, instead of sales price, to create the deciles because they are available on an annual basis for 
every house in the study. Whereas, sales price (i.e. transaction value) is only available when and if a house is sold. 
51.9% of the single-family detached houses did not transact from 2002 – 2014. 
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Later in this study I use a subset of the Fulton County Tax Assessor data that has been 
merged with publicly available loan application registry data gathered under the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA).  The subset is created by merging the Fulton County data with 
proprietary transaction data obtained from CoreLogic. The CoreLogic data includes additional 
loan level information such as the lender name and loan amount.  I then match the combined 
transaction dataset with the HMDA dataset based on each transaction’s (i) census tract, (ii) year 
of the transaction, (iii) lender name, and (iii) loan amount. The HMDA dataset provides detailed 
demographic and economic information about the buyer. 
3.3 Measuring Homeownership 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use parcel-level data to isolate the 
effect of homeownership, and changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house prices. The use 
of microdata allows the examination of the external benefits of homeownership over time across 
areal units of differing size, as I expect the external benefits of homeownership to depend not 
only on the tenure status of the house itself, but also on the overall tenure composition of its 
surrounding neighborhood. If homeowners create positive external benefits for their surrounding 
neighborhoods then households should be willing to pay more to live near other homeowners; 
thereby allowing me to quantify the monetary value of homeownership by examining whether 
households are willing to pay more to live in neighborhoods with higher homeownership levels. 
One of the primary goals of this paper is to isolate the effect of homeownership, and 
changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house prices. To achieve this goal I create a series of 
variables that measure homeownership rates at several areal units of differing size. I estimate 
homeownership rates over time using predefined geographical groupings based on the United 
States Census Bureau’s census tract, block-group, and block levels.8 I also estimate 
homeownership rates by neighborhood based on geographical groupings designated by the 
Fulton County Tax Assessor’s office. I use several measures as previous research shows that the 
results of linear regressions are sensitive to the areal unit chosen (Openshaw and Taylor 1979; 
Fotheringham and Wong 1991). In addition to the predefined geographical groupings I create 
continuous spatial measures of homeownership. 
                                                            
8 I associate every housing unit in Fulton County to its 2010 census tract, block-group, and block. 
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I use the annual tax assessment datasets that contain Fulton County’s entire housing stock 
to estimate the homeownership rate measures. For each single-family detached record in the 
dataset, I observe the property’s address and the mailing address where the county sends the 
property’s tax bill. If the mailing address matches the property’s address I assume the property is 
owner-occupied. If the mailing address does not match the property’s address, but the mailing 
address is a local post office box – I then examine if the post office box is associated with 
multiple single-family detached houses. If the post office box is only associated with one single-
family detached house I consider that house owner-occupied. If the mailing address does not 
match the property’s address, the post office box is not local, or the post office box is associated 
with multiple single-family detached houses I assume the property is not owner-occupied. The 
annual homeownership measures represent the homeownership rate at the beginning of the year 
(i.e. January). I then create monthly homeownership measures by merging and incorporating the 
transaction data. If a property was owner-occupied in the annual file, but then was sold to an 
investor between January 1
st
 and January 31
st, the house’s change in tenure would be included in 
February’s homeownership measure.9  
Table 4 provides an overview of the average size of the housing stock and 
homeownership rate for each predefined areal unit that contains a minimum of five single-family 
detached houses for the entire length of the study. The first column of each section in Table 4 
presents a summary of the housing stock and homeownership rate for the complete data sample 
in four year increments using the annual parcel files. As displayed in the first column of 2002, 
census tracts represent the largest areal unit with an average housing stock of approximately 856 
units. Census block-group is the second largest (~335 units), tax assessor neighborhood is the 
third largest (~160 units), and census blocks are the smallest (~29 units).
10
 The second column of 
                                                            
9 When merging the homeownership measures with the transaction data I associate each transaction with the 
previous month’s homeownership measure for each predefined areal unit grouping. This ensures that a change in 
tenure status of the house in the current transaction is not included in the homeownership measure used in the 
analysis. The approach also aligns the homeownership measure so it reflects the market conditions when the sales 
contract was signed (instead of when the sale was closed). I also associated the homeownership measures using a 
two month lag. The results are similar to those reported using a one month lag. They are not reported in this paper, 
but are available upon request from the authors. 
10 Census blocks are the smallest geographic area at which the Census Bureau collects data. According to the census 
website (www.census.gov), census blocks are “formed by streets, roads, railroads, bodies of water, other visible 
physical and cultural features, and the legal boundaries shown on Census Bureau maps.” Census block-groups 
consist of a cluster of census blocks and generally contain between 600 and 3,000 people. Block-groups can contain 
up to 999 unique census blocks. 
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each section contains areal units that only include single-family detached housing (i.e. there are 
no single-family attached or multi-family housing units in the areal unit) for the length of the 
study. As expected, as the size of the areal unit increases, there are fewer observations that 
include only single-family detached housing. The third column of each section contains areal 
units that include a mix of single-family detached, single-family attached and multi-family 
housing.  
[Insert Table 4] 
A comparison of the April 2010 block-group homeownership rates to the census 2010 
SF1 homeownership rates shows that the two measures are highly correlated (~.96). A direct 
comparison for every block-group is not possible because the census homeownership rates are 
based on housing units - whereas the homeownership rate in this study is based on single-family 
detached houses only.
11
 Additionally, the census homeownership rate only includes occupied 
housing units – whereas this study includes every single-family detached house regardless of 
occupancy.
12
 Thus, when comparing the two homeownership rate measures I limited the 
comparison to the 46 census block-groups that contain only single-family detached housing in 
April 2010.   
The use of predefined areal units is a convenient way to aggregate and estimate 
homeownership measures. However, the size and shape of census blocks, block-groups and 
tracts vary within and between areas. Additionally, the location of a house within the areal unit 
may potentially bias the effect of homeownership on its price. For example, the census block 
homeownership rate measure is likely more appropriate for a house centrally located within the 
census block compared to a house located on its border. As a robustness check - I create monthly 
spatial homeownership measures using radiuses of 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 mile.
13
 In 
addition to accurately estimating the homeownership rate, the continuous spatial measures allow 
                                                            
11 The census bureau defines a housing unit as “a house, apartment, mobile home or trailer, group of rooms, or a 
single room that is occupied, or, if vacant, is intended for occupancy as separate living quarters.”  
12 The census bureau defines an occupied housing unit as a housing unit where someone was staying or living on 
Census Day (April 1, 2016) and the unit was their usual residence (i.e. they stayed their most of the time). 
13 The .05 mile radius represents a radius of approximately 264 feet, .10 mile radius = 528 feet, .25 mile radius = 
1320 feet, .5 mile radius = 2640 feet, and 1.0 mile radius = 5,280 feet. See Figure A1 for a visualization of the 
radiuses employed in this study. 
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me to precisely partition the data into subsamples based on surrounding property type 
compositions.  
Table 5 provides an overview of the average size of the housing stock and 
homeownership rate for each radius distance. A house is only included if there are five single-
family detached houses within the given radius distance. The summary statistics presented in 
Table 5 are cumulative, so the .10 mile radius for each house includes the housing stock in the 
.05 mile radius measure. The first column of each section presents a summary of the housing 
stock and homeownership rate for the entire housing stock, regardless of the property type 
composition, in four year increments. As displayed in the first column of 2002, the 1.00 mile 
radius represents the largest continuous spatial measure with an average housing stock of 
approximately 1,771 units, which is approximately twice the size of a census tract in Table 4. 
The half mile radius measure averages 533 single-family detached housing units placing it 
somewhere between the average size of a census tract and a block-group. The quarter mile radius 
averages 167 units making it comparable in size to the tax assessor neighborhood grouping 
(~160 units). The second column of each section contains houses in which the radius specified 
only contains single-family detached housing. Similar to the areal units in Table 4, as the size of 
the radius increases, there are fewer observations that contain only single-family detached 
housing. The third column of each section contains houses in which the radius specified contains 
a mix of single-family detached, single-family attached and multi-family housing.  
[Insert Table 5] 
In Table 6, I present changes in homeownership rates at the block, neighborhood, and 
block-group levels on an annual basis for the length of the study. As the size of the areal unit 
increases, the range of the change in homeownership rates contracts. The likelihood that an areal 
unit experiences no change in homeownership increases as the size of the areal unit decreases. 
This represents a classic case of the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) in which the effect of 
homeownership on house prices may be sensitive to the scale at which the analysis is run (i.e. the 
spatial size of the areal unit). Openshaw and Taylor (1979) empirically show that changing the 
scale of an areal unit alters the findings in statistical tests. As such, I run the analysis using 
multiple areal units of differing sizes to demonstrate the sensitivity of the homeownership 
measure and the robustness of my findings. 
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[Insert Table 6] 
Fulton County was created in 1853 from the western half of DeKalb County and grew 
into a “strange, elongated shape by absorbing the counties of Milton (to the north) and Campbell 
(to the south) during the Great Depression.”14 Figure 1 provides a rough outline of Fulton County 
and displays the change in homeownership rates at the census block level for the entire study 
period (2002 to 2014). The change in homeownership rate is only plotted for homogeneous 
census blocks that contain only single-family detached housing for the entire study period. In the 
appendix Figure A2, A3, and A4 provide similar information for changes in homeownership 
rates from 2002 to 2006, 2006 to 2010, and 2010 to 2014, respectively.
15
  
[Insert Figure 1] 
3.3 Sales Transactions 
After merging the two Fulton County tax assessor datasets, I remove sales transactions 
that had empty key fields (such as number of bathrooms or square feet of living area), were 
located in census blocks with less than five single-family detached houses, or included multiple 
parcels. I also filter out all records that had more than six bedrooms, six bathrooms, lot size 
greater than five acres, or that was in “unsound” physical condition. Finally, I winsorize the data 
to remove transactions with sales prices in the 1st and 99th percentile. The final cleansed full 
dataset contains 1119,793 sales transactions. Table 7 displays the means and standard deviations 
for the variables used in the analysis.  
[Insert Table 7] 
A change in a house’s tenure from owner-occupied (rental) to a rental (owner-occupied) 
is often associated with a sales transaction. If an increase in transaction volume coincides with 
the change in homeownership, then a portion of the effect on house prices may be the result of a 
liquidity shock. To disentangle changes in homeownership and market liquidity I include a 
turnover variable that measures the number of sales transactions over the past six months divided 
                                                            
14 Additional information on Fulton County’s history is available on Georgia’s website: https://georgia.gov/cities-
counties/fulton-county 
15 The time periods in Figures A2, A3, and A4 align with the data presented in Table 4. 
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by the housing stock within the areal unit.
16
 I also include two proxies for private investment in 
new and existing structures. An increase in the number of new houses or investment in existing 
structures likely creates positive externalities that increase surrounding home values. As such, I 
include two variables that identify the fraction of the housing stock that was (i) built within the 
last three years or (ii) remodeled within the last three years. I identify whether a house was 
remodeled using the ‘effective year built’ field in the Fulton County tax assessor data.  The 
‘effective year built’ field identifies the year in which the house underwent a major addition, but 
does not identify minor remodeling projects that do not require a permit.
17
  
In addition to the market liquidity and private investment variables I control for several 
additional neighborhood characteristics. Given the time period of the study, house prices may be 
influenced by distressed sales of surrounding properties (Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao 2009). To 
address this potential concern, I include a distressed turnover variable that I calculate as the 
number of distressed sales over the past six months divided by the housing stock within the areal 
unit. I also include a school test score variable that represents the average elementary school test 
score on the annual state administered Criterion-Referenced Competency Test (CRCT). The 
remaining neighborhood variables (median income, percent poverty, percent white, percent with 
less than a high school education, and percent with college degree) are all gathered at the census 
block-group level from the 2010 census.  
The first section of Table 7 displays summary statistics for the complete cleansed dataset. 
The second (columns 3 and 4) and third (columns 5 and 6) sections are partitioned by buyer type. 
If an owner-occupier purchased the house it is included in columns 3 and 4, otherwise the sales 
transaction is included in columns 5 and 6. The average sales price over the length of the study is 
just over $261,000 – although the average sales price for houses purchased by owner-occupiers 
($312,547) was considerably higher than investors ($161,414). This is not surprising because, on 
average, the owner-occupied houses are, among other things, more expensive, larger, in better 
condition, and less likely to be part of a distressed sales transaction. Of the 119,793 sales 
                                                            
16 I append transaction data from CoreLogic that extends back to 2000 to the Fulton County transaction data to 
create the turnover variable, so that no records are dropped. 
17 If a house was built in 1985 and had a major addition in 2004 (i.e. an additional bedroom and bathroom were 
added to the structure) then the house’s ‘effective year built’ in the Fulton County tax assessor data would be 2004. 
The house would be included in the remodeled variable for the next three years. 
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transactions in the cleansed dataset, 79,104 were owner-occupied sales transactions and 40,689 
were investor sales transactions.  
Table 8 stratifies the owner-occupied transactions into two property composition 
subgroupings by time period. Columns 1 to 4 include summary statistics for sales transactions 
that took place in homogeneous census blocks that do not contain single-family attached or 
multi-family housing and columns 5 to 6 include summary statistics for sales transactions that 
took place in heterogeneous census blocks that contain a mix of property types. The property 
type composition subgroupings show that houses in homogeneous census blocks are, on average, 
more expensive, younger, bigger, and in better condition. 
[Insert Table 8] 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Average Effect of Homeownership 
Using parcel-level data that includes individual property characteristics and 
homeownership information for every single-family house allows me to employ a hedonic 
pricing method, similar to the method popularized by Rosen (1974), to examine households’ 
valuation of nearby homeownership levels. I begin with a log-linear hedonic model of house 
prices: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑡 + ɣ𝑖𝑡 + ф𝑗𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑡     (1) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of the sales price for house i in areal unit j at time t. Sales price is a function 
of a vector of the house’s physical characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡, sales conditions 𝑆𝑖𝑡, neighborhood 
characteristics 𝑁𝑗𝑡, and nearby homeownership levels 𝐻𝑡. Unobserved characteristics of the 
house and areal unit are represented by ɣ𝑖𝑡 and ф𝑗𝑡, and ε𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a random error term. I recognize 
that variations in homeownership may be correlated with unobservable factors, so Equation 1 
controls for spatial heterogeneity using a standard fixed effects approach at various levels 
(census tract, census block-group, and tax assessor neighborhood). I further allow error terms to 
be clustered at the census tract, block-group, and neighborhood level, respectively. Indicator 
variables are also included to control for quarterly time fixed effects.  
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  The 𝑋𝑖𝑡 vector includes the house’s age, square feet of living area, lot size, number of 
bedrooms, and number of bathrooms. It also includes indicator variables to identify if the house 
has a fireplace, garage, carport, fireplace, pool, and the condition of the house. The 𝑆𝑖𝑡vector 
includes indicator variables that identify whether the transaction was a cash purchase, short sale, 
foreclosure, or real estate owned (REO) transaction. The 𝑁𝑗𝑡 vector includes market liquidity, 
private investment, percent of distressed sales, and census variables discussed in the data section. 
Table 9 presents estimation results for the mean effect of homeownership on house prices 
using several specifications of Equation 1. The estimates reported represent a total of 47 
regressions that differ only in the combination of the areal unit or radius distance in which 
homeownership is measured, the neighborhood’s property type composition, and the location 
fixed effect used. Homeownership is measured at the census block, tax assessor neighborhood, 
and census block-group levels as well as several continuous radius distances as denoted by the 
row names. I run the regression analysis on the entire transaction sample in the first section, and 
then partition the data in the second and third section based on the property type composition 
within the homeownership measure. I control for location fixed effects at several levels. The first 
column of each section (columns 1, 4, and 7) controls for spatial heterogeneity at the census tract 
level. The second and third column of each section controls at the census block-group and tax 
assessor neighborhood levels, respectively. The dependent variable in every column is log of 
sales price. 
[Insert Table 9] 
In Table 9 the coefficient on the key variable of interest, homeownership rate, is positive 
and significant regardless of the measure used.
 18
  The homeownership rate is a decimal in the 
dataset, so the coefficients in Table 9 can be interpreted as the percentage change in house prices 
as homeownership rates move from 0% to 100%. The coefficient in the first row of Column 1 
can be interpreted such that a 10% increase in homeownership results in a 4.7% increase in sales 
price. The coefficients for the census block homeownership measure in the first row are 
relatively similar across each column, ranging from 4.1% to 4.9% (based on a 10% increase in 
homeownership rates).  
                                                            
18 Table A1 in the appendix presents results for all the variables in the block level regressions using data from the 
entire study period.  
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The results for the homeownership rates measured at the tax assessor neighborhood and 
census block-group level are displayed in the second and third row, respectively. As the size of 
the areal unit at which homeownership is measured increases, the magnitude of its coefficient 
increases in the regression results. This is expected because the results of spatial analysis are 
sensitive to the scale at which they measured. The range of coefficients in the second row, where 
homeownership is measured at the tax assessor neighborhood level, is wide compared to the first 
row. When homeownership is measured at the tax assessor neighborhood level, a 10% increase 
in homeownership results in an increase in sales price from 6.9% (column 5) to 17.1% (column 
8). Note that the coefficients in homogeneous neighborhoods, where the entire housing stock is 
single-family detached, are more comparable to the first row. However, the coefficients in 
neighborhoods with a heterogeneous housing stock are much higher which suggests that 
including neighborhoods with multiple structure types complicates the analysis. When 
homeownership is measured at the census block-group level, a 10% increase in homeownership 
results in an increase in sales price ranging from 17.4% (column 7) to 31.1% (column 6). The 
larger coefficients are now in the homogeneous neighborhoods.
19
  
The results for the continuous homeownership radius measures are similar to the 
predefined areal units, in that, as the size of the radius increases, the magnitude of the 
homeownership coefficient increases. At first glance, the results suggest that the value of a house 
is impacted not only by the properties that immediately surround it (census block), but also by 
the ownership composition of the surrounding area (census block-group). However, when 
interpreting the results it’s important to keep the scale of the homeownership measure in mind, as 
a 10% increase in homeownership in a census block-group is less likely to occur compared to a 
10% increase in a census block. For example, a 10% decrease in homeownership rate at the 
block-group level in 2014 would, on average, represent a change in tenure status of 49 houses. 
Whereas, a 10% decrease in homeownership at the block level would, on average, only represent 
a change in tenure status of 3 houses.  
In Table 10 I further partition the dataset into pre-crisis (2002-2006) and post-crisis 
(2007-2014) time period subsamples. The subsamples only include areal units that have a 
homogeneous housing stock (i.e. single-family detached housing only). I re-estimate the mean 
                                                            
19 As displayed in Table 4, only 9.2% (46 of the 501) of the block-groups have a homogeneous housing stock (i.e. 
100% single-family detached).   
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effect of homeownership on house prices using several specifications of Equation 1. The 
estimates reported represent a total of 38 regressions that differ only in the combination of the 
homeownership measure, neighborhood property type composition, and location fixed effects 
used. The pre-crisis subperiod represents an up market in Atlanta; whereas the post-crisis market 
represents a down market. The results highlight the impact homeownership rates have on house 
prices across housing market cycles and suggest that market conditions differed in the pre- and 
post-crisis subperiods. Thus, the use of individual time and location fixed effects in Equation 1 
may not be optimal.  
[Insert Table 10] 
The estimates reported in Tables 9 and 10 may also suffer from an omitted variable bias 
as the standard fixed effects approach using in Equation 1 assumes that the unobservable house 
(ɣ𝑖𝑡) and areal unit (ф𝑗𝑡) characteristics are constant over time. However, if ɣ𝑖𝑡 and ф𝑗𝑡 are 
changing over time and their change is correlated with changes to homeownership then the fixed 
effect coefficient estimates will be inconsistent. In the next step of the analysis I address these 
concerns by explicitly controlling for the unobserved quality of the individual house and 
neighborhood. To do so, I capitalize on the extended timeframe of the study using a repeat-sales 
specification with time-varying census tract effects. Equation 2 is a repeat sales specification that 
includes house fixed effects: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑡 + µ𝑖 + 𝛺𝑗𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑡     (2) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of the sales price for house i in areal unit j at time t. Sales price is a function 
of a vector of variables that include the house’s physical characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡, neighborhood 
characteristics 𝑁𝑗𝑡,  and the surrounding homeownership rate 𝐻𝑡.
20
 House-specific fixed effects 
and a set of tract-by-time fixed effects are denoted by µ𝑖 and 𝛺𝑗𝑡, respectively.
21
 The inclusion of 
house fixed effects ensure that the homeownership coefficient is estimated by comparing 
identical houses, while the tract-by-time fixed effects ensure that the comparisons are made 
                                                            
20 The majority of the house and neighborhood variables do not change over time, so they are differenced out (see 
Equation 3). Thus, in Equation 2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the physical condition of the house and 𝑁𝑗𝑡 represents the distressed 
contagion variables. 
21 The house fixed effects variables assume that the house characteristics and quality remain constant over the study 
period. I include the tax assessor house condition variables to control for changes in the condition of the house over 
time. 
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within the same areal unit during the same time period. To demonstrate how the effect of 
homeownership is identified in Equation 2 I rewrite the equation by differencing observations for 
consecutive pair of repeat transactions for house i at times t and 𝑡′: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 - 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡′ = 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖𝑡 - 𝑋𝑖𝑡′) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑖𝑡 - 𝑆𝑖𝑡′) + 𝛽3(𝑁𝑗𝑡 - 𝑁𝑗𝑡′) + 𝛽4(𝐻𝑡 - 𝐻𝑡′) + (𝛺𝑗𝑡 - 𝛺𝑗𝑡′) + ᴓ𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3) 
The house fixed effect and physical characteristics of the house drop out of Equation 3 because 
the same house is being compared.
22
 One drawback of the repeat sales model is that it requires a 
minimum of two sales transactions for a house. Thus, if a house only sold once during the study 
period (2002-2014) it is not included in the analysis.  
In the first row of Table 11, I estimate the effect of homeownership at the census block 
level. The results are relatively stable regardless of the time period chosen - a 10% increase in 
homeownership increases house prices between 2.6 to 2.9%. The results are similar, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient decreases, when I estimate the impact of homeownership on house 
prices using a 0.10 mile radius measure.  
[Insert Table 11] 
The relationship between household income, house values and homeownership displayed 
in Tables 1 to 3 shows that as income and house value increase, homeownership increases and 
rentership decreases. This is problematic, because it suggests that homeownership is endogenous 
and correlated with household income and house prices. To address this concern, I merge the 
Fulton County Tax Assessor datasets with HMDA data. The HMDA dataset includes 
demographic information about the buyer, allowing me to instrument for the decision to become 
a homeowner using the homebuyer’s demographic information 𝐷𝑖𝑡.  
𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗  = 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (4) 
Equation 4 estimates a bivariate probit model where 𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗  represents the likelihood that a house i 
in census tract j at time t will be purchased by an owner-occupier. I use the estimated parameters 
                                                            
22 To ensure the house fixed effect represents the same quality house (i.e. constant-quality model) I filter out repeat 
sales transactions in which I have reason to believe the house has undergone a major renovation between sales 
transactions. I also filter out repeat sales transactions that have an exceptionally high rate of appreciation (greater 
than 10% per quarter) as they likely underwent major renovations to justify the extraordinarily high rate of 
appreciation. 
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from Equation 4 to calculate an inverse Mills ratio, which I include as an additional explanatory 
variable in Equation 1.  
The results reported in Table 12 are comparable to the results reported in Tables 9 and 
10.
23
 Note that the results in Table 12 are the product of specifications that include an inverse 
Mills ratio and the truncated HMDA data subset.
24
 The inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio for 
homeownership does not change the relationship between homeownership and house prices. 
Thus, I conclude that an increase in surrounding homeownership rates causes an increase in 
house price, regardless of the specification, homeownership measure, or one’s treatment of 
potential endogeneity issue. The initial estimates were relatively unstable across the housing 
market cycle (i.e. pre-crisis vs. post-crisis), however after controlling for time-varying census 
tract effects I find that a 10% increase in homeownership results in a 2.6% increase in house 
prices on average.  
[Insert Table 12] 
I find that the magnitude of the homeownership coefficient increases as the scale of its 
measure increases, so I would expect the estimate to be greater than or equal to previous 
estimates that used a smaller scale. However, the estimates are considerably lower than the 6% 
estimate reported in Coulson and Li (2013) despite the fact that the average size of the measures 
are, in terms of housing stock, nearly three times as big as the clusters used in their study. In the 
next section, I move beyond estimating the average effect of homeownership on house prices and 
instead test for the existence of quantile effects. 
4.2 Distributional Effect of Homeownership 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) originally proposed the quantile regression approach.
25
 
Quantile regression estimates a conditional quantile function in which a quantile of the 
dependent variable’s conditional distribution is expressed as a function of covariates. Thus, 
quantile regressions differ from hedonic regressions that estimate a mean conditional function as 
                                                            
23 Column 1 of Table 12 is similar to the specification used to estimate the first row of Column 4 in Table 9. Column 
2 (3) of Table 12 is similar to the specification used to estimate the first row of Column 1 (4) in Table 10.  
24 The HMDA data does not include cash purchases, private party loans, unmatched records, or matched records 
with blank demographic fields. For example, the sample size for Column 4 of Table 9 is larger (N = 47,570) 
compared to Column 1 of Table 12 (N = 23,111). 
25 Several real estate studies have used quantile regression including, but not limited to Gyourko and Tracy (1999), 
McMillen and Thorsnes (2006), Coulson and McMillen (2007), and McMillen (2008). 
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they allow their estimates to vary with the corresponding quantile, so they are particularly useful 
when quantile effects exist. The primary difference between ordinary least squares regression 
and quantile regression is that quantile regression minimizes the weighted sum of absolute 
residuals instead of the sum of squared residuals. The quantile minimization procedure can be 
expressed as: 
𝛽θ̂ = arg min
𝛽θ∈𝑅
𝐾
∑ |𝑝𝑎 − 𝑥𝑎𝛽θ| 𝑤𝑎
𝐴
𝑎=1         (5) 
where A is the complete sample of transactions, 𝛽θ̂ is a vector of coefficient estimates, 𝑝 denotes 
a vector of A house prices, X denotes an A × K matrix in which the first column is all ones and 
the rest of the columns record the values of K - 1 independent variables, and θ ∈ (0,1) denotes 
the quantile estimated. Thus, 𝑝𝑎 is the 𝑎
𝑡ℎ entry of p, 𝑥𝑎 is the 𝑎
𝑡ℎ entry of X, and 𝑤𝑎 is the 𝑎
𝑡ℎ 
observation’s weight that can be expressed as: 
𝑤𝑎 = {
 2θ, if 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑥𝑎𝛽θ > 0
2(1 − θ),   otherwise
         (6) 
At the median (θ = .5) equal weight is given to positive and negative residuals. Whereas, when 
examining the 80
th
 percentile (θ = .8), 2θ = 1.6 and 2(1-θ) = .4, so more weight is given to 
positive residuals. I estimate the standard errors of the coefficient estimates using a bootstrap 
method that retains the assumption of independent errors but relaxes the assumption of 
identically distributed errors, which makes the bootstrapped standard errors equivalent to robust 
standard errors in linear regressions. One of the primary benefits of quantile regression is that it 
uses the full sample and avoids the truncation problem inherent in subsample hedonic regression 
analysis.
26
 The quantile regression takes the following form: 
𝑝it = 𝛽1(θ)𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(θ)𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(θ)𝐻𝑗𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑡,θ        (7) 
where the housing characteristic, neighborhood characteristic, and homeownership rate 
coefficients vary by quantile θ. Similar to Equation 1, sales price is a function of a vector of the 
house’s physical characteristics𝑋𝑖𝑡, neighborhood characteristics 𝑁𝑗𝑡, and nearby homeownership 
levels 𝐻𝑗𝑡.  
                                                            
26 Some studies subdivide their sample according to the unconditional distribution of their dependent variable and 
then run a hedonic regression for each subsample. 
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Ex ante, I expect that higher (lower) priced houses would be more (less) sensitive to 
changes in homeownership rates as the current federal tax subsidy for owner-occupied housing is 
directly related to the price of the house and indirectly, positively related to the owner occupier’s 
income.
27
 As an owner-occupier’s house price and income increases the tax subsidy for 
homeownership increases.
28
 Although previous research shows that high income households 
benefit the most from the owner-occupier tax subsidies (Poterba and Sinai, 2008) little is known 
about whether the subsidies promote homeownership. Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) argue that the 
federal tax policies appear to increase the amount spent on housing, but have almost no effect on 
the homeownership rate. They posit that the mortgage interest deduction (MID) is ineffective as 
it benefits wealthy households, who would likely be homeowners in its absence. In this section I 
run a series of quantile regressions to examine the effect of homeownership rates over the full 
distribution of house prices. I argue that if the tax subsidies for owner-occupied housing are 
effective instruments, house prices in the upper deciles will be more sensitive to changes in 
homeownership rates as they are the primary beneficiaries.     
Table 13 includes quantile regression estimates for census blocks and 0.10 mile radiuses 
that contain only single-family detached housing. The dependent variable in every column is the 
log of sales price. The first column of Table 13 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) results that 
are comparable to Tables 9 and 10. Results for the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, and 90
th
 quantiles are 
presented in order in columns 2 to 6. The results are displayed for the entire study period in the 
first (fourth) row for the block-level (.10 mile radius) homeownership measure. An increase 
(decrease) in homeownership has a positive (negative) effect in every quantile. The 
homeownership estimates exhibit a quantile effect as the magnitude of homeownership’s effect 
on house prices is greater (lesser) in the lower (upper) deciles of the conditional house price 
distribution. Scatter plots of select explanatory variable coefficients by quantile are displayed in 
Figure 2. The scatter plots are available for several structural variables, property conditions, and 
neighborhood controls. Figure 3 displays a larger, isolated scatter plot of the homeownership rate 
                                                            
27 Assuming that the owner-occupier’s marginal tax rate increases with their income. 
28 The tax subsidy is not directly proportional to an owner-occupier’s income because homeowners can only deduct 
interest on the first $1,000,000 in acquisition debt and first $100,000 in home equity debt that is secured by their 
primary residence and second home. If a homeowner has a second home and they rent it out for part of the year, they 
must use the second home more than 14 days or more than 10% of the number of days during the year that the home 
is rented at a fair market rental rate, whichever is longer. If they do not meet these requirements, the property is 
considered a rental and not a second home (IRS Publication 936). 
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coefficients by quantile with a 95% confidence interval. The figure shows that the magnitude of 
the homeownership’s effect decreases from the lower to the upper deciles of the conditional 
house price distribution. 
[Insert Table 13] 
Two subperiods are created to examine the effect of homeownership on house prices 
across market conditions. The data is partitioned so that the subperiods represent the pre-crisis 
housing boom (2002-2006) and the post-crisis housing bust/recovery (2007-2014). The second 
and fifth rows of Table 13 present the results for the pre-crisis subperiod. During the pre-crisis 
subperiod, I find that an increase (decrease) in homeownership has a positive (negative) effect in 
all but the top quantile. Quantile effects are present as the magnitude of the coefficients decrease 
in the upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution. Figure 4 displays a scatter plot of 
the homeownership rate coefficients by quantile for the pre-crisis subperiod. Similar to Figure 3, 
the magnitude of the homeownership’s effect on house prices decreases from the lower to the 
upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution. 
The third and sixth rows of Table 13 present the results for quantile regressions using the 
post-crisis data subset. As noted earlier, the OLS homeownership rate coefficient estimate is 
noticeably larger in the post-crisis subperiod compared to the pre-crisis subperiod (.4450 in row 
3 versus .1963 in row 2). According to the OLS estimates, a change in homeownership had a 
larger mean effect on house prices during the housing bust/recovery than during the housing 
boom. Similarly, the quantile homeownership coefficients in rows 3 and 6 are also all greater 
than the corresponding quantile coefficients in rows 2 and 5. Figure 5 displays a scatter plot of 
the homeownership rate coefficients by quantile for the post-crisis subperiod. Similar to Figures 
3 and 4, the distributional effect of homeownership decreases as you move from the lower to the 
upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution. 
4.3 Valuing the External Benefits of Homeownership  
 In this section, I calculate a back of the envelope estimate for the external benefits of 
homeownership’s monetary value across the house price distribution. In Table 13, a 10% point 
increase (decrease) in homeownership at the census block level has an average effect of a 2.0% 
point increase (decrease) in pre-crisis house prices and a 4.5% point increase (decrease) post-
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crisis using OLS.  Throughout the study period, the average housing stock in each census block 
was approximately 33 houses. If I assume that 28 of the 33 houses in a census block were owner-
occupied, then the transition of the 29th house from rental to owner-occupancy would increase 
the homeownership rate in the census block by approximately 3% points. Using the OLS 
estimate for the pre-crisis (post-crisis) dataset, the other 28 owner-occupied houses in the block 
would increase in value by approximately 0.59% (1.34%) points. Following Coulson and Li 
(2013), if the average sales price is approximately $307,000 in the pre-crisis period and $355,000 
in the post-crisis period, the monetary value of the house’s tenure transition represents 
approximately $1,800 per house or $50,400 (1,800 * 28) prior to the crisis and approximately 
$4,730 per house or $132,440 (4,730 * 28) for the census block post-crisis. If a 3% annual 
capitalization rate is applied (assuming an infinitely-lived asset), the homeownership externality 
would, on average, yield an annuity of approximately $1,512 ($3,973) per year pre-crisis (post-
crisis) for the owner-occupied properties. 
 The quantile regression results I report in the previous section provide additional insight 
into the distributional effect of homeownership and suggest that the external benefits of 
homeownership vary over the entire distribution of house prices (which serves as a proxy for 
income). In the pre-crisis period I find that a 10% point increase (decrease) has a greater effect, 
approximately 4.3%, on house prices in the lower decile compared to a 2.0% effect in the median 
decile and no effect in the upper decile of the conditional house price distribution. Taking the 
same approach as the previous paragraph, I estimate that the transition of one house would 
increase the other owner-occupied house values by approximately 1.30% points in the lower 
decile, 0.61% in the median decile, and have no effect in the upper decile. Taking into account 
the fact that the typical house value in the upper, median, and lower deciles differ, I estimate the 
monetary value of a house’s tenure transition from rental to owner-occupied to be approximately 
$1,380 per house, or $38,640 per block, in the lower decile, and $1,480 per house, or $41,440 
per block, in the median decile.
29
 Using a 3% annual capitalization rate and assuming an 
infinitely-lived asset, the homeownership externality would, on average, yield an annuity of 
approximately $1,159 in the lower decile and $1,243 in the median decile for owner-occupied 
properties during the pre-crisis period. The homeownership externality has no effect on house 
                                                            
29 The estimation uses an average sales price of $106,000 for the lower decile and $244,000 for the median decile 
during the pre-crisis time period. 
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prices in the upper, Q(0.90), decile. The results demonstrate that using the mean effect 
overestimates the monetary value of the external benefits of homeownership for both the lower 
and median deciles prior to the real estate crisis. It also demonstrates that homeownership has 
little effect on house prices in the upper deciles, despite the fact that they are the primary 
beneficiaries of the federal government’s subsidization of homeownership in the United States. 
Using the same approach for the post-crisis period, I estimate the annuity to be approximately 
$1,050 in the lower decile, $2,822 in the median decile, and $1,806 in the upper decile.
30
  
 The estimates above provide insight into the distributional effect of homeownership on 
house prices and suggest that the federal tax subsidies are ineffective instruments for promoting 
homeownership. Households that rent, but would prefer to be homeowners are typically low 
income households. However, the primary beneficiaries of the federal tax subsidies are high 
income households who, as shown above, receive less homeownership externality benefits. 
Instead of increasing homeownership, the federal tax subsidies likely increase the amount spent 
on housing by high income households, subsidizing the amount spent on housing rather than 
increasing homeownership.  
5. Conclusion 
 Using microdata that includes information for the entire housing stock in Fulton County, 
Georgia I isolate and examine the effect of homeownership on house prices. I exploit the 
extended timeframe of the data using a research design that explicitly controls for the unobserved 
quality of the individual house as well as time-varying neighborhood effects. I find that the 
average causal effect of homeownership on house prices is much lower than previously reported 
despite using a homeownership measure with a larger scale. I estimate that a 10% increase in 
homeownership results in a 2.6% increase in surrounding house prices. Recognizing that 
changing the scale of a measure alters findings in statistical tests, I run the analysis using areal 
units of differing sizes and several continuous spatial measures. My findings are robust and show 
a causal effect regardless of the homeownership measure employed. Although there are 
limitations to the study as I cannot – due to data limitations – control for several potentially 
endogenous factors such as the redistricting of school zones and crime. 
                                                            
30 The estimation uses an average sales price of $79,000 for the lower decile and $302,000 for the median decile, 
and $600,000 for the upper decile during the post-crisis time period. 
24 
 
This paper also provides a first look at the distributional effect of homeownership on 
nearby house prices. Proponents of subsidizing homeownership contend that homeownership 
creates positive externalities and previous research supports the conjecture (see for example: 
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). I argue that the subsidization of homeownership is only 
justifiable if the external benefits created exceed their cost. I measure the external benefits of 
homeownership in the form of higher house prices over the entire distribution of house prices 
and estimate the benefits from a marginal homeowner across the house price distribution. I show 
that homeownership has a greater effect on house prices in the lower deciles of the conditional 
house price distribution despite the fact that they benefit the least, if at all, from the federal tax 
subsidies for homeownership. On the opposite end of the house price distribution, 
homeownership has little to no effect on house prices in the top decile, despite the fact that they 
benefit the most from the federal tax subsidies for homeownership.  
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Figure 1: Homeownership Rate Change 2002 – 2014 
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Figure 2: Quantile Regression – Independent Variable Coefficients
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Figure 3: Census Block Homeownership Rate by Quantile (2002 – 2014) 
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Figure 4: Pre-crisis Block Homeownership Rate by Quantile (2002-2006) 
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Figure 5: Post-crisis Block Homeownership Rate by Quantile (2007-2014) 
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Figure A1 – Continuous Spatial Measures of Homeownership 
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Figure A2: Homeownership Rate Change 2002 – 2006 
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Figure A3: Homeownership Rate Change 2006 – 2010 
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Figure A4: Homeownership Rate Change 2010 – 2014 
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Appendix B: Examination of Supply Shocks 
 Table 6 shows that some census blocks experienced large annual homeownership rate 
swings. The large annual homeownership swings (greater than 10% - increase or decrease) were 
often precluded by a large influx of newly developed single-family detached houses within the 
census block. When estimating the effect of homeownership on house prices in an area that has a 
large increase in newly developed houses it’s possible that the influx of new houses increases the 
homeownership rate and house prices simultaneously. As such, it’s important that the two effects 
are properly controlled for when estimating the effect of homeownership on house prices. 
 I identify 33 census blocks whose housing stock more than doubled in one year – which I 
flag using an indicator variable (Shock). I then create a control sample whereby I identify census 
blocks that (i) did not experience a supply shock (their housing stock did not increase by more 
than 10 percent in any given year) and (ii) are located in the same census tract, but not in the 
same census block-group (they are located in the same geographic area, but not in the immediate 
area). After identifying the control group I then construct a matched sample that identifies 
comparable properties that sold in the same calendar year, have the same number of bedrooms 
and bathrooms, and were built within five years of at least one of the Shock records. After 
dropping observations with no match - the control group of comparable properties (N=444) is 
over twice as large as the Shock group (N=1,100). 
 Properties in the census blocks are matched both before and after the supply shock, so 
that the control group’s house price trend serves as a counterfactual in the analysis. The approach 
assumes that the neighborhood characteristics in the treatment and control groups do not differ 
significantly. The approach also assumes that the control group’s house price trend is 
representative of the house price trend that the treatment group’s house price trend in the absence 
of the housing stock shock.
31
 I then modify equation (1) to include the Shock indicator variable 
and two interaction terms: Shock*After and Shock*After*Trend. The coefficient on the Shock 
indicator variable estimates the constant price difference between houses in the treatment and 
control census blocks for the length of the study. The Shock*After interaction estimates a 
“permanent” price difference after the shock and the Shock*After*Trend interaction estimates the 
                                                            
31 Wiley (2015) uses a similar approach to examine the impact of commercial development on surrounding 
residential house prices. 
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price difference after the shock over time. The Trend variable measures the number of years 
relative to the occurrence of the shock {…,-3,-2,-1,0,+1,+2,…} where 0 represents the year that 
the housing stock more than doubled.
32
 
 The results of the estimation are displayed in Table B1. Column 1 estimates the effect of 
homeownership on house prices using equation (1) - providing a baseline estimate (without the 
three additional variables) using the smaller subsample of data so that it can be compared to the 
full sample estimates in Table 9. Column 2 includes both the local market controls (Turnover, % 
Remodeled Houses, and Distressed Turnover) and the three additional supply shock variables. 
Whereas, column 3 includes the three shock variables, but not the local market controls. The 
results in both columns suggest that a supply shock does not have a significant effect on house 
prices. Whereas, the coefficient on the homeownership variable remains positive and significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
32 Only supply shocks that occurred in 2005 or later are included in the analysis in this section. Shocks that occurred 
earlier are not included in either the treatment or control groups. The 2005 cutoff was chosen to allow a minimum of 
three years of sales transactions in the “before” baseline trend. 
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Abstract 
 
I examine the recent rise of bidding wars and their effectiveness relative to traditional listing 
strategies. A simple theoretical model predicts that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war 
will be most effective in housing markets with high levels of latent demand. I use school quality 
as a proxy for latent demand as households with children naturally want their kids to go to the 
best school possible. I posit that the limited supply of housing within high quality school districts 
creates latent demand for housing within those districts. Evidence from Atlanta supports the 
model - I find that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war is more effective in markets with 
latent demand. However, underpricing does not outperform traditional listing strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
When a homeowner decides to list their house for sale they can choose either a 
“traditional” or “bidding war” listing strategy.  The seller sets a list price that serves as an upper 
bound in a traditional listing strategy. The high list price is often adjusted downwards after a 
series of negotiations between the buyer and seller. In a bidding war strategy the seller sets a list 
price that serves as a lower bound. The low list price is meant to incite immediate activity and 
multiple competing bids, thereby, pushing the sale price upwards. Han and Strange (2014) 
estimate that a growing number of sales, over 30 percent in some markets, were involved in a 
bidding war. The increasing prevalence of bidding wars raises several questions. What are the 
underlying catalysts for bidding wars? Were the bidding wars intentional or unintentional? Can 
house sellers and/or their agent intentionally underprice a house to incite a bidding war? When a 
house is listed using a bidding war strategy (i.e. intentionally underpriced) does it outperform 
traditional listings? The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that latent demand, as 
proxied by school quality, along with supply constraints are two of the primary catalysts 
underlying the seller and/or agent’s choice of listing strategy. While this is not the first to study 
the link between house price and school quality, the link to bidding wars has not been studied 
thus far and is one contribution of this paper.
1
  
Any attempt to estimate bidding war’s market share or causal effect on house prices is 
complicated by the fact that I do not know which listing strategy was employed or the number of 
bids received for each sales transaction. Previous studies simply assume that any house that sold 
for a price above its original list price was involved in a bidding war. Although the assumption 
satisfies the requirement that the seller’s list price served as a lower bound, it does not identify 
whether the seller listed the house using a bidding war strategy. Another distinguishing feature of 
this study is the examination of whether the bidding war was intentional or unintentional. Sellers 
that want to intentionally start a bidding war will list their house for less than their expected sales 
price. Whereas, sellers that list their house above their expected sales price are not intentionally 
trying to start a bidding war. The delineation is important because the recent rise in bidding wars 
gives the impression that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war may be an effective listing 
strategy. Although it may be a false impression if a large fraction of the recent bidding wars are 
                                                            
1 There is a rich literature that studies the link between house prices and school quality. See, for example, Black 
(1999), Bogart and Cromwell (2000), Downes and Zabel (2002), and Figlio and Lucas (2004). 
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unintentional. In addition, intentionally underpricing a house to start a bidding war may attract 
multiple competing offers that push the transaction price above the list price, but still result in an 
unfavorable outcome for the seller. In other words, underpricing a house may incite a bidding 
war, but not maximize the transaction price.  
In this study, I identify neighborhoods with high levels of latent demand as they, by 
definition, contain multiple potential bidders who are waiting to purchase housing in that area. A 
high level of latent demand is a vital component of a bidding war strategy - as its goal is to incite 
immediate activity and multiple competing bids at the time of listing. Thus, neighborhoods that 
have high levels of built up latent demand offer the ideal setting for bidding wars. I use school 
quality as the primary measure of latent demand. School quality allows me to identify 
neighborhoods with built up latent demand because in most MSAs only children who live within 
a school’s attendance boundary can attend the local public school. Households with children 
naturally want their children to attend the best school possible and are faced with two choices. 
They can either purchase housing services in a high quality school district or purchase housing 
services in a lower quality school district and send their children to a private school. For 
households of more modest means, sending their children to a private school may not be an 
option. The limited supply of housing in school districts that have the highest test scores creates 
latent demand for housing within the school district.  
The level of latent demand in a given neighborhood is also a function of the 
neighborhood’s housing supply elasticity. If the neighborhood has a large number of 
undeveloped residential lots, then a portion of the latent demand can be satisfied by building 
additional houses. However, if the neighborhood is highly developed (i.e. there are few 
undeveloped residential lots), then the latent demand for housing will persist as long as the local 
school’s quality remains high relative to nearby school districts. Figure 1 presents a simple 
visualization of the theory. In the figure there are three neighborhoods that differ only in terms of 
school quality and housing supply elasticity. Each neighborhood’s local average school test score 
is displayed in brackets and its housing supply elasticity is represented by the availability of 
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undeveloped residential lots.
2
 In this simple example, I would expect Market A to have the 
highest level of latent demand because it lacks developable lots and has the highest test scores.  
  Although bidding wars have received a good deal of media attention, some of which 
attributes partial blame to them for the housing boom and bust cycle of the 2000s, little is known 
about the forces that drive them or their effectiveness as a sales strategy. I show that built up 
latent demand, as proxied by high quality school districts with inelastic housing supplies, is one 
of the driving forces behind bidding wars. Additionally, real estate agents that advocate 
underpricing a house to incite a bidding war have come under scrutiny as critics argue that it is 
ineffective and constitutes a principal-agent conflict (Bucchianeri and Minson, 2013). The results 
of this study confirm that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war is ineffective. Although, I 
find that real estate agents use a bidding war listing strategy when selling their own house – 
which contradicts the assertion that real estate agents advocate bidding wars purely out of self-
interest.  
2. Background 
Housing transactions are often modeled as a series of negotiations between buyers and 
sellers using a standard search model (Yinger 1981). In a traditional housing search model a 
seller hires a real estate agent to market their house for a given list price. The original list price 
set by the seller is assumed to be the ceiling at which the property can transact (i.e. the highest 
price the seller can possibly attain). When selecting a list price the seller faces a trade-off 
between sale price and time on the market (TOM) (e.g. Trippi 1977; Yavas and Yang 1995; 
Knight 2002).
3
  The trade-off is a function of the seller’s pricing strategy, as the house’s list price 
directly affects the arrival rate of potential buyers. A low list price may increase the arrival rate 
and encourage potential buyers to look at the house sooner. However, a seller may set a higher 
list price as part of their bargaining strategy, because research shows that, on average, it produces 
a higher selling price.
4
 Thus, the lower (higher) the seller lists their property, the more (fewer) 
potential buyers the listing will attract, the shorter (longer) the negotiation process, and the 
shorter (longer) the TOM. 
                                                            
2 An increase in the average test score displayed in brackets represents an increase in the quality of the local school. 
3 Sirmans, MacDonald and Macpherson (2010) provide a detailed overview of previous studies.  
4 See for example Yavas and Yang (1995) 
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Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) examine the degree to which a house is 
overpriced – which they measure as the percentage difference between the actual list price and 
the expected list price given the observable characteristics of the house. Anglin et al. (2003) 
argue that setting the initial list price too high may discourage participation by potential buyers – 
thereby increasing the property’s TOM. Whereas, setting the initial list price too low may result 
in a quick sale – potentially lowering the sales price due to a lack of exposure. The degree of 
overpricing (DOP) measure in Anglin et al. (2003) implicitly assumes that every house uses a 
traditional listing strategy – where the list price is set higher than the expected sales price and 
negotiated downwards. Although 9.3% of the properties in their study sold for more than their 
list price Anglin et al. (2003) do not examine whether sellers intentionally underpriced their 
house to start a bidding war. 
A bidding war listing strategy contains elements of two of the more common real estate 
sales approaches: standard search and auction. Similar to the traditional listing approach, a seller 
lists their house with a real estate agent, but instead of setting a list price that serves as a ceiling 
they intentionally list their house at a price below the expected sales price. The lower list price 
signals that they are not only serious about selling their house but also, similar to a real estate 
auction, attempts to attract multiple buyers that will bid the sales price higher than the original 
list price. If successful, a bidding war listing strategy can minimize the property’s time-on-
market (TOM) and holding costs, while maximizing its sales price.  
 Despite the extensive literature on listing price strategies and their impact on the 
relationship between sales price and TOM, there is a dearth of knowledge related to the 
underpricing of real estate in a search market, especially in regards to strategically underpricing 
real estate in an effort to create a bidding war. Bucchianeri and Minson (2013) examine the 
optimal pricing strategy that sellers should pursue in a search market and find that there is little 
or no benefit to underpricing a house, even in hot markets. They conclude that agents that 
advocate a bidding war listing strategy do so out of self-interest because it increases the 
probability of sale and their likelihood of receiving a commission. Han and Strange (2014) use 
survey data from the National Association of Realtors (NAR) to examine the frequency of 
bidding wars from 1986 – 2010. The authors document the rise of bidding wars, their 
determinants at the MSA level, and the individual characteristics of both buyers and sellers that 
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participated in a bidding war. However, due to the nature of their data Han and Strange (2014) 
do not evaluate whether the seller intentionally underpriced their house to start a bidding war or 
if using a bidding war listing strategy is effective. 
A related strand of literature on auction behavior is of particular interest to this study. 
Bidding wars are similar to auctions in that they have low starting prices and are likely to 
perform better in thicker markets with multiple known potential buyers. Recent studies on 
auction behavior find that auctions which open with low asking prices attract more bids and 
finish with higher prices (Simonsohn and Ariely 2007). Studies that examine auctions in a real 
estate setting offer conflicting evidence. Mayer (1995) develops a framework to compare the 
performance of auctions to negotiated sales (i.e. properties that were sold using the standard 
search process). Mayer (1998) finds that auctions result in a poor match and a discounted price, 
although he does note that auctions will perform worse in down markets with high vacancies. 
Quan (2002) develops a model in which buyers and sellers can choose between a search market 
and an auction. He then examines the two disposition alternatives and finds that vacant lots sold 
for a premium when sold at auction. A recent study by Chow, Hafalir and Yavas (2015) finds 
that auctions generate a higher relative price relative to negotiated sales when (i) demand for the 
house is strong, (ii) the asset is more homogeneous, and (iii) the asset attracts buyers with higher 
valuations. 
In an efficient market, listing strategies should not affect house prices. However, 
researchers have shown that real estate markets are inefficient. For example, Lambson, McQueen 
and Slade (2004) find that out-of-state buyers paid a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful premium for apartment complexes in Phoenix, Arizona. Price distortions also exist 
when real estate agents sell houses that they personally own. Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas 
(2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) find that agent owned houses sell for approximately 4% 
more compared to non-agent owned houses. This study is similar to the aforementioned 
literature, in that I examine the inefficiency of real estate markets. However, I focus on listing 
strategies and their effect on house prices.  
3. Identification Strategy 
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One limitation of this study is that it is impossible to identify whether a property was 
intentionally underpriced to incite a bidding war without contacting the previous owner or listing 
agent, which is time and cost prohibitive given the large dataset and extended timeframe of the 
study. Instead, I develop a detailed identification strategy based on several distinct criteria that 
are intrinsic to bidding wars. Similar to previous studies, the first criterion I propose is that the 
property must sell for more than its list price.
5
 Second, the property must be intentionally 
underpriced. Third, the property must be listed in a thick market. Fourth, the property must not 
be atypical to ensure it appeals to as many potential buyers as possible. Fifth, there must be a 
high level of latent demand for the property.  
The first criterion above identifies houses that were involved in a bidding war. The 
underlying logic is that the house’s sale price was pushed above its list price by competing bids 
from multiple buyers. The first criterion, however, does not identify whether the house was listed 
using a bidding war strategy. The second criterion builds off the first and identifies houses whose 
list price was set below its expected sales price. The second criterion assumes that sellers are 
rational and set their list price based on recent comparable sales. Thus, if a seller sets their list 
price above the expected sales price they choose a traditional listing strategy where the list price 
is an upper bound and the final sales price is determined by a series of negotiations between the 
buyer and seller. If a seller sets their list price below the expected sales price they choose a 
bidding war listing strategy where the final sales price is determined by competition among 
multiple potential buyers who bid against each other in a quasi-auction framework.  
The third criterion, that the property must be listed in a thick market, is indirectly related 
to the second criterion, as sellers must be reasonably confident in their sale price expectation to 
choose a bidding war strategy. In thin markets sellers have fewer comparable sales to draw from 
when setting their sales price expectations, so they are more likely to set a high list price. The 
high list price allows them to extract information from the market that is currently unavailable in 
the form of comparable sales. Additionally, thin markets, by definition, have fewer buyers so a 
low list price may not attract the requisite number of buyers for a successful bidding war.  
                                                            
5 My approach differs slightly as I identify whether the transaction price is greater than both the original and 
terminal list price. The property’s transaction price equals its sales price minus seller concessions. Previous studies 
do not include seller concessions. A property’s terminal list price is its list price in the MLS when the buyer and 
seller reached an agreement and the property was taken off the market.  
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I draw the fourth criterion from previous research that finds that houses with atypical 
features take longer to sell and that sellers of atypical houses tend to set higher original list prices 
relative to the eventual sale price (Haurin 1988; Sass 1988). If a house is similar to recent 
comparable sales I expect its seller to be more confident in their sales price expectation. 
However, if the house is atypical the seller will not be as confident in their sales price 
expectation and is more likely to set a high list price to extract information from the market. 
Thus, I expect houses that are atypical to use a traditional listing strategy. Whereas, houses that 
are more homogeneous will choose between a traditional listing strategy and a bidding war 
strategy. 
The fifth criterion, that the property is located in a neighborhood with a high level of 
latent demand is a vital component of a bidding war because the goal of the listing strategy is to 
incite immediate activity and multiple competing bids at the time of listing. A neighborhood with 
a high level of built up latent demand offers the ideal setting for a bidding war. I identify the 
level of latent demand in a neighborhood by identifying a strong positive externality. If a 
neighborhood offers a strong positive externality that only benefits households that reside within 
that neighborhood, then households who reside outside the neighborhood will compete for 
housing units in that neighborhood when they are listed for sale. The more difficult it is to 
reproduce the positive externality in surrounding neighborhoods, the higher the level of latent 
demand. The level of latent demand for the positive externality is also a function of the 
neighborhood’s housing supply elasticity. If a property is located in a neighborhood that has a 
large number of undeveloped residential lots, then a portion of the latent demand can be satisfied 
by building additional houses in the neighborhood. However, if the neighborhood is fully 
developed then the latent demand for housing will persist over time as long as the positive 
externality remains.  
I use school quality as an instrument for the positive externality mentioned above because 
it cannot easily be reproduced, its market delineations (i.e. school attendance boundaries) are 
clearly defined, and previous research finds that it is one of the most important criteria in the 
home buying process for households with children. For example, Black (1999) finds that parents 
are willing to pay 2.5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in school test scores and Figlio and 
Lucas (2005) find that families make location choices on the basis of school grades. School 
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quality allows me to identify markets with built up latent demand because parents naturally want 
their children to attend the best schools possible and only children who live inside the school 
attendance boundaries can attend the local public school. As such, parents can (i) purchase 
housing services in a high quality school district or (ii) purchase housing services in a lower 
quality school district and send their children to a private school. For households of more modest 
means, private schooling may not be an option.  
3.1 Implementation 
I begin by identifying properties whose transaction price was greater than both its 
original listing price and terminal listing price. To construct the above list price indicator 
variable, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 , I define 𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 as the original list price, 𝐿𝑃𝑖 as the terminal list price, 𝑇𝑃𝑖 as 
the transaction price, 𝑆𝑃𝑖 as the sales price, and 𝑆𝐶𝑖 as the seller concession for house i, where 
𝑇𝑃𝑖 =  𝑆𝑃𝑖 - 𝑆𝐶𝑖. I subtract seller concessions from sales price as concessions are often negotiated 
between the buyer and seller and their inclusion in the sales price could misclassify transactions 
as bidding wars.
6
 Using the definitions above, I then define the 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖  indicator variable as 
follows: 
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 max (𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 
1, 𝑖𝑓 max (𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) < 𝑇𝑃𝑖 
      (1) 
If  𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖  = 1 the house was involved in a bidding war. Next, I identify whether the 
seller used a traditional listing strategy – in which case the bidding war was unintentional – or if 
the seller intentionally underpriced the listing to incite a bidding war. To construct the underprice 
indicator variable, 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 , I define 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 ) as the expected transaction price when the 
house was initially listed on the MLS.
7
 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 max (𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 )
1, 𝑖𝑓 max (𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) < 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 )
      (2) 
Using (2) I further classify the bidding war transactions identified in (1) as intentional if 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 1 and unintentional if 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 0. As noted earlier, one drawback of this 
                                                            
6 Over 53% of the sales transactions in the dataset included a seller concession. Of the transactions that included a 
seller concession the average concession was approximately 2.2%.  
7 The steps taken to estimate the expected transaction price for each listing are detailed in Appendix A. 
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study is that I do not know if houses that were underpriced (𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 1) and did not sell 
above their list price (𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 = 0) were involved in a bidding war that did not push their 
transaction price above their list price.  
After classifying the bidding war transactions I examine how thick the market was when 
the house was listed. A bidding war requires multiple competing bids to push the sales price 
above the original list price, so I argue that bidding wars will be more likely in thick markets.
8
 
Additionally, sellers must be reasonably confident in their sales price expectation to be willing to 
employ a bidding war strategy. I create several measures of market thickness. First, I create two 
measures in the immediate vicinity of the subject property: competition and listing density. The 
two measures are similar to those employed in Turnbull et al. (2006) and Zahirovic-Herbert and 
Turnbull (2008). To construct the market competition variable I define 𝑙𝑖 as the listing date and 
𝑠𝑖 as the sales date for house i. I then calculate house i's time-on-market as 𝑠𝑖-𝑙𝑖+1. If house j is 
also simultaneously listed for sale, then the two houses have an overlapping time-on-market of 
𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) = min[𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗] – max[𝑙𝑖, 𝑙𝑗] + 1. Using the definitions above, the neighborhood market 
competition variable, C, measures the competition for house i as: 
𝐶𝑑 = ∑(𝑑 − 𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗))
2
𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗)         (3) 
where 𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) is the straight-line distance in miles between houses i and j. In this study, I measure 
𝐶𝑑 as the summation taken over all competing houses j within d miles of house i. I measure 
competition at several continuous spatial distances (radiuses of .25, .50, and 1 mile). 
The next market competition variable, L, represents the listing density for house i. Listing 
density measures competing overlapping listings per day on the market. I estimate the listing 
density using a numerator similar to the competition variable in (3) and a denominator that is 
house i's time-on-market as: 
𝐿𝑑 = ∑
(1−𝐷(𝑖,𝑗))
2
𝑂(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑠(𝑖)−𝑙(𝑖)+1
          (4) 
                                                            
8 This sentiment is echoed and confirmed in Han and Strange (2013) and Liu et al. (2015). Liu et al (2015) find that 
mansions, which have atypical features and trade in thin markets, never adopt a bidding war strategy. They argue, 
similar to Han and Strange (2013) that mansions’ atypical features and thin market increases the risk that multiple 
bids for the mansion would not arrive at the same time even if the original list price was set well below the expected 
sale price. 
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 In addition to the market competition and listing density variables, I also include an 
inventory and turnover variable at the elementary school level. Inventory measures the supply of 
single-family detached houses available for sale in the elementary school zone. I calculate 
Inventory as the total number of houses available for sale (i.e. listed on the MLS) during the 
month that the house was listed divided by the average number of sales per month over the 
previous year. Turnover measures the demand for housing over time within the elementary 
school zone. I calculate Turnover as the annualized average number of sales transactions over the 
previous three months divided by the housing stock.   
Previous research finds that houses with unusual attributes sell for less and take longer to 
sell (Haurin 1988) and that real estate auctions generate a higher price relative to negotiated sales 
when the asset is more homogeneous (Chow et al. 2015). As such, I examine the atypicality of 
each house because I expect that houses with fewer unusual features will appeal to a broader 
market, thereby rendering a bidding war listing strategy feasible. Conversely, atypical houses 
will appeal to a smaller market segment, so a bidding war strategy is not feasible. I estimate the 
atypicality of each house following the framework in Turnbull et al. (2006) that measures 
atypicality as the extent to which a given house is either larger or smaller, in terms of its square 
feet of living area, relative to other houses in its surrounding neighborhood.
9
 To create the 
atypicality measure, I index every house within a given radius of house i by J and estimate the 
house’s relative size. The relative house size is estimated as follows: 






Jj jj
Jj jji
i
NLivingarea
NLivingareaLivingarea
Localsize
/
                 (5) 
where Nj is the number of surrounding houses in the neighborhood J. I then define the relative 
size variables A_Largeri and A_Smalleri as the absolute value of the positive and negative values 
of Localsizei as follows: 
A_Largeri = {
0                   , 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ≤ 0
|𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|, 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 > 0
                   (6) 
                                                            
9 Turnbull et al. (2006) estimate the atypicality of a house relative to other houses that were listed for sale, as their 
dataset did not include information on houses that were not listed for sale. If houses that are listed for sale are 
significantly different than houses that are not listed for sale then the measure employed in Turnbull et al. (2006) 
may be biased. The dataset includes information on houses that were and were not listed for sale, so I create the 
atypicality measure using the entire single-family detached housing stock.  
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A_Smalleri = {
0                   , 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ≥ 0
|𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|, 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 < 0
       (7) 
where the relative size variables allow for asymmetric relative house size effects on a house i’s 
market outcome. Similar to competition, I measure the atypicality of a house using several 
continuous spatial distances (radiuses of .25, .50, and 1 mile) and within elementary school 
districts. 
I expect more bidding wars to occur in neighborhoods with a high level of latent demand 
because bidding wars require multiple competing bids to push the transaction price above its 
original list price. Assuming a thick market and low level of atypicality, a house located in a 
neighborhood with a high level of latent demand will, by definition, have multiple interested 
bidders waiting to bid on it when it is listed. Thus, neighborhoods with high levels of latent 
demand offer the ideal setting to employ a bidding war listing strategy. I estimate the latent 
demand for housing in a neighborhood using local school quality.  
To estimate the local school quality for each transaction, I identify and assign each house 
to their local elementary school based on school attendance boundaries using a geographical 
information system. After assigning each house to the appropriate school, I then merge the 
transaction data with the average test score for the corresponding school. The local elementary 
school’s average school test score serves as a proxy for local school quality.10 I also measure the 
local housing supply elasticity as the percent of developed residential lots in the specified areal 
unit in which the house is located. To construct the housing supply elasticity measure I define 𝑢𝐽 
as the number of undeveloped lots and 𝑓𝐽 as the total number of developed lots in neighborhood 
J. I then estimate the neighborhood’s housing supply elasticity as: 
𝐸𝐽 = 𝑢𝐽 / (𝑢𝐽 + 𝑓𝐽)          (8) 
In the empirical analysis I expect to find the highest levels of latent demand in housing markets 
that have high quality schools and are highly developed. 
4. Data  
                                                            
10 I describe the elementary attendance boundaries, redistricting of the boundaries, and school test score data in 
Section 4. 
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The dataset I employ in this study includes several data sources. The transaction level 
data was provided by the Georgia Multiple Listing Service (GAMLS). The transaction data 
includes every single-family detached house that was listed for sale on the GAMLS from January 
1, 1997 to September 30, 2014, regardless of whether it sold or not. The data’s coverage area 
includes four counties (Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett) that make up the core of Atlanta’s 
metropolitan housing market. The GAMLS data contains detailed information on the property’s 
location, lot size, age, structural characteristics (number of bedrooms, bathrooms, etc.), and sales 
conditions (foreclosure, short sale, etc.).  The GAMLS data also includes listing information 
(listing date, list price, sales price, etc.) that I use to calculate time-on-market and identify houses 
that were marketed using a bidding war strategy.  
I supplement and validate the GAMLS data with parcel level information from each 
county’s tax assessor office. The tax assessor data contains information for the entire single-
family detached housing stock regardless of whether the house was listed for sale or not during 
the study period. The tax assessor data was obtained from CoreLogic and includes additional 
information such as the house’s square feet of living area that is not available in the GAMLS 
dataset. After merging the GAMLS and CoreLogic datasets I geocode the entire housing stock 
and identify the local elementary school that the occupant’s children are eligible to attend based 
on the property’s address. I use School Attendance Boundary Survey (SABS) files that were 
obtained from Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to 
associate each housing transaction with its local elementary school and corresponding school 
district. Similar to previous research that examines school quality’s impact on house prices I 
focus on elementary schools because it is the only school-level that allows for enough within-
district variation.  
The SABS files only include the school attendance boundaries for 2014. After assigning 
each house to its elementary school in 2014, I also identify whether the house is located in a 
school attendance zone that has been affected by redistricting during the study period. 
Redistricting is necessary in school districts where the school age population within the 
attendance zone outgrows the occupancy capacity of the school that serves it.
11
 Information on 
                                                            
11 This was a relatively common occurrence within in the metro-Atlanta area during the time period of this study due 
to the rapid growth in the student population. For example, Gwinnett County School District grew from 
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redistricting was obtained directly from the Atlanta Public School, City of Decatur, Cobb 
County, DeKalb County, Fulton County, Gwinnett County, and Marietta City school districts’ 
planning departments. 
Using data obtained from the Georgia Department of Education I create several measures 
of school quality based on each elementary school’s average Criterion-Referenced Competency 
Test (CRCT) scores.
12
 The CRCT was implemented in the spring of 2000 and retired in 2014 
when it was replaced by the Georgia Milestones Assessment System. I create a static overall 
average test score variable using each elementary school’s 2000 to 2014 CRCT test scores as 
well as a non-static annual average test score variable. I use the static overall average variable as 
a proxy for school quality when running the empirical analysis on the entire dataset (1997-2014). 
An obvious drawback of the static measure is that elementary school test scores will vary from 
year to year and the static measure does not take improvement (retrogression) into consideration. 
As such, I also use annual CRCT score averages and restrict the data to a subsample that includes 
the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2014.
13
  
 Students who take the CRCTs are not compared to each other based on their raw score, 
but are measured based on whether they meet specific academic standards outlined by the 
Georgia Department of Education. In addition to a raw test score, a student’s achievement in 
each content area is classified into one of three performance levels: Student Met Standard, 
Student Did Not Meet Standard, or Student Exceeded Standard. Students’ CRCT results are 
made available to the public at an aggregated school and system level each year. The primary 
test score variable used in the analysis is the average standard score for each elementary school 
that I calculate by normalizing and averaging each school's test scores across grades three 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
approximately 110,330 students in the 2000-2001 school year to approximately 175,800 in the 2014-2015 school 
year.  
12 Georgia law, as amended by the A+ Education Reform Act of 2000, requires that all students in first through 
eighth grade take the Reading, English/Language Arts, and Math CRCTs. Students in third through eighth grade also 
must take the Science and Social Studies CRCTs. The CRCTs are administered in late spring each year and the 
results are released prior to the end of the school year. The CRCT is designed to measure student achievement of 
state-mandated content standards. Additional information is available on the Georgia Department of Education’s 
website (http://www.gadoe.org/). 
13 The CRCT test scores are typically released in June of the year they were administered. I associate the test scores 
from the 1999-2000 school year to sales in the third and fourth quarter of 2000 and the first and second quarter of 
2001. The 2000-2001 test scores are then associated to sales in the third quarter of 2001 and so on. 
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through five.
14
 Similar to previous research I focus on the average Math and Reading test scores 
for each elementary school.
15
  
Seasonality variables are also included to examine school quality’s role in a seller’s 
decision to use a bidding war strategy. Seasonality likely plays a role because homebuyers with 
school-age children search within a narrow timeframe (i.e. spring and early-summer) – that way 
their children’s education is not disrupted by a mid-year change of schools. To examine 
seasonality’s role in bidding wars I create monthly and quarterly variables where Winter includes 
houses listed in January, February and March; Spring includes houses listed in April, May and 
June; Summer includes houses listed in July, August and September; and Fall includes houses 
listed in October, November and December.    
Finally, I match each house with its 2010 census block, block-group, and tract. The 
predefined census groupings do not coincide with the school attendance boundaries.  I use the 
census block-group identifications to match the houses with census data. After merging the 
datasets and removing records with missing fields there are 542,354 unique listing records, of 
which 408,959 resulted in a successful sales transaction. Two key fields, Agent Owned and 
Agent Related, are not populated for the entire length of the study so I parse the public remarks 
section of MLS data to populate the fields.
16
 I also parse the public remarks section to identify 
and update missing information for every field used in the empirical analysis. For example, if the 
public remarks section states that the property is a “fixer-upper”, but the listing agent did not 
                                                            
14 From 2000 to 2003, I only use fourth grade CRCT test scores because only grades four, six, and eight were tested 
from 2000 to 2002. The test score variables from 2004 to 2014 include grades three through five. 
15 I also create a variable based on the percent of students in the elementary school that met or exceeded the CRCT 
standards. I create the variable by normalizing and averaging each school's percent of students that met or exceed 
the standards across grades three through five. This measure is the same as the average standard score assigned to 
each elementary school on the popular school ranking website schooldigger.com. As an additional robustness check 
I also create a variable that includes the following test scores for grades three through five: CRCT Reading, CRCT 
English Language Arts, CRCT Math, CRCT Science, and CRCT Social Studies. The findings are similar regardless 
of the school test score measure employed. 
16 The Agent Owned field is unavailable prior to 2006 and the Agent Related field is unavailable prior to 2009. I 
populate the fields by parsing the public remarks section of the MLS. For example, if the public remarks states that 
the “owner is agent”, “agent is owner”, “seller is agent”, “agent is seller”, “owner is real estate agent”, “seller is real 
estate agent”, “owner is licensed agent”, “owner/agent”,  “seller/agent”, or “seller is licensed agent” then I update 
the Agent Owned indicator variable accordingly. A similar string of key words is used to populate the Agent Related 
field. 
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mark the “fixer-upper” box when filling out the MLS input sheet I update the indicator variable 
accordingly.
17
  
After updating the variables using the public remarks, I apply several filters to 
systematically clean the data. I winsorize the top and bottom 1 percent of sale and list prices and 
top 1 percent of time-on-market to remove potential outliers. I remove houses that were built 
prior to 1900 and exclude houses that have less than 500 square feet of living area, more than 5 
acres of land, more than 6 bedrooms or bathrooms, a negative time-on-market, or a seller 
concession greater than 9 percent of the house’s sales price.18 I also remove listings that included 
additional buildings/lots or were listed as a waterfront, rental, tear down, incomplete 
construction, new construction, or fixer upper property. The cleaned dataset includes 283,622 
unique listings that resulted in successful transactions, of which 214,697 were non-distressed 
transactions. Summary statistics for the key variables of interest are available in Table 1. The 
average transaction price for the entire sample was $198,243 which was approximately $7,608, 
or 3.7 percent, less than the average list price at the time of sale. Approximately 9 percent of the 
sample sold for more than their original list price (Above LP) and an additional 4 percent sold for 
more than their reduced list price (Above Reduced LP).
19,20
  
[Insert Table 1] 
In the second and third sections of Table 1 the data is partitioned into non-distressed and 
distressed subsamples to show that the subsamples’ listing strategies, sales processes, and market 
outcomes differ. Houses in the distressed subsample were, on average, older, smaller, and in 
neighborhoods with lower school test scores. The distressed subsample also had a lower average 
sales price, took longer to sell, and were more likely to sell for more than their original list price. 
Above LP transactions represented approximately 15 percent of the distressed subsample 
compared to only 9 percent in the non-distressed subsample. 
                                                            
17 A complete list of the key words used when parsing the public remarks is available upon request. 
18 I remove all records that have a seller concession greater than 9% as that is the upper limit designated in Fannie 
Mae’s Interested Party Contributions (IPC) guidelines. FHA loans limit seller concessions to 6% of the sales price 
and require that each dollar that exceeds the six percent limit be subtracted from the property's sale price. 
19 Approximately 13 percent of the sample had a sales price that exceeded its original list price. The 4 percent 
difference highlights the fact that not accounting for seller concessions would result in a large number of 
transactions being misclassified as bidding wars. 
20 The above reduced list price grouping includes all sales transactions where the transaction price was greater than a 
list price that was reduced at least once over the course of its listing period. 
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The time-on-market measure in Table 1 was constructed using both sold and unsold 
listings where properties that were taken off the market and relisted within 60 days are treated as 
a continuous listing.
21
 Approximately 4 percent of the transactions were relisted at least once 
prior to their sale. The average time-on-market for the entire sample was just under 84 days. In 
Figure 2 (3) I graph time-on-market kernel density estimates for all non-distressed sales 
transactions (with a TOM less than or equal to 90 days).
22
 In both figures the transactions are 
partitioned into six groups: above original list price, above reduced list price, above increased 
list, below or equal to original list price, below or equal to reduced list price, and below or equal 
to increased list. As expected, sales transactions with a reduced list price have a longer time-on-
market, as the list price reduction signals that the property did not transact earlier at the original 
list price. Sales transactions whose list price increased also have a longer average time-on-market 
compared to sales that did not change their list price. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
The two figures illustrate the fact that a high proportion of above original list price 
transactions sold quickly. However, there are a large number of above original list price 
transactions that took an extended amount of time to sell. If one of the primary goals of a bidding 
war is to incite immediate activity then Figures 2 and 3 highlight the need to further refine the 
proxy for bidding wars. As such, I create several bidding war measures using various TOM 
cutoffs. My preferred bidding war measure includes all above original list price transactions that 
sold within 28 days. The 28 day cutoff signifies that the listing incited immediate activity and 
multiple bids. Although I do not have information on the number of bids received, it is more 
plausible that a transaction price was pushed higher by multiple bids early in its listing cycle (i.e. 
four weeks or less) compared to a house that was listed for ten weeks.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
4.1 Underpriced Listings and Bidding Wars 
                                                            
21 TOM = [Sale Date] – [Initial Listing Date] – [Days not on MLS] 
22 90 days or 3 months represents the average length of a listing contract agreement between sellers and their agents 
in the sample. 
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 Han and Strange (2014) classify a transaction as a bidding war if its sales price exceeded 
its list price.
23
 Although this approach identifies houses that were likely part of a bidding war - it 
does not identify if the house was intentionally underpriced to incite a bidding war. If a house 
seller wants to start a bidding war the most effective strategy would be to set their list price lower 
than their expected sales price – similar to an auction. The results in the top section of Table 2 
examine whether underpriced houses sold for more than their list price (columns 3 to 6) and 
expected transaction price (columns 7 to 10).  
[Insert Table 2] 
Underpricing a house results in a bidding war approximately 9 percent of the time – 
although only 1 percent of the houses in the underpriced subsample sold for more than their 
expected transaction price. The transaction price for the overpriced subsample was less likely to 
result in a bidding war (~5%), but much more likely to exceed its expected transaction price 
(~76%). The middle and bottom sections of Table 2 are filtered to only include houses that were 
part of a bidding war. In the middle section, columns 1 and 2 show that 50 percent of bidding 
wars, as proxied by Above LP transactions, were intentionally underpriced. The underpriced 
transactions represent a subset of houses that used a bidding war listing strategy and were 
successful in terms of inciting a bidding war. Of the houses that used a bidding war listing 
strategy, only 13 percent sold for more than their expected transaction price. Using the preferred 
proxy (Above LP [TOM ≤ 28 days]) in the bottom section, I estimate that 55 percent of the 
houses that were involved in a bidding war were intentionally underprice – of which only 11 
percent exceeded their expected transaction price.  
The results in the top section of Table 2 suggest that bidding wars occur more often when 
a house is underpriced and that inciting a bidding war by underpricing a house may come at the 
expense of a lower than expected transaction price. This fact is further reinforced in the middle 
and bottom sections of Table 2 - which only include transactions that involved a bidding war.
24
 
Even when conditioning on a successful bidding war, only 11 to 13 percent of the underpriced 
listings sold for more than their expected transaction price. 
                                                            
23 As noted earlier, this study uses transaction price instead of sales price. 
24 In other words, underpriced houses that did not sell for more than their list price were removed. 
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4.2 Bidding War Frequency  
To examine the frequency of bidding wars over time I partition the dataset into annual 
subsamples from 1998 to 2014 in Table 3. The average time-on-market, premium above list 
price, inventory, turnover, and the number of transactions are displayed for the entire sample and 
several distinct groupings. The number of houses that sold for more than their list price, which 
has been used as a proxy for bidding wars in previous literature, increased during the early- to 
mid-2000s, accounting for as much as 10.2 percent of the total non-distressed sales transactions 
in 2001. Bidding wars are often anecdotally associated with the housing boom and I do find that 
the number of sales that transacted above their list price decreased during the financial crisis. 
However, Table 3 shows that the decrease in bidding wars was temporary and that their market 
share started increasing back to pre-crisis levels in 2012. Bidding wars represented 7.5 percent of 
the market prior to the real estate crisis (2003 – 2006), 3.0 percent during the housing bust 
(2007-2011), and 7.1 percent during the housing recovery (2012-2014) in Atlanta.
25
 The 
reemergence of bidding wars after the financial crisis suggests that they were not a temporary 
byproduct of the housing boom.  
[Insert Table 3] 
The results in the top section of Table 3 also highlight the relationship between bidding 
wars and market conditions. The time-on-market, inventory, and turnover measures represent the 
average market conditions for the elementary school zones where the bidding wars took place. 
When inventory decreased (increased), bidding wars’ market share increased (decreased). 
Whereas, when turnover increased (decreased), bidding wars’ market share increased 
(decreased). There was a relatively large increase in the premium above original list price from 
2008 to 2012.
26
 From 1997 to 2007, the premium ranged from 2.8 to 3.7 percent. However, from 
2008 to 2012 the premium ranged from 4.5 to 6.0 percent - averaging approximately 5.4 percent. 
Although there were much fewer bidding wars, in terms of both volume and market share, from 
2008 to 2012 - the houses that were involved in a bidding war benefited from a higher average 
                                                            
25 For comparison purposes, Han and Strange (2014) estimate that 11.4% (9%) of all non-distressed sales sold for 
more than their list price during Atlanta’s housing boom of 2003 – 2006 (housing bust of 2007 – 2010). 
26 Premium Above LP = [TP  – max(OLP, LP)] / [max(OLP, LP)] 
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premium above list. In 2013 and 2014, the premium above list price returned to pre-crisis levels 
although the average TOM was considerably lower.  
The average time-on-market for houses that were involved in a bidding war increased 
leading up to and during the financial crisis, but dropped below pre-crisis levels soon after. The 
high average TOM, especially from 2004 to 2008, does not seem plausible for bidding wars, so I 
report similar descriptive statistics for a subsample of transactions in which transaction price 
exceeded list price and the time-on-market was 28 days or less. As noted earlier, the 28 day 
time-on-market cutoff represents the preferred proxy for bidding wars. Using ‘% Above LP 
[TOM ≤ 28]’ as the proxy, bidding wars represented 2.7 percent of the market prior to the real 
estate crisis (2003 – 2006), 1.6 percent during the housing bust (2007-2011), and 5.5 percent 
during the housing recovery (2012-2014) in Atlanta.  
Next I partition the Above LP [TOM ≤ 28] grouping into intentional and unintentional 
bidding wars. A transaction is considered an intentional bidding war if (i) its transaction price 
exceeded list price, (ii) the house had a time-on-market of 28 days or less, and (iii) the house was 
underpriced. A transaction is considered an unintentional bidding war if its meets requirements 
(i) and (ii), but it was listed for more than its expected transaction price. Intentional bidding wars 
represented 1.5 percent of the market prior to the real estate crisis (2003 – 2006), 1.1 percent 
during the housing bust (2007-2011), and 3.0 percent during the housing recovery (2012-2014). 
Whereas, unintentional bidding wars represented 1.2 percent of the market prior to the real estate 
crisis (2003 – 2006), 0.5 percent during the housing bust (2007-2011), and 2.5 percent during the 
housing recovery (2012-2014). 
4.3 School Quality, Housing Supply Elasticity, and Latent Demand  
Table 4 provides summary statistics by school test score deciles for non-distressed sales 
transactions. Columns 1 to 3 display the average, minimum and maximum school test score for 
each decile.
27
 The deciles were created such that the elementary schools with the lowest average 
school test scores are included in the 1
st
 decile. As school test scores increase so too do their 
                                                            
27 The school test scores in Table 4 represent the static overall average Math and Reading CRCT scores for each 
elementary school from 2000 through 2014. 
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corresponding decile. There are 323 elementary schools in the metro Atlanta area, so each decile 
represents 32 or 33 schools.
28
 
[Insert Table 4] 
Columns 4 to 10 of Table 4 display aggregated transaction level detail for each decile. 
The transaction detail shows that the average annual sales volume per school district and the 
average transaction price increase as the deciles increase. In contrast, the percent of above list 
price sales transactions decrease as the deciles increase. The percent of above list price sales 
represents all transactions in which the transaction price of the property exceeded both its 
original and terminal list price regardless of property’s TOM. Whereas, the percent of bidding 
wars represents all transactions in which the property’s transaction price exceeded its original 
and terminal list price and the property sold in 28 days or less. The bidding war proxy is further 
partitioned into intentional and unintentional bidding wars. Intentional bidding war shares exceed 
unintentional bidding war shares in the upper deciles. Whereas, the unintentional bidding war 
shares exceed or are on par with intentional bidding war shares in the lower school test score 
deciles. Also, note that the average transaction price for the 5
th
 through 8
th
 deciles is not 
monotonic which suggests that homebuyers may only be willing to pay a premium to live in 
neighborhoods located in the top two test score deciles.  
Each decile’s average housing supply elasticity is presented in the final section of Table 
4. Column 11 represents the average number of single-family detached lots in each elementary 
school zone. For each decile, column 12 (14) displays the average number of undeveloped lots in 
an elementary school zone in 1997 (2014) and column 13 (15) displays the corresponding 
average percent of undeveloped lots. In 1997, there was no clear pattern across the deciles. In 
contrast, a clear pattern emerged over time and is visible in 2014. The percent of undeveloped 
lots in the higher quality school deciles decreased over time as demand increased for housing in 
neighborhoods with higher test scores. In 2014, the top two deciles had the lowest percentage of 
developable lots. This stylized fact combined with the upper decile price premium lends 
credence to the expectation that there is latent demand for housing in neighborhoods with higher 
school test scores. 
                                                            
28 School quality is loosely correlated with median household income. High income neighborhoods generally have 
high quality schools. However, high quality schools are also located in lower income neighborhoods. 
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4.4 Transaction to List Price Ratios by School Decile 
In Figure 4 I graph the transaction to original list price ratios for the school test score 
deciles presented in Table 4. Figure 4 includes all non-distressed sales in which the transaction 
price did not exceed its list prices (max (𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 )  and was not underpriced 
(max (𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 )). These transactions represent houses that were listed using a 
“traditional” listing strategy in which the house seller sets a list price that serves as an upper 
bound. Sellers who are uncertain about their expected sales price use the traditional listing 
strategy to extract information from the market. They often set their list price above their 
expected selling price by an amount that increases with their uncertainty about their home’s 
market value (Liu et al. 2015). The high list price is then adjusted downwards after a series of 
negotiations between the buyer and seller. Figure 4 shows that sellers in the upper school test 
score deciles are more certain about their expected sales price, especially during the real estate 
bust and subsequent recovery (2007 – 2014). This suggests that sellers in the upper test score 
deciles are more likely to select a bidding war listing strategy because confidence in sales price 
expectations is a necessary condition when selecting a bidding war listing strategy. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
4.5 Listing Agents and Agent Owned Sales 
 The seller’s decision to underprice their house in an attempt to start a bidding war was 
likely influenced by the real estate agent they chose to list their house. Table 5 displays the 
frequency in which bidding wars are employed by listing agents. Of the 23,340 distinct agents 
with at least one listing in the dataset over one-fourth (27.4%) of the agents had a listing that sold 
above its list price at least once – although that number drops to 16.7 percent when the using the 
preferred TOM ≤ 28 constraint. Approximately 10.4 percent of the agents were involved in at 
least one transaction in which they intentionally underpriced the house and it sold above the list 
price within 28 days. Of the 2,437 agents that employed an intentional bidding war listing 
strategy the majority (74.6%) only did so once. The frequency in which the bidding war listing 
strategy is employed varies greatly by listing agent, but Table 5 shows that numerous listing 
agents have repeatedly employed the strategy for their clients. 
[Insert Table 5] 
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 Real estate agents that advocate underpricing a house to incite a bidding war have come 
under scrutiny as critics argue that it constitutes a principal-agent conflict (Bucchianeri and 
Minson, 2013). Next, I examine whether real estate agents use a bidding war listing strategy 
when selling their own house – which would contradict the assertion that real estate agents 
advocate the listing strategy purely out of self-interest. If real estate agents – who are often better 
informed than their clients (Levitt and Syverson 2008) - advise their clients to use a bidding war 
strategy, but do not employ the strategy themselves it may signal that the agents’ primary motive 
is a quick sale and not the maximization of sales price for their clients. However, if real estate 
agents use bidding wars when listing their own properties it may signal that they believe the 
listing strategy is an effective option.  
The top portion of Table 6 is stratified by the number of agent owned sales transactions. 
Agents with a single agent owned sales transaction intentionally employed a bidding war listing 
strategy 1.3 percent of the time – which is slightly less than the 1.8 percent average for the non-
agent owned sample. However, if the agent owned and sold multiple houses they were more 
likely to use a bidding war listing strategy. Overall, approximately 1.7 percent of the agent 
owned transactions were sold using a bidding war listing strategy – which is in line with the 1.8 
percent average for the non-agent owned sample. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 I also created a subsample of agent owned sales that I filtered to only include agents that 
used a bidding war strategy at least once for a client. After conditioning on the use of a bidding 
war listing strategy for a client, 4.9 percent of the agents in the subsample also used a bidding 
war strategy when they sold their own house.
29
 Thus, real estate agents that advocate the use of a 
bidding war listing strategy for their clients are more likely to use the strategy themselves when 
listing their own house. 
4.6 Transaction Level Analysis of Bidding Wars 
                                                            
29 The subsample consisted of 628 agent owned sales transactions – of which, 31 were underpriced and sold for 
more than their list price. 
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 To further examine the factors that influence bidding wars and a seller and/or agent’s 
decision to use a bidding war listing strategy I estimate several linear probability models that 
take the following form: 
𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 = α + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1  + ε𝑗𝑡         (9) 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the probability that house i located in neighborhood j will (i) be involved 
in a bidding war, (ii) involved in an intentional bidding war, or (iii) involved in an unintentional 
bidding war at time t. 𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑡 represents a vector of K potentially related transaction level correlates, 
𝛽𝑘 represents the corresponding coefficients, α is a constant, and ε𝑗𝑡 is the error term. In addition 
to the three specifications above, I run a specification that examines a house sellers decision to 
underprice their house and a specification the examines the transaction level correlates for 
underpriced houses that result in a bidding war. 
Table 7 presents the results for the five specifications - all of which include census tract 
and time fixed effects in addition to the variables displayed. The first column presents the results 
for bidding wars as proxied by Above LP [TOM ≤ 28]. The second column presents the results 
for houses that used a traditional listing strategy that were involved in a bidding war (i.e. 
unintentional bidding wars) and the third column presents the results for underpriced houses that 
were involved in a bidding war (intentional bidding wars). The analysis was run using sales 
transactions that occurred in elementary school zones that were not affected by redistricting 
initiatives during the study period. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 The results at the top of Table 7 show an interesting pattern among bidding wars and 
school test scores. The results in column 1 suggest that bidding wars are not correlated with 
school test scores. However, the results in column 2 suggest that an unintentional bidding war is 
more likely to occur in a school district with higher test scores. Whereas, an intentional bidding 
war is less likely to occur in a school district with higher test scores. Most of the physical 
characteristics of the house produce mixed results across the three specifications or are 
insignificant in all three – although larger houses are less likely to be involved in bidding wars. 
Using survey data, Han and Strange (2014) find that younger buyers are more likely to have 
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purchased their houses through bidding wars. I include an indicator variable that identifies 
houses that were described as “starter homes” in the MLS listing. The indicator variable is 
positive and significant in column 1. The result confirms the finding in Han and Strange (2014) 
and suggests that “starter homes” – which are often marketed towards young, first-time 
homebuyers – are more likely to be purchased through a bidding war.  
An indicator variable for agent owned houses is insignificant in all three models – 
although transactions in which the agent is related to the seller is significant and negative in two 
of the three specifications. An increase in inventory reduces the likelihood of a bidding war in all 
three specifications. Thus, when supply decreases (increases) bidding wars are more (less) likely 
to occur. Along the same line, as turnover increases (decreases) the likelihood of bidding war 
increases (decreases). Seasonality also plays a role in bidding wars. Houses are much more likely 
to be purchased through a bidding war when they are listed in the first six months of the year.
30
 
The dependent variable in column 4 is the Underprice variable from equation (2). Thus, 
the estimates in column 4 identify the transaction level correlates for houses that were 
intentionally underpriced. The coefficient on school test scores is negative, large, and significant 
– which suggests that house sellers in high quality school districts are less likely to underprice 
their house. The coefficients on the physical characteristics of the house are mixed. Larger 
houses with more bathrooms are more likely to be underpriced. However, houses with five or six 
bedrooms are less likely to be underpriced. Houses listed as estate owned or corporate 
relocations are also less likely to be underpriced when they are listed. The decision to underprice 
a house is not correlated with agent owned, agent related, or the level of inventory on the market 
when the house was listed. It is, however, correlated with market turnover and the season in 
which it is listed. A house is more (less) likely to be underpriced as recent market turnover 
increases (decreases).  
In column 5, the data is further partitioned to only include underpriced listings. The 
dependent variable in column 5 equals 1 if the house was underpriced and resulted in a bidding 
war and 0 if the house was underpriced and did not result in a bidding war. Although houses in 
                                                            
30 In unreported results – a linear probability model that incudes indicator variables for each month instead of the 
seasons shows that houses listed in March, April, and May were more likely to be purchased through a bidding war 
(compared to the omitted category of January). Whereas, listings in October, November, and December were less 
likely to be purchased through a bidding war. Months not mentioned were insignificant in the model. 
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neighborhoods with high school test scores are less likely to be underpriced – they are more 
likely to result in a bidding war when they are underpriced. Smaller houses with three bedrooms 
are more likely to result in a bidding war when underpriced. Agent owned houses are also more 
likely to result in a bidding war when underpriced – which supports the narrative in previous 
literature that agents are better informed than their clients (Levitt and Syverson 2008). 
Surprisingly, underpricing a house to start a bidding war is not correlated to the inventory on the 
market or recent turnover within the market when the property was listed. 
One dynamic not explored in this study is the relationship between bidding wars and 
redistricting of houses among the elementary school zones. If a house in a low (high) quality 
elementary school zone is suddenly redistricted to a high (low) quality school zone it will impact 
the demand for and value of the house (Bogart and Cromwell 2010; Ries and Somerville 2010). 
Although I have information on what elementary school zones were involved in a redistricting 
initiative, I cannot isolate the individual houses that were affected. To ensure the results reported 
in Table 7 are not biased by redistricting initiatives I remove every elementary school zone that 
was redistricted – simplifying the analysis to focus solely on bidding wars and latent demand, as 
proxied by school quality, over time. Thus, I do not explore the link between bidding wars and 
redistricting – primarily because of data restrictions – and leave it for examination in future 
studies on the topic.  
5. Empirical Strategy 
I recognize that a house’s selling price and time-on-market are simultaneously 
determined when a traditional listing strategy, in which the seller sets a high original list price 
and the sales price is negotiated downward, is employed. As such I specify a joint determination 
model similar to Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) as: 
P = 𝜑𝑝(T, X, A, C) + 𝜀𝑃          (10) 
T = 𝜑𝑇(P, X, A, C) + 𝜀𝑇          (11) 
where P is log of transaction price, T is time-on-market, X is a vector of property and location 
characteristics, A represents the atypicality of the house, C is a measure of market thickness that 
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represents the current local housing market conditions, and 𝜀𝑃 and 𝜀𝑇 are the stochastic error 
terms.  
As noted in Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull (2008) the sales price regression in (10) 
would yield the estimated effect of competition C on price as the partial derivative 𝜕𝑃/𝜕𝐶 if 
time-on-market were held constant. Whereas a change in competition while holding time-on-
market constant can be expressed as a change in listing density, such that 𝜕𝑃/𝜕𝐶 = 𝜕𝑃/𝜕𝐿. Thus, 
I rewrite (10) and (11) as: 
P = 𝜑𝑝(T, X, A, L) + 𝜀𝑃          (12) 
T = 𝜑𝑇(P, X, A, C) + 𝜀𝑇          (13) 
 The primary goal of the empirical analysis is to isolate the effect of bidding wars on real 
estate market outcomes. Similar to previous research the joint determination framework in (12) 
and (13) assumes that sellers face a trade-off between sale price and time-on-market. In other 
words, the equations do not consider bidding wars. As such I modify the framework as follows: 
 P = 𝜑𝑝(T, X, A, L, W, Q)         (14) 
T = 𝜑𝑇(P, X, A, C, W, Q)         (15) 
where W is an indicator variable for a property that was involved in a bidding war and Q is the 
quality of the local elementary school. 
I create several measures for the bidding war indicator variable as the original definition 
includes sales transactions with long marketing periods. My preferred measure only includes 
listings that have a time-on-market of 28 days or less.
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 The local school quality variable, Q, is 
created at the elementary school level based on local school boundaries and their corresponding 
average test scores. I use the school test scores as a proxy for latent demand in the housing 
market. I also include interaction terms between the underpriced indicator variable and the 
                                                            
31 I also use measures that include underpriced listings that sold within 14 days (2 weeks), 42 days (6 weeks), and 56 
days (8 weeks). If one of the primary goals of a bidding war is to incite immediate activity then the preferred 
measure of 28 days or less is the most appropriate. I report results for the 28 and 42 day cutoffs. The results for the 
14 and 52 day cutoffs are similar – although the magnitudes of the coefficients differ. 
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continuous school quality variable to examine the effectiveness of bidding wars across 
neighborhoods of varying levels of latent demand. 
5.2 Matched Samples 
 Prior to running the analysis I examine the data for potential sample selection biases. In 
Table 8, the non-distressed subsample from Table 1 has been partitioned into a treatment and 
control group – where Above LP is the proxy for the treatment group (i.e. bidding wars) in the 
top section and Above LP [TOM ≤ 28 days] is the treatment group in the bottom section. Similar 
to Table 7, the data only includes sales transactions from elementary school zones that were not 
affected by redistricting. The t-test results in column 3, which compare the difference between 
the means of the treatment and control groups, identify a potential issue. The list price and TOM 
variables should differ based on the listing approach employed by the seller, but the house 
characteristics should be similar – if not, the empirical analysis may be affected by sample 
selection bias.  
[Insert Table 8] 
To address this potential issue I create two matched samples. The first matching process 
identifies every unique combination of the following neighborhood and house characteristics in 
the treatment group: elementary school zone, transaction year, number of bedrooms, and number 
of bathrooms. I then limit the control sample to only include records that were not underpriced 
and that match at least one of the records in the treatment group on every characteristic. When 
creating the matched sample for the Above LP [TOM ≤ 28 days] treatment group I also remove 
records that sold above their list price (i.e. were not involved in a bidding war). The process 
matches transactions that were involved in a bidding war with transactions that were not. 
The second matching process I employ matches each observation in the treatment group 
with its nearest neighbor in the control group using a one-to-one propensity score matching 
process with replacement.
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 The second matching process requires an exact match on the 
elementary school and transaction year fields – if there is no exact match then the treatment 
record is dropped. Conditional on an exact match, the process then identifies the nearest 
                                                            
32 Propensity score matching techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) have been been employed in residential 
(McMillen 2012) and commercial (Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010; Wiley 2014) real estate studies. 
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neighbor(s) based on the following fields: age, living area, lot size, bedrooms, bathrooms, and 
the latitude and longitude coordinates of the house. The propensity score matching process 
allows replacement - which increases the matching precision, but does so at the expense of 
statistical power (Wiley 2014). The t-statistics for the matched samples in columns 6 and 9 are 
smaller in magnitude which suggests that running the empirical analysis on the matched samples 
will help address potential empirical problems resulting from sample selection bias. 
6. Empirical Results 
A question of primary interest to this study is whether properties that were involved in a 
bidding war sell for a premium (discount) relative to properties that were not involved in a 
bidding war. Table 9 presents the results from a 2SLS regression that controls for time-on-
market. I use houses that sold above their original listing price within 28 days [columns 1, 3, and 
5] and 42 days [columns 2, 4, and 6] as proxies for bidding wars. In addition to the bidding war 
indicator variables I include each school’s annual test score and an interaction between the two 
variables. The results in the top section of Table 9 use the full sample, the middle section uses 
the characteristic matched sample, and the bottom section uses the nearest neighbor matched 
sample. 
[Insert Table 9] 
The results in the top section confirm my expectation that bidding war’s effectiveness 
will vary across markets based on school test scores. Using the school test score data as a proxy 
for latent demand – the results in the top section show that houses that were purchased through a 
bidding war had higher prices neighborhoods with higher levels of latent demand. The results in 
the top section are sensitive to the TOM constraint imposed on the bidding war indicator variable 
and the market cycle. In column 1, I find that houses that were purchased through a bidding war 
resulted in higher prices in neighborhoods with school test scores above 61.9% which, according 
to the decile ranges in Table 5, would include all transactions that took place in neighborhoods in 
the top four deciles and a large portion of the 6
th
 decile. Based on the results I estimate that a 
house in the top decile would, on average, sell for approximately 1.28% more if it was purchased 
through a bidding war. The 1.28% increase represents a premium of approximately $3,868 based 
on the decile’s average sales price of $301,500. Turning my attention to neighborhoods on the 
29 
 
lower end of the school test score range, I find that houses involved in a bidding war sell for a 
discount. A house located in a neighborhood in the bottom decile of school test scores would sell 
for approximately 2.51% less if it was purchased through a bidding war. The 2.51% decrease 
represents a discount of approximately $3,269 based on the decile’s average sales price of 
$130,300. The results in column 2, which uses a TOM cutoff of 42 days are similar – although 
houses in neighborhoods with a test score above 54.4% would sell for a higher price if it were 
involved in a bidding war. 
The extended time period of the study allows me to examine bidding war transactions 
throughout the housing market cycle. In columns 3 to 6, I partition the dataset into two 
subperiods that represent “up” and “down” markets. Columns 3 and 4 represent an up market in 
which house prices were rising in the metro Atlanta housing market. The results in column 3 (4), 
show that houses that were purchased through a bidding war sold for, on average, a 1.83% 
(2.49%) premium from 2000 to 2006. Columns 5 and 6 represent a down market in which house 
prices rapidly declined and then slowly recovered in the metro Atlanta housing market. The 
results in columns 5 and 6 suggest that houses that were involved in a bidding war only sold for a 
premium in neighborhoods that had a high level of latent demand from 2007 to 2014. . In column 
5, houses that were purchased through a bidding war resulted in higher prices in neighborhoods 
with school test scores above 80.2% which, according to the decile ranges in Table 4, would 
include all transactions that took place in neighborhoods in the top two deciles and a portion of 
the 8
th
 decile. 
In the middle and bottom sections of Table 9, I re-run the analysis using the characteristic 
matched and nearest neighbor matched subsamples. The results in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 9 
use the matched samples in the top section of Table 8. The results in columns 1, 3, and 5 of 
Table 9 use the matched samples in the bottom section of Table 8. After controlling for potential 
sample selection biases the results from the matched sample sections of Table 9 suggest that 
houses that were purchased through bidding wars sell for, on average, less than houses that used 
a traditional listing strategy. The results do, however, suggest that houses that were purchased 
through a bidding war fared better in neighborhoods with higher levels of latent demand. For 
example, in column 1 of the nearest neighbor matched section – houses that were purchased 
30 
 
through a bidding war sold for a 7 percent discount. However, the interaction term shows that the 
discount decreased as the school test score increased. 
6.1 Repeat Sales Specification 
Although the dataset includes detailed information on every parcel, it may still be subject 
to an omitted variable bias - as it is impossible to include every physical attribute related to the 
house in a hedonic model. One potential concern with the results in the previous sections is that 
the houses that were purchased through bidding wars differed in quality relative to the houses 
that were sold using a traditional listing strategy. This is particularly important given the 
differing results in the full and matched sample analysis. In the next step of the analysis I address 
these concerns by explicitly controlling for the unobserved quality of the individual house using 
a repeat-sales specification with house fixed effects. In addition, I partition the bidding war 
sample into intentional and unintentional bidding wars to examine their performance separately. 
[Insert Table 10] 
The results in column 1 of Table 10 are comparable to the full sample results in column 1 
of Table 9. Houses that were purchased through bidding wars result in higher prices in 
neighborhoods with school test scores above 61.8% which, according to the decile ranges in 
Table 5, would include all transactions that took place in neighborhoods in the top four deciles 
and a large portion of the 6
th
 decile. Based on the results in column 1 of Table 10 - I estimate that 
a house in the top decile would, on average, sell for approximately 1.79% more if it was involved 
in a bidding war. The 1.79% increase represents a premium of approximately $5,387 based on 
the decile’s average sales price of $301,500. Turning my attention to neighborhoods on the lower 
end of the school test score range, I find that houses that sold through a bidding war fared much 
worse. A house in the bottom school score decile would sell for a discount of approximately 
3.46% if it was acquired through a bidding war. The 2.51% decrease represents a discount of 
approximately $4,514 based on the decile’s average sales price of $130,300. 
In column 2, I include indicator variables that identify whether the bidding war was 
intentional or unintentional. A transaction is considered an unintentional bidding war if it was 
listed using a traditional listing strategy (i.e. its list price exceeded it expected transaction price) 
and it sold above its list price. A transaction is considered an intentional bidding war if its list 
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price was set below its expected transaction price and it sold above its list price. Based on these 
definitions alone, I expect that unintentional bidding wars will outperform intentional bidding 
wars – in which case, unintentional bidding wars are likely biasing the coefficients in the earlier 
analysis upwards. The results in column 2 show that unintentional bidding wars sell for a 9.8% 
premium above traditional listings. Whereas, intentional bidding wars sell for a 1.3% discount 
relative to traditional listings. The stark difference between the two coefficients highlights the 
need to carefully delineate between the two types of bidding wars – especially when trying to 
decide whether to list a house using a bidding war strategy (i.e. underpricing).  
In column 3, I interact the intentional and unintentional bidding war indicator variables 
with school test scores. Intentional bidding wars still sell for a discount, but that discount 
decreases as the school test scores increase. In contrast, unintentional bidding wars sell for a 
premium, but that premium decreases as school test scores increase. In column 4, I isolate the 
effect of intentional bidding wars by removing unintentional bidding wars. The results, similar to 
column 3, show that houses that are underpriced and purchased through a bidding war sell for a 
discount relative to traditional listings. Thus, it appears that using a bidding war listing strategy 
is ineffective – regardless of the latent demand within the market. This is especially true when 
one considers the fact that the measure does not include underpriced houses that did not sell 
above their list price. 
6.2 Alternative Specifications 
Up to this point, I’ve used school quality as the sole proxy for latent demand in the 
analysis. In Table 11 I interact the bidding war indicator variables with three additional proxies. 
In column 1 and 2, I use inventory as a proxy for latent demand. When inventory levels are low, 
the likelihood of a bidding war increases (see Table 7) and houses purchased through a bidding 
war sell at higher prices according to column 1. The results in column 2 suggest, similar to the 
previous results, that unintentional bidding wars sell for a premium. Unlike previous results, the 
results in column suggest that the effectiveness of bidding wars is tied to market inventory. As 
inventory decreases (increases), house prices for intentional bidding wars increases (decreases). 
Thus, column 2 suggests that underpricing to incite a bidding war may be effective in markets 
with low inventory levels – although it’s important to note that houses that were underpriced and 
did not result in a bidding war are not included in the measure. 
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In columns 3 and 4, I interact the bidding war indicator variables with the turnover 
measure. The interaction variables in both columns are insignificant. In column 3, houses that 
were purchased through a bidding war sold for a premium. However, column 4 shows that the 
positive coefficient is largely due to unintentional bidding wars. In columns 5 and 6, I interact 
the bidding war indicator variables with a measure of the average time-on-market. The average 
time-on-market variable is calculated at the elementary school level based on the last 12 months 
of sales transactions. If there is latent demand for housing in the elementary school zone then the 
average TOM should be lower. The results in column 5 show that houses purchases through a 
bidding war sell for higher prices when the average time-on-market is lower. Interestingly, this 
result carries over to intentional bidding wars in column 6 – suggesting that intentional bidding 
wars are effective if the recent time-on-market within the elementary school zone was less than 
55.2 days.
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7. Conclusion 
Using transaction level data that accounts for seller concessions, I find that bidding wars’ 
market share increased over the past two decades; albeit at a slower rate than previously 
reported. Despite bidding wars’ increasing prevalence little is known about the factors that drive 
them or their effectiveness as a listing strategy. I develop a simple theory that predicts that 
bidding wars will be more effective in markets with high levels of latent demand. I use school 
quality as a proxy for latent demand because households with children naturally want their kids 
to attend the best school possible. I argue that the limited supply of housing within high quality 
school districts creates latent demand for housing within those districts. Sellers that list their 
houses using a bidding war strategy attempt to incite immediate activity and multiple competing 
bids. Thus, neighborhoods with known latent demand offer the ideal setting for a bidding war.  
The results suggest that intentional bidding wars are more effective in neighborhoods 
with latent demand. However, I show that intentionally underpricing a house to incite a bidding 
war is risky and, on average, does not outperform houses that were sold using a traditional listing 
strategy. I also find that a large fraction of the recent rise in bidding wars can be attributed to 
unintentional bidding wars – in which the house seller did not intentionally underprice their 
                                                            
33 Approximately 328 of 1,022 intentional bidding war records had an average time-on-market less than 55.2 days in 
the repeat sales subsample. 
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house in an attempt to start a bidding war. Thus, although bidding wars market share has 
increased over the past two decades – a large portion of the increase is not due to house sellers 
using a bidding war listing strategy. 
The results confirm previous research that that finds that underpricing a house is an 
ineffective listing strategy – although I find some evidence that discredits the claim that real 
estate agents advocate bidding wars purely out of self-interest (Bucchianeri and Minson 2013). I 
show that real estate agents are just as likely to use a bidding war listing strategy when selling 
their own house and after conditioning on the real estate agent using a bidding war listing 
strategy for a client - they are actually more likely to use the strategy themselves when selling 
their own house. While this study focused primarily on latent demand and its impact on bidding 
wars, additional research that examines the effectiveness of bidding wars warrants further 
exploration. For example, the examination of bidding wars in a less elastic, supply constrained 
market may find that bidding wars are even more effective than reported in this study.  
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Figure 1: Example of Latent Demand for Housing 
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Figure 2: TOM Kernel Density by Listing Strategy 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: TOM Kernel Density by Listing Strategy (TOM < = 90 days) 
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Appendix A: Expected Transaction Price  
When a homeowner lists their house for sale they can choose either a “traditional” or 
“bidding war” listing strategy. If the homeowner chooses a bidding war listing strategy, they 
intentionally underprice their house below their expected transaction price in an attempt to incite 
a bidding war. However, if the homeowner chooses a traditional listing strategy they set their list 
price above the expected transaction price. To identify which listing strategy the seller chose I 
estimate the expected transaction price for each listing when it was listed given the property’s 
physical and location characteristics. To do so, I first estimate a standard hedonic model for all 
transactions: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = α + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑋𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1  + ε𝑗𝑡         (A1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of transaction price for house i located in neighborhood j. 𝑋𝑗𝑙𝑡 represents a 
vector of L property and location characteristics, 𝛽𝑙 represents the corresponding coefficients, α 
is a constant, and ε𝑗𝑡 is the error term. Census tract and quarterly time fixed effects are also 
included.   
 The results of estimation process from equation (A1) are displayed in Table A1. The 
adjusted R-squared for the estimation is .86 and the signs and significance of the variables are all 
as expected. Using the coefficients, 𝛽?̂?, from Table A1 - I estimate the expected transaction price, 
E(TP), when the property was listed by updating the quarterly time fixed effect to reflect the date 
the property was listed instead of when it was sold.  
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Figure B1: Location of Bidding Wars 
 
